Tristan Tomala
Names
first: |
Tristan |
last: |
Tomala |
Contact
Affiliations
-
HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
- website
- location: Jouy-en-Josas, France
Research profile
author of:
-
Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors
by Tomala, Tristan
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring
by Tristan Tomala
-
Mechanism design and communication networks
by Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Payoffs Dependent on the Signal.
by Tomala, T.
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Tristan Tomala
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Selected topics in the theory of repeated games
by Tristan Tomala
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala
-
Mechanism design and communication networks
by Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
-
Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
by Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Tomala, Tristan
-
Mechanism design and communication networks
by Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Secret correlation in repeated games with signals
by Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala
-
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
Protocols for Fault Identifcation in Partially Known Networks
by Tristan Tomala
-
Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
-
Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
by Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan
-
Informationally optimal correlation
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala
-
Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation
by Tristan Tomala
-
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games
by Lovo , Stefano & Tomala , Tristan
-
Public Equilibria of Repeated Games with Signal-Dependent Payoffs.
by Tomala, T.
-
General Properties of Long-Run Supergames
by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala
-
Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks
by Tristan Tomala
-
Informationally optimal correlation
by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala
-
Pure Equilibria of Repreated Games with Public Information.
by Tomala, T.
-
Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
by Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini
-
Finitely repeated games with semi-standard
by Tristan Tomala & Pauline Contou-Carrère
-
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala
-
Reliability and security of multicast communication in general networks
by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala
-
Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning
by Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner
-
Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems
by Tristan Tomala
-
Repeated Proximity Games
by Renault, J. & Tomala, T.
-
Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
by Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala
-
Repeated proximity games
by JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala
-
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
by Tristan Tomala & J. Hörner & S. Lovo
-
"The Emergence of Complex Social Networks", a Discussion
by Tristan Tomala
-
Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan
-
Repeated Games with Complete Information
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
-
Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning
by Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan
-
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
by Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan
-
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala
-
Secure message transmission on directed networks
by Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
-
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments
by Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
-
The controlled biased coin problem
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
by Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes
-
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence
by Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala
-
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
by Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala
-
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
by Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala
-
Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games
by Tristan Tomala
-
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
by Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
-
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan
-
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence
by Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan
-
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
by Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner
-
Secure Communication: A Mechanism Design Approach
by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
-
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments
by Tomala , Tristan & Gensbittel , Fabien
-
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan
-
A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
by Jérôme Renault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala
-
Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
-
Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems
by Tristan Tomala
-
Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
by Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala
-
Zero-Sum Revision Games
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan
-
Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games
by Tristan Tomala
-
Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
by Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan