Thomas Wiseman
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Thomas |
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Wiseman |
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Affiliations
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University of Texas-Austin
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:1:p:1-31)
by Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman - How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction (RePEc:arx:papers:2110.13121)
by Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman - A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:49:y:2011:i:3:p:674-684)
by Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman - Strategic Ignorance and Information Design (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16892)
by Taneva, Ina & , - Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17312)
by Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Olszewski, Wojciech & , - A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:73:y:2005:i:2:p:629-645)
by Thomas Wiseman - Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral (RePEc:eee:deveco:v:94:y:2011:i:1:p:30-40)
by Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas - Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:53-55)
by Wiseman, Thomas - The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:88:y:2005:i:2:p:170-175)
by Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas - When do traffic reports make traffic better? (RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:36:y:2023:i:c:s2212012223000333)
by Wiseman, Jim & Wiseman, Thomas - Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model (RePEc:eee:exehis:v:45:y:2008:i:4:p:303-326)
by Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas - Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945 (RePEc:eee:exehis:v:48:y:2011:i:4:p:519-537)
by Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas - Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:491-511)
by Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas - Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:216-242)
by Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan - Reputation and impermanent types (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:190-210)
by Wiseman, Thomas - Reputation and exogenous private learning (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1352-1357)
by Wiseman, Thomas - Competitive long-term health insurance (RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:58:y:2018:i:c:p:144-150)
by Wiseman, Thomas - School choice with neighbors (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:83:y:2019:i:c:p:101-109)
by Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas - Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry (RePEc:kap:revind:v:40:y:2012:i:1:p:1-19)
by Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman - A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10463)
by Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman - Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War (RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00018008)
by Krainin, Colin & Thomas, Caroline & Wiseman, Thomas - Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1248)
by Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya - Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture (RePEc:oup:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:317-331)
by R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman - A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory (RePEc:red:issued:15-48)
by Thomas Wiseman - Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture (RePEc:red:sed005:636)
by Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee - Reputation and Impermanent Types (RePEc:red:sed006:650)
by Thomas Wiseman - A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning (RePEc:red:sed011:181)
by Thomas E. Wiseman - Memory and the Limits of Money (RePEc:tex:wpaper:130313)
by Thomas Wiseman - A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes (RePEc:the:publsh:1512)
by , & , - How to sell in a sequential auction market (RePEc:the:publsh:4768)
by Hendricks, Ken & Wiseman, Thomas - Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation (RePEc:the:publsh:5911)
by Bhaskar, V. & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas - A partial folk theorem for games with private learning (RePEc:the:publsh:913)
by , - When Does Predation Dominate Collusion? (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:555-584)
by Thomas Wiseman - Sequential Choice And Non-Bayesian Observational Learning (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:03:n:s0219198909002327)
by Thomas Wiseman