Bettina Klaus

Names

first:	Bettina
last:	Klaus

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pkl18

Contact

homepage:	https://www.bklaus.net/
phone:	+41 (0)21 692 34 75
postal address:	Faculty of Business and Economics University of Lausanne Internef 538 CH-1015 Lausanne Switzerland

Affiliations

Université de Lausanne / Faculté des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC) / Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique (DEEP)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Amartya Sen and World Food Day 2000 (RePEc:ags:nbaece:306187)
by Klaus, Bettina
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems (RePEc:arx:papers:2311.03950)
by Oihane Gallo & Bettina Klaus
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:aub:autbar:552.02)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:aub:autbar:554.02)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (RePEc:aub:autbar:566.03)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching (RePEc:aub:autbar:582.03)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods (RePEc:aub:autbar:598.04)
by Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked (RePEc:aub:autbar:601.04)
by Bettina Klaus
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:604.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:616.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Employment by Lotto Revisited (RePEc:aub:autbar:627.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] (RePEc:aub:autbar:628.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Median Stable Matching for College Admission (RePEc:aub:autbar:632.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:653.05)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:aub:autbar:694.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Smith and Rawls Share a Room (RePEc:aub:autbar:706.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:708.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement (RePEc:aub:autbar:866.11)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:bge:wpaper:103)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:117)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1264)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Characterizing the Coordinatewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1341)
by Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1399)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Seçkin Özbilen
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:145)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:156)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Median Stable Matching for College Admission (RePEc:bge:wpaper:165)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:261)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura
Employment by Lotto Revisited (RePEc:bge:wpaper:263)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:bge:wpaper:296)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Smith and Rawls Share a Room (RePEc:bge:wpaper:315)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:33)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:357)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching (RePEc:bge:wpaper:36)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Farsighted House Allocation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:384)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:385)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement (RePEc:bge:wpaper:538)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:bge:wpaper:78)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists (RePEc:bge:wpaper:892)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (RePEc:bge:wpaper:894)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (RePEc:bie:wpaper:372)
by Haake, Claus-Jochen & Klaus, Bettina
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (RePEc:bie:wpaper:399)
by Haake, Claus-Jochen & Klaus, Bettina
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:61-76)
by Di Feng & Bettina Klaus
Introduction to the Coalition Theory Network Special Issue (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:6:p:883-884)
by Francis Bloch & Jean‐Jacques Herings & Bettina Klaus & Myrna Wooders
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:6:p:921-933)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:167-184)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:14)
by Klaus Bettina
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods (RePEc:cor:louvco:2007061)
by BOCHET, Olivier & KLAUS, Bettina & WALZL, Markus
"Fair marriages": An impossibility (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:74-75)
by Klaus, Bettina
Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:98-101)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:3:p:339-346)
by Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:1:p:106-110)
by Klaus, Bettina & Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:222-229)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
Consistency and its converse for roommate markets (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:43-58)
by Klaus, Bettina
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:198-237)
by Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:64-82)
by Klaus, Bettina
Efficient priority rules (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:372-384)
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:154-171)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:172-186)
by Klaus, Bettina
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:128-146)
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
Stable matchings and preferences of couples (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:121:y:2005:i:1:p:75-106)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:2227-2233)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Nakamura, Toshifumi
Stochastic stability for roommate markets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2218-2240)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus
Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0022053119300997)
by Karakaya, Mehmet & Klaus, Bettina & Schlegel, Jan Christoph
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:3:p:329-339)
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:9-10:p:919-924)
by Klaus, Bettina
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:7-8:p:422-434)
by Klaus, Bettina & Walzl, Markus
Farsighted house allocation (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:817-824)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus
A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:84-98)
by Klaus, Bettina & Bochet, Olivier & Walzl, Markus
Local and global consistency properties for student placement (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:3:p:222-229)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
Stochastic stability in assignment problems (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:62-74)
by Klaus, Bettina & Newton, Jonathan
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:79:y:2018:i:c:p:140-156)
by Doğan, Battal & Klaus, Bettina
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:3:p:228-233)
by Ashlagi, Itai & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Klaus, Bettina
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-017)
by Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-046)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Markus Walzl
"Fair Marriages:" An Impossibility (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-053)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-069)
by Itai Ashlagi & Emin Karagozoglu & Bettina Klaus
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-072)
by Bettina Klaus
Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-110)
by Bettina Klaus & Lars Ehlers
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-111)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Farsighted House Allocation (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-129)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-135)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl
Consistency and Monotonicity in One-Sided Assignment Problems (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-146)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:39:y:2014:i:4:p:949-966 (article)
Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces (RePEc:kap:theord:v:51:y:2001:i:1:p:13-29)
by Bettina Klaus
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:537-554)
by Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness (RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.01)
by Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet
A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.02)
by Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet & Markus Walzl
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.03)
by Bettina Klaus
Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.08)
by Burak Can & Bettina Klaus
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (RePEc:lau:crdeep:12.06)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) (RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.10)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.12)
by Bettina Klaus
Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem (RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.14)
by Bettina Klaus & Frédéric Payot
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems (RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.02)
by Bettina Klaus & Jonathan Newton
Matching under Preferences (RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.07)
by Bettina Klaus & David F. Manlove & Francesca Rossi
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics (RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.08)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)Possibilities (RePEc:lau:crdeep:15.01)
by Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus
Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.04)
by Katarina Cechlarova & Bettina Klaus & David F.Manlove
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.08)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Solidarity Properties of Choice Correspondences (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.14)
by Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas
Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.15)
by Battal Dogan & Bettina Klaus
Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.01)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.03)
by Bettina Klaus
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.09bis)
by Haris Aziz & Bettina Klaus
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.12)
by Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus & Jan Christoph Schlegel
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.13)
by Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field (RePEc:lau:crdeep:18.06)
by Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices (RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants (RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.06)
by Bettina Klaus & Jan-Christoph Schlegel & Mehmet Karakaya
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices:Heterogeneous Objects (RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field (RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.09)
by Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences (RePEc:lau:crdeep:20.02)
by Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals (RePEc:lau:crdeep:20.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas
The core for housing markets with limited externalities (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.03a)
by Bettina Klaus & Claudia Meo
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.04)
by Bettina Klaus
Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.05)
by Bettina Klaus & Lars Ehlers
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.09)
by Author-Name: Christian Basteck & Author-Name: Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.10)
by Di Feng & Bettina Klaus
Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.11)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems (RePEc:lau:crdeep:22.03)
by Oihane Gallo & Bettina Klaus
A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:22.06)
by Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-27)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-13)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-14)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Consistent House Allocation (RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-08)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2009-16)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-12)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-05)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (RePEc:mtl:montde:2014-10)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2013)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Consistent House Allocation (RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2005)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:mtl:montec:11-2003)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2003)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance : Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics (RePEc:mtl:montec:14-2014)
by Lars EHLERS & Bettina KLAUS
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference : Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montec:15-2012)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montec:17-2009)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina
Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-27)
by Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B.
How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field (RePEc:rco:dpaper:114)
by Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:2:p:305-333)
by Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
Procedurally fair and stable matching (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:431-447)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Consistent House Allocation (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:30:y:2007:i:3:p:561-574)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:411-416)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:3:p:393-410)
by Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:70:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01223-6)
by Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
The core for housing markets with limited externalities (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:76:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-022-01478-6)
by Bettina Klaus & Claudia Meo
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:3:p:421-435)
by Bettina Klaus & Eiichi Miyagawa
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:545-560)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:1-11)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Fair and efficient student placement with couples (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:177-207)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:281-287)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0533-y)
by Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00728-y)
by Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:175-184)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó
original papers : Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:1:p:85-98)
by Bettina Klaus
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:249-268)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:297-311)
by Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
Choice correspondences for public goods (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:127-154)
by Bettina Klaus & Ton Storcken
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:265-280)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:255-261)
by Bettina Klaus
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:1-18)
by Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus
Consistency in one-sided assignment problems (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:3:p:415-433)
by Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:4:p:647-667)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:1:p:41-63)
by Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet
Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:4:p:835-862)
by Burak Can & Bettina Klaus
Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:53:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01181-x)
by Haris Aziz & Bettina Klaus
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01245-3)
by Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01303-w)
by Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems (RePEc:syd:wpaper:2014-05)
by Klaus, Bettina & Newton, Jonathan
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments (RePEc:unm:umamet:1995001)
by Klaus, B.E. & Storcken, A.J.A. & Peters, H.J.M.
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good (RePEc:unm:umamet:1995012)
by Klaus, B.E. & Storcken, A.J.A. & Peters, H.J.M.
The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005007)
by Dellaert, B.G.C. & Golounov, V.Y. & Prabhu, J.
Consistent house allocation (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005008)
by Ehlers, L.H. & Klaus, B.E.
The role of regulatory capital in international bank mergers and acquisitions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005018)
by Valkanov, E. & Kleimeier, S.
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005019)
by Klaus, B.E.
Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005027)
by de Regt, E.R.
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005028)
by Dimitrov, D. & Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.E.
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005029)
by Klaus, B.E. & Haake, C.J.
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005060)
by Klaus, B.E. & Dimitrov, D. & Haake, C.J.
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006042)
by Klaus, B.E. & Walzl, M.
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006059)
by Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.E.
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007012)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Walzl, M.
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007018)
by Bochet, O.L.A. & Klaus, B.E. & Walzl, M.
Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007025)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Nakamura, T.
Smith and Rawls share a room (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007026)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F.
The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007029)
by Klaus, B.E.
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007046)
by Klaus, B.E.
Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007058)
by Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.E.
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008009)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F.
Stochastic stability for roommate markets (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008010)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Walzl, M.
Employment By Lotto Revisited (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219198909002248)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn
How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field (RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2018205)
by Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea

The profile is maintained by Bettina Klaus

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pkl18/