Tristan Tomala

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
  • website
  • location: Jouy-en-Josas, France

Research profile

author of:

• Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors
  by Tomala, Tristan
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring
  by Tristan Tomala
• Mechanism design and communication networks
  by Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Payoffs Dependent on the Signal.
  by Tomala, T.
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
  by Tristan Tomala
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Selected topics in the theory of repeated games
  by Tristan Tomala
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals
  by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala
• Mechanism design and communication networks
  by Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
• Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
  by Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
  by Tomala, Tristan
• Mechanism design and communication networks
  by Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Secret correlation in repeated games with signals
  by Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala
• Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• Protocols for Fault Identifcation in Partially Known Networks
  by Tristan Tomala
• Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
  by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
• Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
  by Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan
• Informationally optimal correlation
  by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation
  by Tristan Tomala
• Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games
  by Lovo , Stefano & Tomala , Tristan
• Public Equilibria of Repeated Games with Signal-Dependent Payoffs.
  by Tomala, T.
• General Properties of Long-Run Supergames
  by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala
• Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks
  by Tristan Tomala
• Informationally optimal correlation
  by Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala
• Pure Equilibria of Repreated Games with Public Information.
  by Tomala, T.
• Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
  by Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini
• Finitely repeated games with semi-standard
  by Tristan Tomala & Pauline Contou-Carrère
• Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
  by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala
• Reliability and security of multicast communication in general networks
  by Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala
• Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning
  by Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner
• Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems
  by Tristan Tomala
• Repeated Proximity Games
  by Renault, J. & Tomala, T.
• Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
  by Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala
• Repeated proximity games
  by JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala
• Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
  by Tristan Tomala & J. Hörner & S. Lovo
• "The Emergence of Complex Social Networks", a Discussion
  by Tristan Tomala
• Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
  by GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan
• Repeated Games with Complete Information
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
  by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
• Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning
  by Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan
• Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
  by Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan
• Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
  by Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
  by Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
• Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments
  by Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
• The controlled biased coin problem
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
  by Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes
• Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence
  by Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
  by Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
  by Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala
• Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games
  by Tristan Tomala
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
  by Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
• Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
  by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence
  by Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
  by Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner
• Secure Communication: A Mechanism Design Approach
  by Tristan Tomala & L. Renou
• Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments
  by Tomala , Tristan & Gensbittel , Fabien
• Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
  by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
  by Jérôme Renault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
  by Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala
• Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems
  by Tristan Tomala
• Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
  by Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala
• Zero-Sum Revision Games
  by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan
• Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games
  by Tristan Tomala
• Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
  by Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan