Sergiu Hart

Names

first:	Sergiu
last:	Hart

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pha148

Contact

homepage:

http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart

Affiliations

Hebrew University of Jerusalem / Center for the Study of Rationality (weight: 50%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem / Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:3:p:690-713)
by Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry
Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:5:p:1830-1836)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
A Neo2Bayesian Foundation of the Maximin Value for Two-Person Zero- Sum Games (RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275500)
by Hart, Sergiu & Modica, Salvatore & Schmeidler, David
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (RePEc:ags:uwarer:270003)
by Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty
Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons (RePEc:arx:papers:0801.3353)
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott & Benjamin Weiss
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (RePEc:arx:papers:1204.1846)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Selling Multiple Correlated Goods: Revenue Maximization and Menu-Size Complexity (old title: "The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions") (RePEc:arx:papers:1304.6116)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:arx:papers:1305.4874)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
The Better Half of Selling Separately (RePEc:arx:papers:1712.08973)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game (RePEc:arx:papers:2209.04892)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Calibrated Forecasts: The Minimax Proof (RePEc:arx:papers:2209.05863)
by Sergiu Hart
Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism (RePEc:arx:papers:2209.11601)
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott
Posterior Probabilities: Nonmonotonicity, Asymptotic Rates, Log-Concavity, and Tur\'an's Inequality (RePEc:arx:papers:2209.11728)
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.07152)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Forecast Hedging and Calibration (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.07169)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.17150)
by Ran Ben-Moshe & Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Repeat Voting: Two-Vote May Lead More People To Vote (RePEc:arx:papers:2211.16282)
by Sergiu Hart
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem (RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11370)
by Sara Fish & Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Sergiu Hart
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:bge:wpaper:174)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Equally distributed correspondences (RePEc:bie:wpaper:11)
by Hart, Sergiu & Kohlberg, Elon
Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:2:p:185-211)
by Sergiu Hart
Robert Aumann’s Game and Economic Theory (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001285)
by Sergiu Hart
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002205)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Cooperative Games in Strategic Form (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002406)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:572)
by S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000326)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000433)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000625)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
Markets, Correlation, and Regret-Matching (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000814)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000819)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000466)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Adaptive Heuristics (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000471)
by Sergiu Hart
The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001299)
by Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000532)
by Sergiu Hart
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games, and the Vertices of Random Polygons (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000781)
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott & Benjamin Weiss
Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000193)
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry
An Operational Measure of Riskiness (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000095)
by Dean Foster & Sergiu Hart
On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space (RePEc:cor:louvrp:183)
by HART, Sergiu & HILDENBRAND, Werner & KOHLBERG, Elon
Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information (RePEc:cor:louvrp:636)
by HART, Sergiu
Efficiency of Resource Allocation by Uninformed Demand (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:6:p:1453-82)
by Groves, Theodore & Hart, Sergiu
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:4:p:1047-64)
by Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai
An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:6:p:1295-1313)
by Hart, Sergiu
Nontransferable Utility Games and Markets: Some Examples and the Harsanyi Solution (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:6:p:1445-50)
by Hart, Sergiu
Potential, Value, and Consistency (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:3:p:589-614)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
Bargaining and Value (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:64:y:1996:i:2:p:357-80)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:4:p:909-912)
by Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:68:y:2000:i:5:p:1127-1150)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Long Cheap Talk (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:71:y:2003:i:6:p:1619-1660)
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart
Adaptive Heuristics (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:73:y:2005:i:5:p:1401-1430)
by Sergiu Hart
Posterior probabilities: Dominance and optimism (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:194:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520302263)
by Hart, Sergiu & Rinott, Yosef
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (RePEc:eee:gamchp)
from Elsevier as editor
Games in extensive and strategic forms (RePEc:eee:gamchp:1-02)
by Hart, Sergiu
Values of perfectly competitive economies (RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-57)
by Hart, Sergiu
The query complexity of correlated equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:401-410)
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam
Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:271-293)
by Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu
Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:74-99)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
The Absent-Minded Driver (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:102-116)
by Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty
The Forgetful Passenger (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:117-120)
by Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:27:y:1999:i:2:p:204-228)
by Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:227-264)
by Hart, Sergiu
Regret-based continuous-time dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:375-394)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:2:p:286-303)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
Michael's questions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:367-367)
by Hart, Sergiu
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:1:p:287-287)
by Hart, Sergiu
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:649-649)
by Hart, Sergiu
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:107-126)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mansour, Yishay
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:6-8)
by Hart, Sergiu
Markets, correlation, and regret-matching (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:93:y:2015:i:c:p:42-58)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (RePEc:eee:gamhes)
from Elsevier as editor
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (RePEc:eee:gamhes:1)
by None
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (RePEc:eee:gamhes:2)
by None
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (RePEc:eee:gamhes:3)
by None
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:172:y:2017:i:c:p:313-347)
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam
Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:991-1029)
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam
The number of commodities required to represent a market game (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:1:p:163-169)
by Hart, Sergiu
Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:28:y:1982:i:2:p:320-346)
by Kurz, Mordecai & Hart, Sergiu
Formation of cartels in large markets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:7:y:1974:i:4:p:453-466)
by Hart, Sergiu
"Knowing Whether," "Knowing That," and The Cardinality of State Spaces (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:70:y:1996:i:1:p:249-256)
by Hart, Sergiu & Heifetz, Aviad & Samet, Dov
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:98:y:2001:i:1:p:26-54)
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:1:y:1974:i:2:p:159-166)
by Hart, Sergiu & Hildenbrand, Werner & Kohlberg, Elon
Equally distributed correspondences (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:1:y:1974:i:2:p:167-174)
by Hart, Sergiu & Kohlberg, Elon
Values of non-atomic vector measure games : Are they linear combinations of the measures? (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:17:y:1988:i:1:p:31-40)
by Hart, Sergiu & Neyman, Abraham
Asymptotic value of games with a continuum of players (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:4:y:1977:i:1:p:57-80)
by Hart, Sergiu
Values of non-differentiable markets with a continuum of traders (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:4:y:1977:i:2:p:103-116)
by Hart, Sergiu
Significance levels for multiple tests (RePEc:eee:stapro:v:35:y:1997:i:1:p:43-48)
by Hart, Sergiu & Weiss, Benjamin
Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:fth:harver:9)
by Hart, S. & Mas-Colell, A.
A Neo Bayesian Foundation Of The Maxmin Value For Two- Person Zero-Sum Games (RePEc:fth:teavfo:38-90)
by Hart, S. & Modica, S. & Schmeidler, D.
Long Cheap Talk (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284)
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart
Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp299)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp309)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp337)
by Sergiu Hart
A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp338)
by Sergiu Hart
Decay and Growth for a Nonlinear Parabolic Equation (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp342)
by Sergiu Hart & Benjamin Weiss
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp371)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Adaptive Heuristics (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp372)
by Sergiu Hart
An Interview with Robert Aumann (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp386)
by Sergiu Hart
Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp393)
by Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry
Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp416)
by Sergiu Hart
The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp419)
by Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour
Shapley Value (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp421)
by Sergiu Hart
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp434)
by Sergiu Hart
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games, and the Vertices of Random Polygons (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp445)
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott & Benjamin Weiss
Five Questions on Game Theory (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp453)
by Sergiu Hart
An Operational Measure of Riskiness (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp454)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Cooperative Games in Strategic Form (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp484)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp490)
by Sergiu Hart
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp493)
by Robert J. Aumann & Ein-Ya Gura & Sergiu Hart & Bezalel Peleg & Hana Shemesh & Shmuel Zamir
A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the Aumann-Serrano Index of Riskiness (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp517)
by Sergiu Hart
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp531)
by Sergiu Hart
A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp577)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp594)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp606)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp630)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp637)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp647)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Markets, Correlation, and Regret-Matching (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp648)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods? (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp666)
by Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan
Allocation Games with Caps: From Captain Lotto to All-Pay Auctions (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp670)
by Sergiu Hart
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp684)
by Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, and Finite Recall (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp692)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Repeat Voting: Two-Vote May Lead More People To Vote (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp711)
by Sergiu Hart
The Better Half of Selling Separately (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp712)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp730)
by Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott
Forecast-Hedging and Calibration (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp731)
by Sergiu Hart & Dean P. Foster
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:10:y:1985:i:1:p:117-153 (article)
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:14:y:1989:i:1:p:18-25 (article)
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:20:y:1995:i:4:p:1003-1022 (article)
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:20:y:1995:i:4:p:959-1002 (article)
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:22:y:1997:i:3:p:619-630 (article)
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:5:y:1980:i:2:p:197-228 (article)
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:6:y:1981:i:4:p:485-492 (article)
A comparison of non-transferable utility values (RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:35-46)
by Sergiu Hart
A comparison of non-transferable utility values (RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:2_2:p:35-46)
by Sergiu Hart
An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Non-Transferable Utility Solution (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:573)
by Sergiu Hart
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0055-3)
by Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny
A Neo[superscript]2 Bayesian Foundation of the Maxmin Value for Two-Person Zero-Sum Games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:4:p:347-58)
by Hart, Sergiu & Modica, Salvatore & Schmeidler, David
An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:355-366)
by Sergiu Hart
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:441-460)
by Sergiu Hart
A wealth-requirement axiomatization of riskiness (RePEc:the:publsh:1150)
by , P. & ,
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations (RePEc:the:publsh:1517)
by , & , J.
"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game (RePEc:the:publsh:5330)
by Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:8:y:2010:i:1:p:7-33)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Market Crashes without External Shocks (RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:77:y:2004:i:1:p:1-8)
by Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman
An Operational Measure of Riskiness (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/644840)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/662222)
by Sergiu Hart
Forecast Hedging and Calibration (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/716559)
by Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart
Cooperative games in strategic form (RePEc:upf:upfgen:1094)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Bargaining and value (RePEc:upf:upfgen:114)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium (RePEc:upf:upfgen:200)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field (RePEc:upf:upfgen:241)
by Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
A general class of adaptative strategies (RePEc:upf:upfgen:373)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium (RePEc:upf:upfgen:783)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
'Knowing Whether', 'Knowing That' and the Cardinality of State Spaces (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9404002)
by Sergiu Hart & Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703006)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Market Crashes Without External Shocks (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703009)
by Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9705003)
by Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9709001)
by Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9904001)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9905002)
by Sergiu Hart
Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment (RePEc:wrk:warwec:1091)
by Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty
Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment (RePEc:wrk:wcreta:06)
by Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty
Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics (RePEc:wsi:wsbook:8408)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Existence Of Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0001)
by Sergiu Hart & David Schmeidler
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0002)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
A General Class Of Adaptive Strategies (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0003)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
A Reinforcement Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0004)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0005)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead To Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0007)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics And Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0008)
by Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell
How Long To Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity Of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0010)
by Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour
Adaptive Heuristics (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0011)
by Sergiu Hart
Nash Equilibrium And Dynamics (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814390705_0012)
by Sergiu Hart

The profile is maintained by Sergiu Hart

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pha148/