Songzi Du
Names
first: | Songzi |
last: | Du |
Identifer
RePEc Short-ID: | pdu334 |
Contact
homepage: | https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~sodu/ |
Affiliations
-
University of California-San Diego (UCSD)
/ Department of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Research profile
author of:
- Are CDS Auctions Biased and Inefficient? (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:72:y:2017:i:6:p:2589-2628)
by Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu - Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:74-87)
by Du, Songzi - Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:167:y:2017:i:c:p:285-311)
by Du, Songzi & Zhu, Haoxiang - Welfare and Optimal Trading Frequency in Dynamic Double Auctions (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20588)
by Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu - What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets? (RePEc:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1606-1651.)
by Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu - Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:86:y:2018:i:5:p:1569-1588)
by Songzi Du - Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:3:p:1313-1360)
by Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du