Nicolas Vieille
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| first: |
Nicolas |
| last: |
Vieille |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Research profile
author of:
- Bureaucracy in Quest for Feasibility (repec:ags:isfiwp:275779)
by Cres, Herve & Gilboa, Itzhak & Vieille, Nicolas - Lowest Unique Bid Auctions (repec:arx:papers:1007.4264)
by Marco Scarsini & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stationary social learning in a changing environment (repec:arx:papers:2201.02122)
by Raphael L'evy & Marcin Pk{e}ski & Nicolas Vieille - Timing Games with Informational Externalities (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000000704)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000412)
by Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000881)
by Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (repec:cor:louvco:1998023)
by GOSSNER, Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas - Repeated communication through the mechanism “and” (repec:cor:louvco:1998056)
by GOSSNER , Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas - On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1737)
by Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1742)
by Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1848)
by Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1933)
by Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (repec:cwl:cwldpp:1933r)
by Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic games : recent results (repec:ebg:heccah:0743)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas - Stopping games: recent results (repec:ebg:heccah:0744)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & SOLAN, Eilon - Two-player games : a reduction (repec:ebg:heccah:0745)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas - An Application of Ramsey Theorem to stopping Games (repec:ebg:heccah:0746)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & SHMAYA, Eran & SOLAN, Eilon - Quitting games - an example (repec:ebg:heccah:0747)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & SOLAN, Eilon - Random walks and voting theory (repec:ebg:heccah:0753)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas - Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information (repec:ebg:heccah:0754)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon - Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems (repec:ebg:heccah:0755)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & WEIBULL, Jörgen W. - Approximating a sequence of observations by a simple process (repec:ebg:heccah:0756)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon - Perturbed Markov Chains (repec:ebg:heccah:0757)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & SOLAN, Eilon - On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (repec:ebg:heccah:0760)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon - Majority vote following a debate (repec:ebg:heccah:0761)
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & GILBOA, Itzhak - Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (repec:ebg:heccah:0772)
by Nicolas, VIEILLE & Eilon, SOLAN - Continuous-Time Games of Timing (repec:ebg:heccah:0773)
by Nicolas, VIEILLE & Rida, LARAKI & Eilon, SOLAN - Informational externalities and convergence of behavior (repec:ebg:heccah:0856)
by Vieille, Nicolas & Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon - Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games (repec:ebg:heccah:0966)
by Renault, Jerome & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information (repec:ebg:heccah:1007)
by Cardaliaguet, Pierre & Rainer, Catherine & Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille , Nicolas - On Games of Strategic Experimentation (repec:ebg:heccah:1008)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Salomon , Antoine & Vieille , Nicolas - Strategic Information Exchange (repec:ebg:heccah:1009)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas - On the Efficiency of Social Learning (repec:ebg:heccah:1246)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille, Nicolas - Stationary social learning in a changing environment (repec:ebg:heccah:1433)
by Levy, Raphaël & Pęski, Marcin & Vieille, Nicolas - Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:75:y:2007:i:6:p:1591-1611)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:77:y:2009:i:1:p:29-69)
by Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Vieille - Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:79:y:2011:i:4:p:1277-1318)
by Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic games: Recent results (repec:eee:gamchp:3-48)
by Vieille, Nicolas - Optimal dynamic information provision (repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:329-349)
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Zero-sum games with ambiguity (repec:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:238-249)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille, Nicolas - Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games (repec:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:362-399)
by Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - How to play with a biased coin? (repec:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:206-226)
by Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas - Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (repec:eee:gamebe:v:42:y:2003:i:1:p:25-47)
by Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas - An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games (repec:eee:gamebe:v:42:y:2003:i:2:p:300-306)
by Shmaya, Eran & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Informational externalities and emergence of consensus (repec:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:979-994)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - On games of strategic experimentation (repec:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:31-51)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Salomon, Antoine & Vieille, Nicolas - Strategic information exchange (repec:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:444-467)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games (repec:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:70-83)
by Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas - Continuous-time games of timing (repec:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:206-238)
by Laraki, Rida & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Aggregation of multiple prior opinions (repec:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2563-2582)
by Crès, Hervé & Gilboa, Itzhak & Vieille, Nicolas - Dynamic sender–receiver games (repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:502-534)
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility (repec:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001071)
by Crès, Hervé & Gilboa, Itzhak & Vieille, Nicolas - Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games (repec:eee:mateco:v:39:y:2003:i:8:p:911-929)
by Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems (repec:eee:stapro:v:80:y:2010:i:5-6:p:381-385)
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information (repec:ema:worpap:2000-27)
by O. Gossner & N. Vieille - How to play with a biased coin ? (repec:ema:worpap:99-31)
by O. Gossner & N. Vieille - Continuous-Time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies (repec:fth:pariem:1999.112)
by Touzi, N. & Vieille, N. - How to play with a biased coin? (repec:fth:pnegmi:99-31)
by Gossner, O. & Vieille, N. - Informational externalities and emergence of consensus (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464565)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg - Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464577)
by Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner - Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464609)
by Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan - Continuous-time games of timing (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464672)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Rida Laraki - Random Walks and Voting Theory (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464928)
by Nicolas Vieille - Majority vote following a debate (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464932)
by Nicolas Vieille & Itzhak Gilboa - Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464938)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg - Approximating a sequence of observations by a simple process (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464946)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464949)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464953)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - Quitting games – An example (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464962)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Perturbed Markov chains (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464967)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464974)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan - Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464978)
by Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner - How to play with a biased coin? (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464984)
by Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille - Blackwell optimality in Markov decision processes with partial observation (repec:hal:journl:hal-00464998)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - Uniform value in recursive games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465002)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Continuous-Time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465013)
by Nicolas Vieille & Nizar Touzi - Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465020)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stopping games with randomized strategies (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465029)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - Repeated communication through the mechanism and (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465040)
by Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner - Quitting Games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465043)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - Solvable States in n-player Stochastic Games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00465045)
by Nicolas Vieille - Two-player stochastic games I: A reduction (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481401)
by Nicolas Vieille - Small perturbations and stochastic games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481409)
by Nicolas Vieille - Two-player stochastic games II: The case of recursive games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481416)
by Nicolas Vieille - The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481429)
by Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg - On equilibria on the square (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481439)
by Nicolas Vieille - Conditional systems revisited (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481474)
by Nicolas Vieille - Solvable states in stochastic games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481853)
by Nicolas Vieille - Weak Approachability (repec:hal:journl:hal-00481891)
by Nicolas Vieille - Protocols with no acknowledgment (repec:hal:journl:hal-00491697)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Dynamic sender receiver games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00495595)
by Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner - On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information (repec:hal:journl:hal-00528398)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Johannes Hörner & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00528413)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan - On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems (repec:hal:journl:hal-00528414)
by Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan - On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information (repec:hal:journl:hal-00528415)
by Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan - Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for - 1 and a Folk Theorem (repec:hal:journl:hal-00543616)
by Nicolas Vieille - Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem (repec:hal:journl:hal-00609191)
by Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi - Unknown
- Invited conference (repec:hal:journl:hal-00715395)
by Nicolas Vieille - Dynamic sender-receiver games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00804028)
by Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault - Aggregation of multiple prior opinions (repec:hal:journl:hal-01024224)
by Hervé Crès & Itzhak Gilboa, & Nicolas Vieille - Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information (repec:hal:journl:hal-02058235)
by Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille - Stopping Games - Recent Results (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00006711)
by Nicolas Vieille - Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00009854)
by Nicolas Vieille & E. Solan - Informational Externalities and Convergence of Behavior (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00120992)
by Nicolas Vieille & E. Solan & D. Rosenberg - Bureaucracy in Quest for Feasibility (repec:hal:spmain:hal-00973094)
by Hervé Crès & Itzhak Gilboa, & Nicolas Vieille - Aggregation of multiple prior opinions (repec:hal:spmain:hal-01024224)
by Hervé Crès & Itzhak Gilboa, & Nicolas Vieille - Stopping games: recent results (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00242994)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Quitting games - An example (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00242995)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic Games : recent results (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00242996)
by Nicolas Vieille - Stopping games and Ramsey theorem (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00242997)
by Eran Schmaya & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On a class of recursive games (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00242998)
by Nicolas Vieille - On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00242999)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00354231)
by Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull - On Games of Strategic Experimentation (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00579613)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Antoine Salomon & Nicolas Vieille - Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00591681)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Continuous-Time Games of Timing (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00591682)
by Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593394)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Approximating a Sequence of Observations by a Simple Process (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593643)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593645)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Majority Vote Following a debate (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593646)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Nicolas Vieille - Perturbed Markov Chains (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593647)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593648)
by Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull - Random Walks and Voting Theory (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00593650)
by Nicolas Vieille - Two-player Games: a Reduction (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00595479)
by Nicolas Vieille - An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00595481)
by Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stopping Games: recent results (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00595484)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic Games: recent results (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00596229)
by Nicolas Vieille - Bureaucracy in Quest for Feasibility (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00973094)
by Hervé Crès & Itzhak Gilboa, & Nicolas Vieille - Stationary social learning in a changing environment (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03837075)
by Raphaël Levy & Marcin Pęski & Nicolas Vieille - Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems (repec:hhs:iuiwop:0577)
by Vieille, Nicolas & Weibull, Jörgen W. - Protocols with No Acknowledgment (repec:inm:oropre:v:57:y:2009:i:4:p:905-915)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information (repec:inm:oropre:v:58:y:2010:i:4-part-2:p:1107-1115)
by Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games (repec:nwu:cmsems:1226)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Quitting Games (repec:nwu:cmsems:1227)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies (repec:nwu:cmsems:1258)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Blackwell Optimality in Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation (repec:nwu:cmsems:1292)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Uniform Value in Recursive Games (repec:nwu:cmsems:1293)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Quitting Games - An Example (repec:nwu:cmsems:1314)
by Eilon Solan & Nicholas Vieille - An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games (repec:nwu:cmsems:1323)
by Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (repec:nwu:cmsems:1337)
by Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (repec:nwu:cmsems:1341)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Perturbed Markov Chains (repec:nwu:cmsems:1342)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (repec:nwu:cmsems:1344)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Approximating a Sequence of Approximations by a Simple Process (repec:nwu:cmsems:1345)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information (repec:nwu:cmsems:1346)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (repec:nwu:cmsems:1355)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vielle - Continuous-time Games of Timing (repec:nwu:cmsems:1363)
by Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements (repec:nwu:cmsems:1371)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (repec:nwu:cmsems:1376)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems (repec:nwu:cmsems:1396)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information (repec:nwu:cmsems:1412)
by Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Keeping Your Story Straight: Truthtelling and Liespotting (repec:pri:econom:2017-5)
by Johannes Hörner & Xiaosheng Mu & Nicolas Vieille - Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem (repec:pri:metric:wp005.pdf)
by Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games (repec:pri:metric:wp037_2012_horner_takahashi_vielle_on%20the%20limit%20equilibrium.pdf)
by Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (repec:red:sed006:813)
by Johannes Hoerner & Nicolas Vieille - Unknown
- Unknown
- Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements (repec:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:3:p:721-726)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting (repec:spr:joecth:v:39:y:2009:i:3:p:513-526)
by Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull - Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games (repec:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:237-253)
by Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - On Equilibrium on the Square (repec:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:199-205)
by Vieille, Nicolas - Conditional Systems Revisited (repec:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:207-17)
by Vieille, Nicolas - Repeated communication through the mechanism (repec:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:41-60)
by Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille - The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (repec:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:1:p:133-150)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille - Majority vote following a debate (repec:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:1:p:115-125)
by Itzhak Gilboa & Nicolas Vieille - Optimal Dynamic Information Provision (repec:tse:wpaper:31316)
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas - Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (repec:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i:5:p:1795-1848)
by Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille - On the Efficiency of Social Learning (repec:wly:emetrp:v:87:y:2019:i:6:p:2141-2168)
by Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille - Stationary Social Learning in a Changing Environment (repec:wly:emetrp:v:92:y:2024:i:6:p:1939-1966)
by Raphaël Levy & Marcin Pęski & Nicolas Vieille