Hitoshi Matsushima
Names
first: |
Hitoshi |
last: |
Matsushima |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Tokyo
/ Faculty of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Symposium On Decentralization (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:47:y:1996:i:2:p:111-112)
by Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shinsuke Nakamura & Hitoshi Matsushima - Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:48:y:1997:i:3:p:293-306)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:56:y:2005:i:1:p:41-54)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:61:y:2010:i:4:p:443-454)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:63:y:2012:i:3:p:333-347)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:65:y:2014:i:1:p:116-121)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type‐Independent Preference Orderings (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:69:y:2018:i:4:p:363-373)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:16:n:19)
by Matsushima Hitoshi - Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:19:y:2019:i:1:p:11:n:16)
by Matsushima Hitoshi - Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:20:y:2020:i:1:p:11:n:1)
by Matsushima Hitoshi - Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:20:y:2020:i:1:p:17:n:10)
by Matsushima Hitoshi - Large Auction Design in Dominance (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf007)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf010)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf015)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Large Market Design in Dominance (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf036)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf050)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf059)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi - Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf062)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf067)
by Hitoshi Matsushiima - Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf096)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf109)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf110)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf112)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes ( Revised in April 2008 ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf121)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation and Social Influence (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf140)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf144)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation and Mind Control (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf174)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Incentives in Hedge Funds (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf205)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf208)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf209)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi - Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf213)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Financing Harmful Bubbles (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf227)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf244)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Toshihiko Shima - Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf258)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf261)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf279)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf285)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf288)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf292)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf293)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges with Opt-Out Types (Revised version of CARF-F-258)(Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf294)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf301)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf306)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf309)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama - Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf331)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf357)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf359)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf381)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf386)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf414)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf415)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf416)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Framing Game Theory (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf425)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Framing Game Theory (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf428)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Psychological Aspect of Monitoring Accuracy in Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf432)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf433)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (Revised version of CARF-F-306)(Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf439)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf443)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf447)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf452)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf453)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf459)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf462)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 ) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf464)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf466)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Recurrent Preemption Games (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf472)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf474)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Unique Information Elicitation (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf496)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496) (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf498)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf500)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Assignments with Ethical Concerns (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf514)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Auctions with Ethical Concerns (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf515)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf518)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Free-Rider Problem And Sovereignty Protection (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf531)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf548)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf549)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Private observation and Communication and Collusion (RePEc:cla:levarc:1256)
by Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima - Trading information goods on a network: An experiment (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1151)
by Nobuyuki Hanaki & Yutaka Kayaba & Jun Maekawa & Hitoshi Matsushima - Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:5:p:993-1008)
by Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi - A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information] (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:6:p:1439-42)
by Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi - Private Observation, Communication and Collusion (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:66:y:1998:i:3:p:627-652)
by Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima - Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:3:p:823-852)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral aspects of implementation theory (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:161-164)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:34:y:1990:i:2:p:109-112)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:34:y:1990:i:3:p:245-248)
by Matsushina, Hitoshi - Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games : Two-principal case (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:34:y:1990:i:4:p:329-332)
by Kambe, Shinsuke & Matsushima, Hitoshi - On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:253-256)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part II: revelation through communication (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:257-261)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:37:y:1991:i:4:p:371-375)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:193-208)
by Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa - Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:389-402)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:1-30)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Role of honesty in full implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:139:y:2008:i:1:p:353-359)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:141:y:2008:i:1:p:134-151)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2241-2259)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki - Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:858-870)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - A new approach to the implementation problem (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:45:y:1988:i:1:p:128-144)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:2:p:428-442)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:1:p:198-203)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Efficiency in partnerships (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:55:y:1991:i:2:p:296-322)
by Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi - Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:59:y:1993:i:1:p:107-121)
by Matsushima Hitoshi - Exact Implementation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:1:p:1-19)
by Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi - Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:98:y:2001:i:1:p:158-178)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Rationality in Abreu‐Matsushima Mechanisms (RePEc:hit:ecorev:v:47:y:1996:i:1:p:1-15)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-23)
by KAYABA, Yutaka & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa - Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1017)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1018)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Recurrent Preemption Games (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1020)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1027)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Financing Harmful Bubbles (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:711)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:742)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:69:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1111_jere.12176)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Process manipulation in unique implementation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:4:p:883-893)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:53:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01198-2)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01292-w)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Dilip Abreu on Hugo F. Sonnenschein (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-74057-5_11)
by Dilip Abreu & Hitoshi Matsushima - The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability (RePEc:tky:fseres:2000cf84)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships (RePEc:tky:fseres:2000cf98)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring (RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf123)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Stable Implementation (RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf128)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf147)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf148)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf149)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf154)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Honesty-Proof Implementation (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf178)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf179)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance (RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf185)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Multi-Group Incentives (RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf201)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players (RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf242)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation and Preference for Honesty (RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf244)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation (RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf254)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Large Auction Design in Dominance (RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf282)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality (RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf287)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems (RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf304)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Large Market Design in Dominance (RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf346)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance (RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf376)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information (RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf401)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi - Role of Honesty in Full Implementation (RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf405)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents (RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf419)
by Hitoshi Matsushiima - Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf492)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Honesty in Full Implementation (RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf518)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies (RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf519)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory (RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf523)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:tky:fseres:2008cf560)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation and Social Influence (RePEc:tky:fseres:2008cf598)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:tky:fseres:2009cf606)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation and Mind Control (RePEc:tky:fseres:2009cf673)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Incentives in Hedge Funds (RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf714)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract (RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf720)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information (RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf721)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi - Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition (RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf727)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Financing Harmful Bubbles (RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf756)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations (RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf776)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments (RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf790)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Toshihiko Shima - Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments (RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf795)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations (RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf806)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges (RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf826)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design (RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf853)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf857)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf859)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation (RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf870)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy (RePEc:tky:fseres:2013cf875)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity (RePEc:tky:fseres:2013cf876)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (RePEc:tky:fseres:2013cf879)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama - Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes (RePEc:tky:fseres:2013cf905)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (RePEc:tky:fseres:2015cf955)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction (RePEc:tky:fseres:2015cf960)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Implementation, Verification, and Detection (RePEc:tky:fseres:2015cf991)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory (RePEc:tky:fseres:2016cf1004)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves (RePEc:tky:fseres:2016cf1015)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (RePEc:tky:fseres:2017cf1056)
by Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (RePEc:tky:fseres:2017cf1057)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection (RePEc:tky:fseres:2017cf1058)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Framing Game Theory (RePEc:tky:fseres:2017cf1072)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Framing Game Theory (RePEc:tky:fseres:2018cf1076)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (RePEc:tky:fseres:2018cf1088)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1115)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1116)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance (RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1119)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries (RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1121)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1124)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1125)
by Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama - Recurrent Preemption Games (RePEc:tky:fseres:2020cf1143)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement (RePEc:tky:fseres:2020cf1145)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection (RePEc:tky:fseres:2022cf1185)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View (RePEc:tky:fseres:97f10)
by Matsushima, Hitoshi - Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games (RePEc:tky:fseres:97f21)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures (RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf07)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Towards a Theory of Subjective Games (RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf09)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Efficient Entrepreneurship (RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf13)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion (RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf24)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Learning as the Dynamics of Emotions and Strength of Confidence (RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf34)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination (RePEc:tky:fseres:99cf53)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Moral Decision and Information Aversion (RePEc:tky:fseres:99cf64)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - "New Progress in Repeated Games: Implicit Collusion with Private Monitaring" (in Japanese) (RePEc:tky:jseres:2001cj65)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - "Note on Combinatorial Auction Design: Efficient Slot Allocation for Domestic Airline Regular Services in Haneda Airport" (in Japanese) (RePEc:tky:jseres:2010cj229)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - "4G Spectrum Auction in Japan: Japanese Package Auction (JPA)" (in Japanese) (RePEc:tky:jseres:2012cj240)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - "Experiments of Multi-Object Auction: Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanisms" (in Japanese) (RePEc:tky:jseres:2013cj250)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Hiroshi Teruyama - Institutional Design for social common capitals (RePEc:tky:jseres:2022cj304)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Recurrent Preemption Games (RePEc:toh:dssraa:110)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement (RePEc:toh:dssraa:111)
by Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda - Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection (RePEc:toh:tupdaa:20)
by Hitoshi Matsushima - Efficiency in partnerships (RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/7044)
by Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima