Arunava Sen
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Indian Statistical Institute
Research profile
author of:
- Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments (RePEc:ags:queddp:273386)
by Bergin, James & Sen, Arunava - Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes (RePEc:ags:uwarer:269616)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava - Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals (RePEc:ags:uwarer:271188)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - Conditional Expected Utility Criteria for Decision Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity (RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1614)
by Nicolas Gravel & Thierry Marchant & Arunava Sen - Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000750)
by Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen - Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar (RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000090)
by Arunava Sen - Dictatorial domains (RePEc:cor:louvco:1999040)
by ASWAL, Navin & CHATTERJI, Shurojit & SEN, Arunava - Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability (RePEc:cor:louvrp:1399)
by LE BRETON, Michel & SEN, Arunava - Pairwise Partition Graphs and Strategy-proof Social Choice in the Exogenous Indifference Class Model (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0898)
by Anup Pramanik & Arunava Sen - Tops-Only Domains (RePEc:eab:macroe:22064)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen - Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:4:p:997-1021)
by Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava - Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:3:p:605-628)
by Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen - Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:2:p:523-540)
by Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen - Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:4:p:1109-1132)
by Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterji & Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu'alem & Noam Nisan & Arunava Sen - Limiting behaviour of Dickey-Fuller t-tests under the crash model alternative (RePEc:ect:emjrnl:v:6:y:2003:i:2:p:421-429)
by A. Sen - An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: The two alternative case (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:1:p:49-52)
by Picot, Jérémy & Sen, Arunava - Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:70:y:2001:i:3:p:381-385)
by Sen, Arunava - Nash implementation with partially honest individuals (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:154-169)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:283-298)
by Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava - Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:104-115)
by Spiegel Matthew & Currie Janet & Sonnenschein Hugo & Sen Arunava - Random dictatorship domains (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:212-236)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia - Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:374-394)
by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:106:y:2002:i:2:p:392-416)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava - Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:275-275)
by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:1050-1073)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Sanver, Remzi & Sen, Arunava - On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:30-49)
by Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Sharma, Tridib & Ülkü, Levent - Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:229-243)
by Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve & Sen, Arunava - Matching with partners and projects (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s002205311830214x)
by Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal - Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:2:p:285-299)
by Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava - Bayesian Implementation: The Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:1:p:130-141)
by Dutta Bhaskar & Sen Arunava - Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:71:y:1996:i:1:p:90-101)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:80:y:1998:i:2:p:222-256)
by Bergin, James & Sen, Arunava - Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:20:y:1991:i:1:p:49-67)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:6:p:353-366)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava - Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:52:y:2014:i:c:p:123-127)
by Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Storcken, Ton - Conditional expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:78:y:2018:i:c:p:79-95)
by Gravel, Nicolas & Marchant, Thierry & Sen, Arunava - Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:88:y:2020:i:c:p:31-41)
by Ehlers, Lars & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava - The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:28-34)
by Gaurav, Abhishek & Picot, Jérémy & Sen, Arunava - Strategyproofness and Decomposability : Strict Orderning (RePEc:fth:aixmeq:95a37)
by Le Breton, M. & Sen, A. - Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings (RePEc:fth:aixmeq:95a38)
by Le Breton, M. & Sen, A. - Layoff Compensation As Commitment For Entry Deterrence (RePEc:fth:indgan:39)
by Saha, B. & Sen, A. - Nash Bargaining and the Cournot Theory of Oligopoly (RePEc:fth:indgan:52)
by Sen, A. - Conditional expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01988972)
by Nicolas Gravel & Thierry Marchant & Arunava Sen - Conditional Expected Utility Criteria for Decision Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01303548)
by Nicolas Gravel & Thierry Marchant & Arunava Sen - Ranking Completely Uncertain Decisions by the Uniform Expected Utility Criterion (RePEc:iep:wpidep:0705)
by Nicolas Gravel & Thierry Marchant & Arunava Sen - Unknown item RePEc:ind:isipdp:02-10 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:ind:isipdp:03-01 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:ind:isipdp:10-03 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:ind:isipdp:14-12 (paper)
- Continuity and incentive compatibility (RePEc:mtl:montde:2016-04)
by EHLERS, Lars & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & MISHRA, Debasis & SEN, Arunava - Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2016)
by Lars EHLERS & Dipjyoti MAJUMDAR & Debasis MISHRA & Arunava SEN - A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation (RePEc:oup:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:1:p:121-128.)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen - Implementation in Generic Environments (RePEc:qed:wpaper:879)
by James Bergin & Arunava Sen - A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions (RePEc:ris:smuesw:2016_011)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia - Restricted Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains (RePEc:ris:smuesw:2020_003)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia - Tops-Only Domains (RePEc:siu:wpaper:06-2009)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen - On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions (RePEc:siu:wpaper:07-2010)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Remzi Sanver & Arunava Sen - A CHaracterization of Single-Peaked Preferences via Random Social Choice Functions (RePEc:siu:wpaper:13-2014)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen & Huaxia Zeng - Random Dictatorship Domains (RePEc:siu:wpaper:27-2012)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen & Huaxia Zeng - Dictatorial domains (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:1:p:45-62)
by Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen - Tops-only domains (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:46:y:2011:i:2:p:255-282)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen - The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:3:p:619-627)
by Anirban Kar & Arunava Sen - Book Review: “Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality” by Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar (RePEc:spr:jqecon:v:17:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40953-019-00160-4)
by Arunava Sen - Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra - 2-person Bayesian implementation (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:41-54)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen - The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem: a generalization and a new proof (RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:515-527)
by Arunava Sen - Implementation in generic environments (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:4:p:467-478)
by Arunava Sen & James Bergin - Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:175-187)
by Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen - Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:163-179)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen - Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:701-702)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen - Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:29-48)
by Manipushpak Mitra & Arunava Sen - A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:867-887)
by Mridu Goswami & Arunava Sen & Sonal Yadav - Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-015-0944-x)
by Anup Pramanik & Arunava Sen - Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies (RePEc:the:publsh:1214)
by , Prabal & , & , - Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs (RePEc:the:publsh:1529)
by Bhargava, Mohit & , & , - A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions (RePEc:the:publsh:1972)
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia - Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013040)
by Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Sen, A. & Storcken, A.J.A. - Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes (RePEc:wrk:warwec:722)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Peter, Hans & Sen, Arunava - Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals (RePEc:wrk:warwec:920)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava