Andrew Postlewaite
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Postlewaite |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of Pennsylvania
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Buying Locally (RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2015-624)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Social Arrangements and Economic Behavior (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:67-87)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:2:p:692-95)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:3:p:718-20)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:685-87)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:3:p:732-34)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:5:p:736-39)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:743-48)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Johannes Horner - Oligopoly and Competition in Large Markets (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:70:y:1980:i:1:p:22-31)
by Okuno, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:896-918)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Confidence-Enhanced Performance (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:1536-1557)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Fact-Free Learning (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1355-1368)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:2:p:603-04)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Immigration and Poverty in the United States (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:2:p:41-44)
by Steven Raphael & Eugene Smolensky - Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:2:p:683-84)
by Andrew Postlewaite - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:aejmic)
from American Economic Association as editor - Editor's Note (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:iii-iii)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:22:y:2008:i:3:p:173-88)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew W. Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage’s Axioms? (RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275722)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David - Economic Models as Analogies (RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275778)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew - Social Norms and Social Assets (RePEc:anr:reveco:v:3:y:2011:p:239-259)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Using Monotonicity Restrictions to Identify Models with Partially Latent Covariates (RePEc:arx:papers:2101.05847)
by Minji Bang & Wayne Yuan Gao & Andrew Postlewaite & Holger Sieg - An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities (RePEc:arx:papers:2305.01477)
by Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (RePEc:arx:papers:2311.12242)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria (RePEc:att:wimass:20025)
by Mailath,G.J. & Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L. - Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices (RePEc:att:wimass:200311)
by Mailath,G.J. & Postlewait,A. & Samuelson,L. - Consumption commitments and preferences for risk (RePEc:att:wimass:200415)
by Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L. & Silverman,D. - Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off (RePEc:aub:autbar:564.03)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Rhetoric and Analogies (RePEc:aub:autbar:932.13)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections (RePEc:bge:wpaper:236)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - Rhetoric and Analogies (RePEc:bge:wpaper:706)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Exclusivity Clauses And Best Price Policies In Input Markets (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:3:p:423-454)
by Patrick DeGraba & Andrew Postlewaite - Exclusivity Clauses and Best Price Policies in Input Markets (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:3:p:423-54)
by DeGraba, Patrick & Postlewaite, Andrew - Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:13:y:2004:i:4:p:617-633)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite - Rational Expectations and the Measurement of a Stock's Elasticity of Demand (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:39:y:1984:i:4:p:1119-25)
by Allen, Franklin & Postlewaite, Andrew - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:2)
by Cole Harold Linh & Mailath George J. & Postlewaite Andrew - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:7:y:2011:i:1:n:2)
by Anderlini Luca & Felli Leonardo & Postlewaite Andrew - Observational Implications of Non-Exponential Discounting (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_712_0313)
by Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_736_0897)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:cep:stitep:447)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:cep:stitep:511)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1852)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Probabilities in Economic Modelling (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001976)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002307)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000185)
by E. Aragones & I. Gilboa & A. Postlewaite & D. Schmeidler - The Social Context of Economic Decisions (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000315)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000011)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000162)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000353)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Matching with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000551)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Rationality of Belief (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000690)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001242)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000145)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000019)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000261)
by Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001202)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Probabilities in Economic Modeling (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000357)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments (RePEc:cla:penntw:08d6793d32cab8f6e1f46dac0dbb3611)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy (RePEc:cla:penntw:452f3f87415f37596752b399575585f0)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences (RePEc:cla:penntw:6bd000503382ae2f0b90d25e38a0acb0)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:cla:penntw:7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4e11ae69)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Investment and Concern for Relative Position (RePEc:cla:penntw:adb2940730338ff113d930aa2e42ccdf)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:penntw:b52ac626d6631b39913783700317fc3a)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (RePEc:cla:penntw:bdb2c3969ad56e98068513c7c1faebb0)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:cla:penntw:e9e0aca257b20d3bb6bb4a52a98edeb8)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Political reputations and campaign promises (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1258)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Disadvantageous monopolies and disadvantageous endowments (RePEc:cor:louvrp:310)
by DREZE, Jacques H. & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & POSTLEWAITE, Andrew - Monopolistic quantity rationing (RePEc:cor:louvrp:536)
by BÖHM, Volker & MASKIN, Eric & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heraklis & POSTLEWAITE, Andrew - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2835)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4197)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9623)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Krueger, Dirk & Hai, Rong - Ignorance and Uncertainty (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781108422024)
by Compte,Olivier & Postlewaite,Andrew - Ignorance and Uncertainty (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781108434492)
by Compte,Olivier & Postlewaite,Andrew - Is It Always Rational To Satisfy Savage'S Axioms? (RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:25:y:2009:i:03:p:285-296_99)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David - Rationality of Belief. Or: Why Bayesianism is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1484)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Fact-Free Learning (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1491)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Aggregation of Expert Opinions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503)
by Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1752)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1810)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1829)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Matching with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1870)
by Quingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1958)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Buying Locally (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1992)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1182)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry & Schmeidler, David - What are Axiomatizations Good for? (RePEc:ebg:heccah:1318)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry & Schmeidler, David - The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:44:y:1976:i:1:p:115-27)
by Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew - A Note on the Stability of Large Cartels (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:45:y:1977:i:8:p:1877-78)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John - Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:46:y:1978:i:1:p:127-35)
by Postlewaite, A & Schmeidler, David - Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:6:p:1273-92)
by Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:6:p:2421-2453)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2002-2003 (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:1:p:336-338)
by Eddie Dekel & Glenn Ellison & Joel Horowitz & Costas Meghir & Andrew Postlewaite - Consumption Commitments and Preferences for Risk (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:162)
by Larry Samuelson & Andrew Postlewaite - Using monotonicity restrictions to identify models with partially latent covariates (RePEc:eee:econom:v:235:y:2023:i:2:p:892-921)
by Bang, Minji & Gao, Wayne Yuan & Postlewaite, Andrew & Sieg, Holger - The social basis of interdependent preferences (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:779-800)
by Postlewaite, Andrew - Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:131-143)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:34-48)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:1:p:72-89)
by Matsui, Akihiko & Postlewaite, Andrew - Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:222-241)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Introduction to the special issue in memory of Robert W. Rosenthal (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:271-277)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Wilson, Robert - Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:410-433)
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew - David Schmeidler (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:1-2)
by Karni, Edi & Postlewaite, Andrew - Core convergence with asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:58-78)
by McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew - Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:1:p:126-140)
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry - Aggregation of expert opinions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:339-371)
by Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew - Social Norms and Random Matching Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109)
by Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew - Plausible cooperation (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:45-59)
by Compte, Olivier & Postlewaite, Andrew - The possibility of recipient-harming, donor-benefiting transfers with more than two countries (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:16:y:1984:i:3-4:p:357-364)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Webb, Michael - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:333-373)
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:191-212)
by McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew - Disadvantageous monopolies and disadvantageous endowments (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:16:y:1977:i:1:p:116-121)
by Dreze, Jacques H. & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Postlewaite, Andrew - Memorable consumption (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:414-455)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry - Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: Nonmonotonicity of the core (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:19:y:1978:i:1:p:200-209)
by Kalai, Ehud & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John - A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:20:y:1979:i:1:p:13-22)
by Kalai, Ehud & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John - Implementation in differential information economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:39:y:1986:i:1:p:14-33)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David - Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:238-263)
by Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Refining cheap-talk equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:55:y:1991:i:2:p:247-273)
by Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew - Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:60:y:1993:i:2:p:241-276)
by Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew - Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:61:y:1993:i:2:p:206-229)
by Allen F. & Morris S. & Postlewaite A. - Disadvantageous syndicates (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:9:y:1974:i:3:p:324-326)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W. - Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:4:y:1977:i:2:p:131-137)
by Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Relative income concerns and the rise in married women's employment (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:70:y:1998:i:1:p:157-183)
by Neumark, David & Postlewaite, Andrew - Class systems and the enforcement of social norms (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:70:y:1998:i:1:p:5-35)
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Rhetoric and analogies (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:68:y:2014:i:1:p:1-10)
by Aragones, Enriqueta & Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David - Laws and authority (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:1:p:32-42)
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew - The complexity of the consumer problem (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:75:y:2021:i:1:p:96-103)
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David - Strategic firms and endogenous consumer emulation (RePEc:ehl:lserod:29699)
by Kircher, Philipp & Postlewaite, Andrew - Active courts and menu contracts (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3569)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3576)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3593)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:4677)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Unknown item RePEc:ehl:lserod:58189 (paper)
- Active courts and menu contracts (RePEc:elg:eechap:14720_13)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models (RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1995:i:sum:p:12-21:n:v.19no.3)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Class systems and the enforcement of social norms (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:213)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient non-contractible investments (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:253)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Rational Expectations and Stock Market Bubbles (RePEc:fth:pennfi:07-91)
by Franklin Allen & Andrew Postlewaite - Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (Reprint 042) (RePEc:fth:pennfi:16-92)
by Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Rational Expectations and Stock Market Bubbles (RePEc:fth:pennfi:7-91)
by Franklin Allen & Andrew Postlewaite - Rational Expectations and Stock Market Bubbles (RePEc:fth:pennif:7-91)
by Allen, F. & Postlewaite, A. - Rhetoric and Analogies (RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-15)
by Aragones, E. & Gilboa, I. & Postlewaite, A. & Schmeidler, D. - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-26)
by Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-29)
by Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-07)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-08)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00463394)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Fact-Free Learning (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481243)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Enriqueta Aragones & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage's Axioms? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00493170)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Rationality of belief or: why savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00745599)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Rhetoric and analogies (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00977099)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Plausible cooperation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01204780)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Ignorance and Uncertainty (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02103172)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Plausible cooperation (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01204780)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Plausible cooperation (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01204780)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Ignorance and Uncertainty (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02103172)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - What Are Axiomatizations Good For? (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01933876)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01970753)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Approximate Walrasian Equilibria and Nearby Economies (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:22:y:1981:i:1:p:105-11)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David - Social Assets (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:47:y:2006:i:4:p:1057-1091)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:27:y:1981:i:1:p:75-80)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Andrew Postlewaite - Social isolation and inequality (RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:3:y:2005:i:3:p:243-262)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - What are axiomatizations good for? (RePEc:kap:theord:v:86:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-018-09685-1)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Information and Liquidity (RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i::p:355-377)
by Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright - The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10522)
by Nicola Persico & Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - Consumption, Commitmants and Preferences for Risk (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10527)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19386)
by Rong Hai & Dirk Krueger & Andrew Postlewaite - Using Monotonicity Restrictions to Identify Models with Partially Latent Covariates (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28436)
by Minji Bang & Wayne Gao & Andrew Postlewaite & Holger Sieg - Access and Exposure to Local News Media in the Digital Era: Evidence from U.S. Media Markets (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31436)
by Minji Bang & Lucie L'Heude & Andrew Postlewaite & Holger Sieg - Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in Married Women's Employment (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5044)
by David Neumark & Andrew Postlewaite - Unknown item RePEc:nos:voprec:2009-10-3 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:nos:voprec:2015-04-6 (article)
- Economic models as analogies (RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2015:id:71)
by I. Gilboa & A. Postlewaite & L. Samuelson & D. Schmeidler - Disadvantageous Syndicates in Exchange Economies (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:105)
by Andrew Postlewaite - A Technical Note on Cartel Stability in Large Economies (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:248)
by Andrew Postlewaite & John Roberts - Disadvantageous Syndicates (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:40)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Robert W. Rosenthal - The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior In Large Economies (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:44)
by Donald John Roberts & Andrew Postlewaite - Sustainable Outlay Schedules (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:626)
by J.C. Panzar & AW. Postlewaite - The Economics of Quality Testing and Disclosure (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:634)
by Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite - Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:744r)
by Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite - Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:892r)
by Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite - On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:992)
by Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:15:y:2017:i:5:p:1158-1175.)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:23:y:2007:i:3:p:662-684)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:123:y:2008:i:2:p:621-661.)
by Philipp Kircher & Andrew Postlewaite - Manipulation via Endowments (RePEc:oup:restud:v:46:y:1979:i:2:p:255-262.)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Feasible and Continuous Implementation (RePEc:oup:restud:v:56:y:1989:i:4:p:603-611.)
by Andrew Postlewaite & David Wettstein - Strategic Information Revelation (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:1:p:25-47.)
by Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura - Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:351-367.)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:369-380.)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:3:p:809-827)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts (RePEc:oup:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:2:p:559-578)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - Information, Liquidity, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy (RePEc:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:3:p:1209-1238)
by Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty (RePEc:pen:papers:03-003)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Confidence-Enhanced Performance (RePEc:pen:papers:03-009)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (RePEc:pen:papers:03-011)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (RePEc:pen:papers:03-014)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives (RePEc:pen:papers:03-018)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite - Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria (RePEc:pen:papers:03-021)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Fact-Free Learning (RePEc:pen:papers:03-023)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:pen:papers:03-026)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:pen:papers:03-027)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height (RePEc:pen:papers:03-036)
by Nicola Persico & Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) (RePEc:pen:papers:04-007)
by George J.Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Rationality of Belief Or Why Bayesianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality (RePEc:pen:papers:04-011)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, Third Version (RePEc:pen:papers:04-013)
by Nicola Persico & Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - Social Isolation and Inequality (RePEc:pen:papers:04-017)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - Consumption Commitments and Preferences for Risk (RePEc:pen:papers:04-021)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - Confidence-Enhanced Performance (RePEc:pen:papers:04-023)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Social Assets (RePEc:pen:papers:04-025)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies (RePEc:pen:papers:04-040)
by Richard McLean & James Peck & Andrew Postlewaite - Social Isolation and Inequality (RePEc:pen:papers:05-001)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - Fact-Free Learning (RePEc:pen:papers:05-002)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Aggregation of Expert Opinions (RePEc:pen:papers:05-016)
by Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections (RePEc:pen:papers:05-021)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (RePEc:pen:papers:05-024)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections (RePEc:pen:papers:05-027)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:pen:papers:06-001)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts (RePEc:pen:papers:06-002)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - Social Assets (RePEc:pen:papers:06-003)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (RePEc:pen:papers:06-007)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:pen:papers:06-024)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:pen:papers:06-025)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts (RePEc:pen:papers:06-028)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:07-001)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Fourth Version (RePEc:pen:papers:07-020)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman - Probabilities in Economic Modeling (RePEc:pen:papers:07-023)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:08-002)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation (RePEc:pen:papers:08-003)
by Philipp Kircher & Andrew Postlewaite - Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing (RePEc:pen:papers:08-026)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Olivier Compte - Information, Liquidity and Asset Prices (RePEc:pen:papers:08-039)
by Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright - Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:08-043)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:pen:papers:09-004)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Effecting Cooperation (RePEc:pen:papers:09-019)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:10-003)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Social Norms and Preferences (RePEc:pen:papers:10-019)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Social Norms and Preferences, Chapter for the Handbook for Social Economics, Edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin and M. Jackson (RePEc:pen:papers:10-031)
by Andrew Postlewaite - "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:10-037)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Plausible Cooperation, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:10-039)
by Andrew Postlewaite & Olivier Compte - Information, Liquidity, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:10-040)
by Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright - Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:11-029)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility (RePEc:pen:papers:11-036)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Economic Models as Analogies (RePEc:pen:papers:12-001)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:12-008)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Belief Formation, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:12-027)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Economic Models as Analogies, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:12-030)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:12-031)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Matching with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pen:papers:12-032)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:12-042)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Third Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-001)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-005)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Economic Models as Analogies, Third Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-007)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Plausible Cooperation,Third Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-008)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Simple Auctions, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-017)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Belief free equilibria (RePEc:pen:papers:13-020)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Folk Theorems, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-022)
by Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-028)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Rhetoric and Analogies (RePEc:pen:papers:13-039)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuationsin the Presence of Memorable Goods (RePEc:pen:papers:13-046)
by Rong Hai & Dirk Krueger & Andrew Postlewaite - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:13-060)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Fourth Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-068)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:14-012)
by Rong Hai & Andrew Postlewaite & Dirk Krueger - A Model of Modeling (RePEc:pen:papers:14-026)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:15-004)
by Rong Hai & Dirk Krueger & Andrew Postlewaite - Memory Utility (RePEc:pen:papers:15-005)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Plausible Cooperation, Fourth Version (RePEc:pen:papers:15-006)
by Oliver Compte & Andrew Postlewaite - Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Fifth Version (RePEc:pen:papers:15-009)
by David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen - Informational size and two-stage mechanisms (RePEc:pen:papers:15-011)
by Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Buying Locally (RePEc:pen:papers:15-012)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Consumer Choice as Constrained Imitation (RePEc:pen:papers:15-013)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:15-023)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:15-034)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Memorable Consumption (RePEc:pen:papers:16-003)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:16-004)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Laws and Authority (RePEc:pen:papers:16-018)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - A Very Robust Auction Mechanism (RePEc:pen:papers:18-001)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - What Are Axiomatizations Good For? (RePEc:pen:papers:18-026)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future (RePEc:pen:papers:18-027)
by Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods (RePEc:pen:papers:20-025)
by Rong Hai & Dirk Krueger & Andrew Postlewaite - Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology (RePEc:pen:papers:22-008)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Economic Theories and Their Dueling Interpretations (RePEc:pen:papers:22-013)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (RePEc:pen:papers:23-018)
by Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite - Future Orientedness (RePEc:pen:papers:23-019)
by John Knowles & Andrew Postlewaite - Laws and Authority (RePEc:pri:metric:082_2016)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:red:sed005:301)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:red:sed007:531)
by Larry Samuelson & Andrew Postlewaite & George Mailath - Social Arrangements and Economic Behavior (RePEc:red:sedpln:1999-2)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Quality Testing and Disclosure (RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:autumn:p:328-340)
by Steven Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite - Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:453-467)
by Hyun Song Shin & Andrew Postlewaite & Stephen Morris - Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:453-67)
by Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew & Shin, Hyun Song - original papers : Investment and concern for relative position (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:2:p:241-261)
by George J. Mailath & Harold L. Cole & Andrew Postlewaite - On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies (RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-27192-5_6)
by Richard McLean & James Peck & Andrew Postlewaite - Pricing and investments in matching markets (RePEc:the:publsh:1189)
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry - Implementation with interdependent valuations (RePEc:the:publsh:1440)
by , & , - The Social Context of Economic Decisions (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:2-3:p:354-362)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Political Reputations and Campaign Promises (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:4:p:846-884)
by Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite - Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:6:p:1092-1125)
by Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew - Aristocratic Equilibria: Response (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:2:p:439-43)
by Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew - The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:112:y:2004:i:5:p:1019-1053)
by Nicola Persico & Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman - Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:95:y:1987:i:3:p:485-91)
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier - Ambiguity in election games (RePEc:upf:upfgen:364)
by Enriqueta Aragonés & Andrew Postlewaite - Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation (RePEc:upf:upfgen:525)
by Enriqueta Aragonés & Andrew Postlewaite - Rationality and uncertainty (RePEc:vep:journl:y:2012:v:120:i:3:p:289-294)
by Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - Economic Models as Analogies (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:124:y:2014:i:578:p:f513-f533)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:604:p:2041-2065)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Stable Matching With Incomplete Information (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:82:y:2014:i:2:p:541-587)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Buying Locally (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:57:y:2016:i:4:p:1179-1200)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Economics: Between Prediction And Criticism (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:2:p:367-390)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - Information and Liquidity (RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:s2:p:355-377)
by Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright - Superfairness: Applications and theory, by William J. Baumol. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986, 266 pp. Price: $20.00 cloth (RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:7:y:1987:i:2:p:387-388)
by Andrew Postlewaite - On the welfare cost of consumption fluctuations in the presence of memorable goods (RePEc:wly:quante:v:11:y:2020:i:4:p:1177-1214)
by Rong Hai & Dirk Krueger & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:wop:pennca:00-05)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Investment and Concern for Relative Position (RePEc:wop:pennca:00-06)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - "Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-14)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - "Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:96-04)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - "The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-14)
by Andrew Postlewaite - Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-3)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-13)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:wop:pennca:99-14)
by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy (RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-finite)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Investment and Concern for Relative Position (RePEc:wop:pennca:invest)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Fact-Free Learning (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814366182_0008)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - On the welfare cost of consumption fluctuations in the presence of memorable goods (RePEc:zbw:cfswop:201324)
by Hai, Rong & Krueger, Dirk & Postlewaite, Andrew