Fabio Michelucci
Names
first: |
Fabio |
last: |
Michelucci |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
/ Dipartimento di Economia
Research profile
author of:
- Manipulating Information Revelation with Reserve Prices (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2019:i:133:p:87-92)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Hiding Information in Open Auctions (RePEc:cer:papers:wp469)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Does Anticipated Regret Really Matter? Revisiting the Role of Feedback in Auction Bidding (RePEc:cer:papers:wp487)
by Peter Katuscak & Fabio Michelucci & Miroslav Zajicek - Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions (RePEc:cer:papers:wp489)
by Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci - On the Optimality of Not Allocating (RePEc:cer:papers:wp514)
by Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci - Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids (RePEc:cer:papers:wp537)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Electoral Contests with Dynamic Campaign Contributions (RePEc:cer:papers:wp599)
by Andrea Mattozzi & Fabio Michelucci - On the optimality of not allocating (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:233-235)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - On the efficiency of the first price auction (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:159-161)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - Second best efficiency and the English auction (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:496-506)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions? (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:119:y:2015:i:c:p:139-152)
by Katuščák, Peter & Michelucci, Fabio & Zajíček, Miroslav - Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01432853)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Creating a winner's curse via jump bids (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01432861)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Hiding Information in Open Auctions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01458368)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Second Best Efficiency in Auctions (RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2008-17)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana & Fabio Michelucci - Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:20:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-016-0187-z)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci - Inefficient rushes in auctions (RePEc:the:publsh:2513)
by Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio - Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:126:y:2016:i:594:p:1484-1502)
by David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci