Hitoshi Matsushima

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• University of Tokyo → Faculty of Economics
  • website
  • location: Tokyo, Japan

Research profile

author of:

• "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Stable Implementation"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Honesty-Proof Implementation"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Multi-Group Incentives"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Implementation and Preference for Honesty"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View"
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• "Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Towards a Theory of Subjective Games"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Efficient Entrepreneurship"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Learning as the Dynamics of Emotions and Strength of Confidence"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Moral Decision and Information Aversion"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "New Progress in Repeated Games: Implicit Collusion with Private Monitaring" (in Japanese)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information.
  by Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi
• A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information].
  by Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
  by Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games : Two-principal case
  by Kambe, Shinsuke & Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part II: revelation through communication
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• "Large Auction Design in Dominance"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments
  by Matsushima Hitoshi
• Exact Implementation
  by Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi
• "Large Market Design in Dominance"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Efficiency in partnerships
  by Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching
  by Matsushina, Hitoshi
• "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi
• "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents"
  by Hitoshi Matsushiima
• A new approach to the implementation problem
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• "Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Role of honesty in full implementation
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• "Implementation and Social Influence"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Implementation and Mind Control"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Incentives in Hedge Funds"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi
• "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Efficiency in partnerships
  by Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Financing Harmful Bubbles"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Financing Harmful Bubbles
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Financing Harmful Bubbles
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi
• Large Market Design in Dominance
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi
• Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Large Auction Design in Dominance
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a regular article. )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Implementation and Mind Control
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes ( Revised in April 2008 )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Implementation and Social Influence
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Incentives in Hedge Funds
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Note on Combinatorial Auction Design: Efficient Slot Allocation for Domestic Airline Regular Services in Haneda Airport" (in Japanese)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents
  by Hitoshi Matsushiima
• ROLE OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN INTERGROUP COMPETITION
  by HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA
• "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki
• Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Toshihiko Shima
• "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• "Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Toshihiko Shima
• Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "4G Spectrum Auction in Japan: Japanese Package Auction (JPA)" (in Japanese)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH SMALL FINES: THE PENANCE CONTRACT
  by HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA
• Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges with Opt-Out Types (Revised version of CARF-F-258)(Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama
• "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama
• Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes
  by Matsushima, Hitoshi
• Rationality in Abreu‐Matsushima Mechanisms
  by "Matsushima, Hitoshi"
• "Experiments of Multi-Object Auction: Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanisms" (in Japanese)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Hiroshi Teruyama
• Process manipulation in unique implementation
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• SYMPOSIUM ON DECENTRALIZATION
  by TATSUYOSHI SAIJO & SHINSUKE NAKAMURA & HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA
• Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Implementation, Verification, and Detection"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory"
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory"
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Framing Game Theory
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Framing Game Theory"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction
  by Matsushima Hitoshi
• Framing Game Theory
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Framing Game Theory"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (Revised version of CARF-F-306)(Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Psychological Aspect of Monitoring Accuracy in Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type‐Independent Preference Orderings
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
  by Matsushima Hitoshi
• Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• ON DETAIL‐FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY*
  by HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA
• Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 )
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• "Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)
  by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments"
  by Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Private observation and Communication and Collusion
  by Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima
• Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
  by Matsushima Hitoshi
• Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
  by Matsushima Hitoshi
• Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Recurrent Preemption Games
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Recurrent Preemption Games
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Recurrent Preemption Games"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement"
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Recurrent Preemption Games
  by Hitoshi Matsushima
• Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments
  by Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa
• Unique Information Elicitation
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)
  by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda
• Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge
  by Hitoshi Matsushima