Shigehiro Serizawa
Names
first: 
Shigehiro 
last: 
Serizawa 
Contact
Affiliations

Osaka University
→ Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Research profile
author of:

Maximal Domain for StrategyProof Rules with one Public Good.
by Berga, D. & Serizawa, S.

Pairwise StrategyProofness and SelfEnforcing Manipulation
by Shigehiro Serizawa

Maximal Domain for Strategyproof Rules in Allotment Economies
by Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa

Strategyproof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
by Shigehiro Serizawa

Strategyproof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*)
by Shigehiro Serizawa

Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is StrategyProof
by Serizawa Shigehiro

StrategyProof Voting on Compact Ranges.
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.

A Maximal Domain for the Existence of StrategyProof Rules
by Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro

StrategyProof Voting on Compact Ranges
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.

StrategyProof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
by Shigehiro Serizawa

Maximal Domain for StrategyProof Rules with One Public Good
by Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro

StrategyProof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies.
by Serizawa, Shigehiro

Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
by Soo Chew & Shigehiro Serizawa

Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
by Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa

Efficient strategyproof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees
by Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A.

Inefficiency of StrategyProof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies
by Serizawa, Shigehiro

Efficient StrategyProof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees
by Shigehiro Serizawa & John A. Weymark

StrategyProof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule
by Shigehiro Serizawa

Pairwise StrategyProofness and SelfEnforcing Manipulation
by Shigehiro Serizawa

Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling:Theoretical and Experimental Results
by R'obert F. Vesztegy, Serizawa & Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa

Maximal Domain for StrategyProof Rules in Allotment Economies
by Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa

An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems
by Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa

Coalitionally strategyproof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa

Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction
by Chew Soo Hong & Shigehiro Serizawa

Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect
by Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa

Coalitionally StrategyProof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa

A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents
by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching

An impossibility theorem for matching problems
by Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa

An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices
by Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa

Auctions for Public Construction with Cornercutting
by Kenju Akai & Shigehiro Serizawa

A maximal domain for strategyproof and novetoer rules in the multiobject choice model
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa

Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
by Itai Ashlagi & Shigehiro Serizawa

Strategyproofness and Efficiency with Nonquasilinear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule
by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa

A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
by Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching

An IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN PURE PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMIES WITH FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: VOTING BY COMMITTEES IN NONRECTANGULAR FEASIBLE SETS
by SHIGEHIRO Serizawa

Strategyproofness and efficiency with nonquasilinear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
by Morimoto, Shuhei & Serizawa, Shigehiro

A maximal domain for strategyproof and novetoer rules in the multiobject choice model
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa

Efficiency and strategyproofness in object assignment problems with multidemand preferences
by Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa

Efficiency and strategyproofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
by Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa

StrategyProofness and Efficiency for Nonquasilinear CommonTieredObject Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule
by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa

Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
by Hikaru Kondo & Shigehiro Serizawa

Mechanism design without quasilinearity
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa

Strategyproofness and efficiency for nonquasilinear and commontieredobject preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule
by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro

Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market
by Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa

Mechanism design without quasilinearity
by Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro

A StrategyProof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be StrategyProof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction
by Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama

Strategyproof multiobject allocation: Expost revenue maximization with no wastage
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa

Strategyproof multiobject mechanism design: Expost revenue maximization with nonquasilinear preferences
by Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa

Strategyproof multiobject mechanism design: Expost revenue maximization with nonquasilinear preferences
by Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro