Eric Kamwa
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Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA)
Research profile
author of:
- Unknown
- Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited (repec:cai:repdal:redp_273_0375)
by Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes - On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle (repec:cai:repdal:redp_305_0021)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Une expérimentation de deux modes de scrutin en Martinique lors du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2017 (repec:cai:repdal:redp_305_0081)
by Eric Kamwa & Gilles Joseph & Aurélie Roger - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (repec:crb:wpaper:2020-05)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules (repec:crb:wpaper:2024-02)
by Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gabon Gassi & Eric Kamwa - q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules (repec:crb:wpaper:2024-17)
by Clinton Gubong Gassi & Eric Kamwa - The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates (repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00853)
by Eric Kamwa - The Kemeny rule and committees elections (repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00868)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Likelihood of the Coincidence of Condorcet Committees (repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00692)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes (repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00656)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - A Joint Use Of The Mean and Median for Multi Criteria Decision Support: The 3MCD Method (repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00394)
by Ruffin-benoit Mpoy Ngoie & Eric Kamwa & Berthold Ulungu - On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules (repec:eee:ejores:v:328:y:2026:i:1:p:258-268)
by Diss, Mostapha & Gassi, Clinton Gubong & Kamwa, Eric - Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes (repec:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:130-138)
by Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent - On stable rules for selecting committees (repec:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:36-44)
by Kamwa, Eric - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (repec:gat:wpaper:1812)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes (repec:hal:journl:hal-01631174)
by Eric Kamwa - Coincidence of Condorcet committees (repec:hal:journl:hal-01631176)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - On stable rules for selecting committees (repec:hal:journl:hal-01631177)
by Eric Kamwa - Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited (repec:hal:journl:hal-01631180)
by Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes - On the Likelihood of the Coincidence of Condorcet Committees (repec:hal:journl:hal-01631184)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe
[Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe] (repec:hal:journl:hal-01631190)
by Ibrahima Dia & Eric Kamwa - Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes (repec:hal:journl:hal-01702492)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule (repec:hal:journl:hal-01757742)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Tax Competition and the Determination of the Quality of Public Goods (repec:hal:journl:hal-01757768)
by A.H. Ould H Ould Abdessalam & Eric Kamwa - Joint use of the mean and median for multi criteria decision support: the 3MCD method (repec:hal:journl:hal-01760775)
by Ruffin-Benoît O Ngoie & Eric Kamwa & Berthold Ulungu - The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser (repec:hal:journl:hal-01786121)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules (repec:hal:journl:hal-01786590)
by Eric Kamwa - A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes (repec:hal:journl:hal-01896273)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - An Experiment of two Voting Methods in Martinique during the rst round of the 2017 Presidential Election
[Une expérimentation de deux modes de scrutin en Martinique lors du premier tour de l’électi (repec:hal:journl:hal-01965660)
by Eric Kamwa & Gilles Joseph & Aurélie Roger - On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle (repec:hal:journl:hal-02147735)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (repec:hal:journl:hal-02185965)
by Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou - Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention (repec:hal:journl:hal-02196387)
by Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa - Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation (repec:hal:journl:hal-02424936)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa - Choice of studies and reports on the mobility of high school students and Martiniquan students
[Choix d’études et rapports à la mobilité des lycéens et étudiants martiniquais] (repec:hal:journl:hal-02512834)
by Gilles Joseph & Eric Kamwa & Sébastien Mathouraparsad - Paolo Serafini: Mathematics to the Rescue of Democracy. What does Voting Mean and How can it be Improved? XIII, 135 pp., Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 (repec:hal:journl:hal-03322709)
by Eric Kamwa - On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting (repec:hal:journl:hal-03614585)
by Eric Kamwa - Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures (repec:hal:journl:hal-03614587)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox (repec:hal:journl:hal-03632662)
by Eric Kamwa - Unknown
- Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries (repec:hal:journl:hal-04177030)
by Mohamed Mansour & Eric Kamwa - The effect of close elections on the likelihood of voting paradoxes: Further results in three-candidate elections (repec:hal:journl:hal-04230359)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules (repec:hal:journl:hal-04390700)
by Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Eric Kamwa - Une petite histoire des collaborations entre l’Afrique et la France en théorie des jeux et en théorie du choix social (repec:hal:journl:hal-05054566)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes - Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Boniface Mbih (repec:hal:journl:hal-05054568)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes - Tourist travel decision-making in the French West Indies (repec:hal:journl:hal-05068164)
by Eric Kamwa - Understanding voluntary citizen engagement amid weak policy responses: The case of the sargassum seaweed crisis in the French West Indies (repec:hal:journl:hal-05242677)
by Eric Kamwa - The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00865738)
by Eric Kamwa - The Kemeny rule and committees elections (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00865742)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Fishburn social choice function (repec:hal:journl:halshs-01183232)
by Eric Kamwa - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-01757761)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - How to obtain an overall reduction of individual income deprivations by means of a finite sequence of T 2 -transformations? A solution and a well-suited algorithm (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-02162854)
by Paul-Emile Maingé & Eric Kamwa & Gilles Joseph - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-02554924)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - To what extent does the model of processing sincereincomplete rankings affect the likelihood of the truncation paradox? (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-02879390)
by Eric Kamwa - Judges and the price of human life in the French Court System (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03129639)
by Mohamed Mansour & Eric Kamwa - Scoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03143741)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin & Faty Mbaye Top - Unknown
- Unknown
- The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03880064)
by Eric Kamwa - Unknown
- Unknown
- On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04390700)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Clinton Gubong Gassi - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04543260)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04730580)
by Clinton Gubong Gassi & Eric Kamwa - Exploring Equilibrium under Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04747341)
by Eric Kamwa - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-01817943)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings Under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives Using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule (repec:kap:compec:v:53:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10614-018-9816-7)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Paolo Serafini: mathematics to the rescue of democracy. What does voting mean and how can it be improved? (repec:kap:jeczfn:v:134:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-021-00757-5)
by Eric Kamwa - Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox (repec:kap:pubcho:v:192:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-022-00972-8)
by Eric Kamwa - On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting (repec:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01070-z)
by Eric Kamwa - Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser (repec:kap:theord:v:87:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09716-5)
by Eric Kamwa - Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe
[The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe] (repec:pra:mprapa:80572)
by Dia, Ibrahima & Kamwa, Eric - Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes (repec:spr:grdene:v:26:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-016-9504-8)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules (repec:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9605-7)
by Eric Kamwa - Coincidence of Condorcet committees (repec:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1079-z)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (repec:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_12)
by Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou - Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (repec:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_3)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui - Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures (repec:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_3)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes (repec:tut:cremwp:201412)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Tax competition and determination of the quality of public goods (repec:zbw:ifwedp:201331)
by Abdessalam, A. H. Ould & Kamwa, Eric - Tax competition and the determination of the quality of public goods (repec:zbw:ifweej:201412)
by Abdessalam, A. H.