Philipp Renner
Names
| first: | Philipp |
| last: | Renner |
Identifer
| RePEc Short-ID: | pre476 |
Contact
| homepage: | https://sites.google.com/site/phrenner/ |
Affiliations
-
Lancaster University
/ Management School
/ Department of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Research profile
author of:
- Finding All Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Static and Dynamic Games with Continuous Strategies (RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1045)
by Kenneth L. JUDD & Philipp RENNER & Karl SCHMEDDERS - Dynamic Principal-Agent Models (RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1626)
by Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders - New and Revised Results for 'Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration' (RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1632)
by Vanessa Kummer & Maik Meusel & Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders - Finding all pure‐strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies (RePEc:ecm:quante:v:3:y:2012:i:2:p:289-331)
by Kenneth L. Judd & Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders - Computing generalized Nash equilibria by polynomial programming (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:77:y:2013:i:3:p:459-472)
by Eleftherios Couzoudis & Philipp Renner - A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal–Agent Problems (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i::p:729-769)
by Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders