Eric Kamwa
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Université des Antilles
/ Faculté de Droit et d'Économie (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- On the Fishburn social choice function (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:247-251)
by Eric Kamwa - Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_273_0375)
by Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes - On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_305_0021)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Une expérimentation de deux modes de scrutin en Martinique lors du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2017 (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_305_0081)
by Eric Kamwa & Gilles Joseph & Aurélie Roger - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-05)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-02)
by Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gabon Gassi & Eric Kamwa - The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00853)
by Eric Kamwa - The Kemeny rule and committees elections (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00868)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Likelihood of the Coincidence of Condorcet Committees (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00692)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00656)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - A Joint Use Of The Mean and Median for Multi Criteria Decision Support: The 3MCD Method (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00394)
by Ruffin-benoit Mpoy Ngoie & Eric Kamwa & Berthold Ulungu - Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:130-138)
by Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent - On stable rules for selecting committees (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:36-44)
by Kamwa, Eric - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1812)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631174)
by Eric Kamwa - Coincidence of Condorcet committees (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631176)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - On stable rules for selecting committees (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631177)
by Eric Kamwa - Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631180)
by Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes - On the Likelihood of the Coincidence of Condorcet Committees (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631184)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe
[Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631190)
by Ibrahima Dia & Eric Kamwa - Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01702492)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01757742)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Tax Competition and the Determination of the Quality of Public Goods (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01757768)
by A.H. Ould H Ould Abdessalam & Eric Kamwa - Joint use of the mean and median for multi criteria decision support: the 3MCD method (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01760775)
by Ruffin-Benoît O Ngoie & Eric Kamwa & Berthold Ulungu - The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01786121)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01786590)
by Eric Kamwa - A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01896273)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - An Experiment of two Voting Methods in Martinique during the rst round of the 2017 Presidential Election
[Une expérimentation de deux modes de scrutin en Martinique lors du premier tour de l’électi (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01965660)
by Eric Kamwa & Gilles Joseph & Aurélie Roger - On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02147735)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02185965)
by Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou - Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02196387)
by Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa - Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02424936)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa - Choice of studies and reports on the mobility of high school students and Martiniquan students
[Choix d’études et rapports à la mobilité des lycéens et étudiants martiniquais] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02512834)
by Gilles Joseph & Eric Kamwa & Sébastien Mathouraparsad - Paolo Serafini: Mathematics to the Rescue of Democracy. What does Voting Mean and How can it be Improved? XIII, 135 pp., Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03322709)
by Eric Kamwa - On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03614585)
by Eric Kamwa - Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03614587)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03632662)
by Eric Kamwa - Forty years of collaboration in social choice theory: A bibliometric evaluation
[Quarante années de collaboration en théorie du choix social: Une évaluation bibliométrique] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04109291)
by Eric Kamwa - Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04177030)
by Mohamed Mansour & Eric Kamwa - The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00865738)
by Eric Kamwa - The Kemeny rule and committees elections (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00865742)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Fishburn social choice function (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01183232)
by Eric Kamwa - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01757761)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - How to obtain an overall reduction of individual income deprivations by means of a finite sequence of T 2 -transformations? A solution and a well-suited algorithm (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02162854)
by Paul-Emile Maingé & Eric Kamwa & Gilles Joseph - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02554924)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - To what extent does the model of processing sincereincomplete rankings affect the likelihood of the truncation paradox? (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02879390)
by Eric Kamwa - Judges and the price of human life in the French Court System (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03129639)
by Mohamed Mansour & Eric Kamwa - Scoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03143741)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin & Faty Mbaye Top - Unknown item RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03614585 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03614587 (paper)
- The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03880064)
by Eric Kamwa - Unknown item RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04177030 (paper)
- The effect of close elections on the likelihood of voting paradoxes: Further results in three-candidate elections (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04230359)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04390700)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Clinton Gubong Gassi - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01817943)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings Under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives Using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule (RePEc:kap:compec:v:53:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10614-018-9816-7)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Paolo Serafini: mathematics to the rescue of democracy. What does voting mean and how can it be improved? (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:134:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-021-00757-5)
by Eric Kamwa - Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:192:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-022-00972-8)
by Eric Kamwa - On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01070-z)
by Eric Kamwa - Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser (RePEc:kap:theord:v:87:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09716-5)
by Eric Kamwa - Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe
[The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe] (RePEc:pra:mprapa:80572)
by Dia, Ibrahima & Kamwa, Eric - Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:26:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-016-9504-8)
by Eric Kamwa - On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9605-7)
by Eric Kamwa - Coincidence of Condorcet committees (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1079-z)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_12)
by Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou - Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_3)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui - Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_3)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes (RePEc:tut:cremwp:201412)
by Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin - Tax competition and determination of the quality of public goods (RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201331)
by Abdessalam, A. H. Ould & Kamwa, Eric - Tax competition and the determination of the quality of public goods (RePEc:zbw:ifweej:201412)
by Abdessalam, A. H.