Andreas Marcel Oestreich
Names
| first: | Andreas |
| middle: | Marcel |
| last: | Oestreich |
Identifer
| RePEc Short-ID: | poe15 |
Contact
| homepage: | http://www.brocku.ca/social-sciences/departments-and-centres/economics/faculty/amo |
Affiliations
-
Brock University
/ Department of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Research profile
author of:
- Competitive vs. Random Audit Mechanisms in Environmental Regulation: Emissions, Self-Reporting, and the Role of Peer Information (RePEc:awi:wpaper:0699)
by Goeschl, Timo & Oestreich, Marcel & Soldà, Alice - The Optimal NGO Chief: Strategic Delegation in Social Advocacy (RePEc:brk:wpaper:1701)
by Anthony Heyes & Marcel Oestreich - Carbon emissions and stock returns: Evidence from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:58:y:2015:i:c:p:294-308)
by Oestreich, A. Marcel & Tsiakas, Ilias - On optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:84:y:2017:i:c:p:62-83)
by Oestreich, Andreas Marcel - Firms’ Emissions and Self-Reporting Under Competitive Audit Mechanisms (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:949-978)
by Andreas Oestreich - A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:54:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11149-018-9370-1)
by Anthony Heyes & Andreas Marcel Oestreich - Carbon Emissions and Stock Returns: Evidence from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (RePEc:rim:rimwps:15-18)
by A. Marcel Oestreich & Ilias Tsiakas - Compliance And Truthfulness: Leveraging Peer Information With Competitive Audit Mechanisms (RePEc:rug:rugwps:23/1069)
by Timo Goeschl & Marcel Oestreich & Alice Soldà - Compliance and Truthfulness: Leveraging Peer Information with Competitive Audit Mechanisms (RePEc:ucp:jaerec:doi:10.1086/723110)
by Timo Goeschl & Marcel Oestreich & Alice Soldà