Pierre Chaigneau

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Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Queen's University / School of Business
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:4:p:1805-1837)
  by Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta
• The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10143)
  by Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre
• The Value of Informativeness for Contracting (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10180)
  by Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre
• The Generalized Informativeness Principle (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10279)
  by Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre
• The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15625)
  by Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre
• How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15755)
  by Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel
• The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium (RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:53:y:2018:i:03:p:1297-1339_00)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas
• Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:14-16)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard
• The optimal timing of CEO compensation (RePEc:eee:finlet:v:24:y:2018:i:c:p:90-94)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre
• Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation (RePEc:eee:finsta:v:9:y:2013:i:4:p:778-789)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:743-755)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel
• Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion (RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:67:y:2013:i:c:p:4-23)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre
• Does improved information improve incentives? (RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:130:y:2018:i:2:p:291-307)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach (RePEc:ehl:lserod:102226)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel
• Does improved information improve incentives? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:102227)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel
• The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium (RePEc:ehl:lserod:55405)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas
• Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts (RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp654)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation (RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp660)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion (RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp693)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises (RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp700)
  by Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta
• Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02292785)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
• Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors (RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:149:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-016-3115-9)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1206)
  by Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta
• The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1207)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1208)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1224)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet
• Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1406)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet
• Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1521)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt
• The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20456)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb
• The Value of Informativeness for Contracting (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20542)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb
• The Generalized Informativeness Principle (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20729)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb
• How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:35:y:2022:i:1:p:168-206.)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb
• Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques (RePEc:ris:actuec:0088)
  by Chaigneau, Pierre
• Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0051-7)
  by Pierre Chaigneau
• Downside risk-neutral probabilities (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00165-5)
  by Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt
• Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation (RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:21:y:2015:i:15:p:1357-1373)
  by Pierre Chaigneau