Mostapha Diss
Names
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Mostapha |
| last: |
Diss |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Université de Franche-Comté
/ UFR des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques, Politiques et de Gestion
/ Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques (CRESE)
Research profile
author of:
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (RePEc:arx:papers:1911.09173)
by Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy - Une étude de la répartition du pouvoir confessionnel au Liban (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_254_0527)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdallah Zouache - On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_305_0021)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Brexit et transfert des agences européennes: Pourquoi l’Agence européenne des médicaments ira-t-elle à Amsterdam et l'Autorité bancaire européenne à Paris ? (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-09)
by Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-05)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-06)
by Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori - Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-08)
by Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy - Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2021-01)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou - Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2022-05)
by Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou - Modeling medical material shortage using Markov processes (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2023-04)
by Alexis Roussel & Romain Biard & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss - Combining diversity and excellence in multi winner elections (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2023-05)
by Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou - The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00391)
by Mostapha Diss & William V. Gehrlein - A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00656)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Social acceptability of Condorcet committees (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:105:y:2020:i:c:p:14-27)
by Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad - Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:111:y:2021:i:c:p:11-18)
by Diss, Mostapha & Tsvelikhovskiy, Boris - When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:123:y:2023:i:c:p:128-136)
by Diss, Mostapha & Dougherty, Keith & Heckelman, Jac C. - An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:1:p:57-66)
by Diss, Mostapha & Louichi, Ahmed & Merlin, Vincent & Smaoui, Hatem - Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1302)
by Mostapha Diss - Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1402)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1414)
by Richard Baron & Mostapha Diss & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Analyse économique du système électoral confessionnel au Liban (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1428)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdallah Zouache - Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1533)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1613)
by Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi - Another perspective on Borda’s paradox (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1632)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1723)
by Mostapha Diss & Frank Steffen - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1812)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1813)
by Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori - Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1906)
by Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne - A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01896273)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02147735)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02196387)
by Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa - Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02424936)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa - Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03614587)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00443854)
by Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin - On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00533124)
by Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes - An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00667660)
by Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Louichi & Vincent Merlin & H. Smaoui - Borda's Paradox with weighted scoring rules (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00759869)
by Mostapha Diss & William V. Gehrlein - Paradoxes, stabilité et efficience des classements par points (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00990195)
by Mostapha Diss - A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01107698)
by Richard Baron & Mostapha Diss & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01136401)
by Mostapha Diss - Fuzzy social choice theory, Michael B. Gibilisco et al, Springer: A review (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01148756)
by Mostapha Diss - Une étude de la répartition du pouvoir confessionnel au parlement libanais (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01148763)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdallah Zouache - Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01196091)
by Mostapha Diss - The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01231013)
by Mostapha Diss - Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01231031)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01236333)
by Mostapha Diss & William V. Gehrlein - Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01289319)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01381394)
by Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi - Another perspective on Borda's paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01660816)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01660826)
by Mostapha Diss & Frank Steffen - Another perspective on Borda's paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01660828)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01660834)
by Mostapha Diss & Frank Steffen - Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02393100)
by Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori - Introduction (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03504784)
by Vincent Merlin & Mostapha Diss - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01757761)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02554924)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Muhammad Mahajne - Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03614587)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00785366)
by Mostapha Diss - Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00944687)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00993015)
by Richard Baron & Mostapha Diss & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Une étude de la répartition du pouvoir confessionnel au Liban (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01090114)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdallah Zouache - Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01285526)
by Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi - Another perspective on Borda's paradox (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01402268)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01587503)
by Mostapha Diss & Frank Steffen - The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01817943)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01827668)
by Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori - Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02003292)
by Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne - Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02011732)
by Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne - Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:169:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0376-x)
by Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi - Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00692-6)
by Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori - Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:191:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00951-5)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou - On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:289-316)
by Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin - Another perspective on Borda’s paradox (RePEc:kap:theord:v:84:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9649-1)
by Mostapha Diss & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences (RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09828-x)
by Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori - Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:229:y:2015:i:1:p:347-376:10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7)
by Mostapha Diss - Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:25:y:2016:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-015-9467-1)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:121-136)
by Mostapha Diss & William Gehrlein - A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:123-153)
by Richard Baron & Mostapha Diss & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:61:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01464-4)
by Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou - Introduction (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_1)
by Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin - Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_3)
by Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui - The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_4)
by Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_3)
by Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi - On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_11)
by Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes - Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-030-48598-6)
by None