Leandro Arozamena
Names
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Leandro |
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Arozamena |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
/ Departamento de Economía
Research profile
author of:
- Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:83)
by Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum - Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1275)
by Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum - Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions (RePEc:col:000518:019429)
by Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum - Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions (RePEc:col:000518:019430)
by Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum - Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2676)
by Cantillon, Estelle & Arozamena, Leandro - Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1276)
by Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon - Education, signaling and the allocation of entrepreneurial skills (RePEc:dbl:dblwop:1102)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Ruffo, Hernán - Education, Signaling and Mismatch (RePEc:dbl:dblwop:916)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Ruffo, Hernán - A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d40010)
by Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum - Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00718)
by Leandro Arozamena & Nicholas Shunda & Federico Weinschelbaum - The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions (RePEc:ecm:latm04:180)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena - Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:1:p:23-26)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico - On favoritism in auctions with entry (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:265-267)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico - Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:171:y:2018:i:c:p:115-118)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Renegotiation, discrimination and favoritism in symmetric procurement auctions (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:159:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123001940)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico - Tenure, business cycle and the wage-setting process (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:50:y:2006:i:2:p:401-424)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Centeno, Mario - The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:645-657)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico - Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF (RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:22:y:2003:i:7:p:1041-1063)
by Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro - Incentive Schemes in Export and Investment Promotions (RePEc:idb:brikps:4090)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico - Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:1:p:1-18)
by Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon - Tenure, Business Cycle and the Wage-Setting Process (RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w200108)
by Leandro Arozamena - On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry (RePEc:sad:wpaper:103)
by Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum - Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism (RePEc:sad:wpaper:110)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena & Nicolas Shunda - The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions (RePEc:sad:wpaper:82)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena - A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses (RePEc:sad:wpaper:92)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena - Liquidity Protection versus Moral Hazard: The Role of the IMF (RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:ocho)
by Andrew Powell y Leandro Arozamena - Simultaneous vs. Sequential Price Competition with Incomplete Information (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2008_3)
by Leandro Arozamena & erico Weinschelbaum - On favoritism in auctions with entry (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2010-072)
by Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum - Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2010-10)
by Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti - Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2012-03)
by Leandro Arozamena & Nicholas Shunda & Federico Weinschelbaum - Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2021_09)
by Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum & Juan-José Ganuza - Investment incentives in procurement auctions (RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9005)
by Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon - De teoría de subastas a diseño de mercados: las contribuciones de Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson a la economía
[From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to (RePEc:uns:esteco:v:38:y:2021:i:76:p:219-296)
by Leandro Arozamena & Andres Fioriti & Federico Weinschelbaum - Renegotiation and discrimination in symmetric procurement auctions (RePEc:upf:upfgen:1790)
by Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum