Sergiu Hart
Names
first:  Sergiu 
last:  Hart 
Contact
email:  
homepage:  http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart 
Affiliations

Hebrew University of Jerusalem
→ Center for the Study of Rationality (weight: 50%)
 website
 location: Jerusalem, Israel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem
→ Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
 website
 location: Jerusalem, Israel
Research profile
author of:

An Axiomatization of the Consistent NonTransferable Utility Value
by Sergiu Hart 
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement
by Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy 
A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement
by Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy 
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions.
by Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai 
Market Crashes Without External Shocks
by Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman 
Bargaining and Value.
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field
by Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution.
by Hart, Sergiu 
A general class of adaptative strategies
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
A Comparison of NonTransferable Utility Values
by Sergiu Hart 
'Knowing Whether', 'Knowing That' and the Cardinality of State Spaces.
by Sergiu Hart & Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet 
Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field
by Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
A Neo[superscript]2 Bayesian Foundation of the Maxmin Value for TwoPerson ZeroSum Games.
by Hart, Sergiu & Modica, Salvatore & Schmeidler, David 
An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's NonTransferable Utility Solution
by Sergiu Hart 
Nontransferable Utility Games and Markets: Some Examples and the Harsanyi Solution.
by Hart, Sergiu 
Efficiency of Resource Allocation by Uninformed Demand.
by Groves, Theodore & Hart, Sergiu 
Long Cheap Talk
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart 
Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria.
by Hart, S. & MasColell, A. 
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Decay and Growth for a Nonlinear Parabolic Equation
by Sergiu Hart & Benjamin Weiss 
RegretBased ContinuousTime Dynamics
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction
by Sergiu Hart 
Long Cheap Talk
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart 
Potential, Value, and Consistency.
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
A NEO BAYESIAN FOUNDATION OF THE MAXMIN VALUE FOR TWO PERSON ZEROSUM GAMES.
by HART, S. & MODICA, S. & SCHMEIDLER, D. 
Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
The AbsentMinded Driver
by Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty 
Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
by Hart, Sergiu 
Regretbased continuoustime dynamics
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field
by Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
The Forgetful Passenger
by Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty 
Bargaining and value
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Market Crashes without External Shocks
by Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman 
"Knowing Whether," "Knowing That," and The Cardinality of State Spaces
by Hart, Sergiu & Heifetz, Aviad & Samet, Dov 
Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Adaptive Heuristics
by Sergiu Hart 
A comparison of nontransferable utility values
by Sergiu Hart 
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
A comparison of nontransferable utility values
by Sergiu Hart 
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
Conditioning and the SureThing Principle
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry 
An Interview with Robert Aumann
by Sergiu Hart 
Adaptive Heuristics
by Sergiu Hart 
Games in extensive and strategic forms
by Hart, Sergiu
edited by 
Values of perfectly competitive economies
by Hart, Sergiu
edited by 
Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory
by Sergiu Hart 
An axiomatization of the consistent nontransferable utility value
by Sergiu Hart 
The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures
by Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour 
Shapley Value
by Sergiu Hart 
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
edited by R. J. Aumann & S. Hart 
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
edited by R. J. Aumann & S. Hart 
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
edited by R. J. Aumann & S. Hart 
Paretooptimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy
by Kurz, Mordecai & Hart, Sergiu 
The number of commodities required to represent a market game
by Hart, Sergiu 
Formation of cartels in large markets
by Hart, Sergiu 
Values of nondifferentiable markets with a continuum of traders
by Hart, Sergiu 
Values of nonatomic vector measure games : Are they linear combinations of the measures?
by Hart, Sergiu & Neyman, Abraham 
On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
by Hart, Sergiu & Hildenbrand, Werner & Kohlberg, Elon 
Equally distributed correspondences
by Hart, Sergiu & Kohlberg, Elon 
Asymptotic value of games with a continuum of players
by Hart, Sergiu 
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games
by Sergiu Hart 
Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory
by Sergiu Hart 
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games, and the Vertices of Random Polygons
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott & Benjamin Weiss 
Five Questions on Game Theory
by Sergiu Hart 
An Operational Measure of Riskiness
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart 
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games
by Sergiu Hart 
Cooperative Games in Strategic Form
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Cooperative games in strategic form
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics
by Sergiu Hart 
Cooperative Games in Strategic Form
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Significance levels for multiple tests
by Hart, Sergiu & Weiss, Benjamin 
Michael's questions
by Hart, Sergiu 
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam
by Robert J. Aumann & EinYa Gura & Sergiu Hart & Bezalel Peleg & Hana Shemesh & Shmuel Zamir 
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society
by Hart, Sergiu 
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society
by Hart, Sergiu 
A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the AumannSerrano Index of Riskiness
by Sergiu Hart 
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection
by Sergiu Hart 
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
by Hart, Sergiu & Mansour, Yishay 
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Robert Aumann’s Game and Economic Theory
by Sergiu Hart 
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
by S. Hart & A. MasCollel 
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and dynamics
by Hart, Sergiu 
A WealthRequirement Axiomatization of Riskiness
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart 
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection
by Sergiu Hart 
An Operational Measure of Riskiness
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart 
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny 
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny 
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan 
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan 
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
A wealthrequirement axiomatization of riskiness
by Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu 
Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny 
Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny 
The MenuSize Complexity of Auctions
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan 
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan 
Markets, Correlation, and RegretMatching
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Markets, Correlation, and RegretMatching
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan 
How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods?
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan 
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations
by Hart, Sergiu & Reny, Philip J. 
Allocation Games with Caps: From Captain Lotto to AllPay Auctions
by Sergiu Hart 
Simple Adaptive Strategies:From RegretMatching to Uncoupled Dynamics
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMICS
by Sergiu Hart
edited by 
EXISTENCE OF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
by Sergiu Hart & David Schmeidler
edited by 
ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS
by Sergiu Hart
edited by 
HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? THE COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF UNCOUPLED EQUILIBRIUM PROCEDURES
by Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour
edited by 
On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
by HART, Sergiu & HILDENBRAND, Werner & KOHLBERG, Elon 
Nonzerosum twoperson repeated games with incomplete information
by HART, Sergiu 
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
by Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry 
Markets, correlation, and regretmatching
by Hart, Sergiu & MasColell, Andreu 
Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment
by Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty 
Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment
by Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty 
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, and Finite Recall
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart 
Law of Large Numbers for Random Sets and Allocation Processes
by Zvi Artstein & Sergiu Hart 
Potentials and Weighted Values of Nonatomic Games
by Sergiu Hart & Dov Monderer 
Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: I. A Continuum of Players
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
MeasureBased Values of Market Games
by Sergiu Hart 
Existence of Correlated Equilibria
by Sergiu Hart & David Schmeidler 
NonzeroSum TwoPerson Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
by Sergiu Hart 
Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
by Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry 
Equally distributed correspondences
by Hart, Sergiu & Kohlberg, Elon 
Repeat Voting: TwoVote May Lead More People To Vote
by Sergiu Hart 
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny 
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam 
The Better Half of Selling Separately
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny 
Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
by Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu 
The query complexity of correlated equilibria
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam 
A Neo2Bayesian Foundation of the Maximin Value for TwoPerson Zero Sum Games
by Hart, Sergiu & Modica, Salvatore & Schmeidler, David 
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
by Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty 
Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menusize complexity
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam 
Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott 
ForecastHedging and Calibration
by Sergiu Hart & Dean P. Foster 
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell 
Conditioning and the SureThing Principle
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry 
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games, and the Vertices of Random Polygons
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott & Benjamin Weiss 
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games
by Sergiu Hart 
An Operational Measure of Riskiness
by Dean Foster & Sergiu Hart 
The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures
by Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour 
Adaptive Heuristics
by Sergiu Hart
editor of:

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
edited by R. J. Aumann & S. Hart 
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
edited by R. J. Aumann & S. Hart