Alessandro Riboni

Names

first:	Alessandro
last:	Riboni

Contact

email:
homepage:	https://sites.google.com/site/alessandroriboni/

Affiliations

Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST) (weight: 95%)
- website
- location: Palaiseau, France
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) (weight: 05%)
- website
- location: London, United Kingdom

Research profile

author of:

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
by Alessandro Riboni & Francisco Ruge-Murcia
Preference heterogeneity in monetary policy committees
by Alessandro Riboni & Francisco Ruge-Murcia
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees
by Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.
Statute Law or Case Law?
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro
Statute Law or Case Law?
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
by ALESSANDRO RIBONI & FRANCISCO J. RUGE-MURCIA
Statute Law or Case Law?
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.
COMMITTEES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR COMMITMENT
by Alessandro Riboni
Why Stare Decisis?
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni & Riboni, Alessandro
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions
by Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia
Why Stare Decisis?
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior
by Alessandro Riboni
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions
by RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.
Ideology and endogenous constitutions
by Alessandro Riboni
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH
by LUCA ANDERLINI & LEONARDO FELLI & GIOVANNI IMMORDINO & ALESSANDRO RIBONI
Spending Biased Legislators - Discipline Through Disagreement
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior
by Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior
by Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni
Statute law or case law?
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, A.
Why Stare Decisis?
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
Dissent in monetary policy decisions
by Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco
Statute Law or Case Law?
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
Spending-Biased Legislators: Discipline Through Disagreement
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior
by Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?
by Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour
by Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni
Collective Versus Individual Decisionmaking : A Case Study of the Bank of Israel Law
by Francisco RUGE-MURCIA & Alessandro RIBONI
Legal Efficiency and Consistency
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour
by Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni
Collective versus individual Decision-Making: A case study of the Bank of Israel Law
by Ruge-Murcia, Francisco & Riboni, Alessandro
The SSM at 1
by 26 authors
edited by Jens Ulbrich, Carl-Christoph Hedrich and Morten Balling
Nation-Building, Nationalism and Wars
by Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich & Alessandro Riboni
Unequal societies, Unequal Terms of Trade and Trade Policy
by Martine Carré & Alessandro Riboni
Nation-Building, Nationalism, and Wars
by Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich & Alessandro Riboni
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Deliberation in Committees : Theory and Evidence from the FOMC
by Alessandro RIBONI & Francisco RUGE-MURCIA
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
by Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni
Legal Efficiency and Consistency
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni
Central banking and monetary policy: Which will be the post-crisis new normal? Abstract: Central Bankers are currently facing big challenges in designing and implementing monetary policy, as well as with safeguarding financial stability, with the world economy still in the process of digesting the legacy of the crisis. The crisis has changed central banking in many ways: by shifting the focus of monetary policy from fighting too high inflation towards fighting too low inflation; by prompting new ‘experimental’ non-conventional measures, which risk to cause large, long-lasting market distortions and imbalances and which also have more far-reaching distributional consequences than ‘normal, conventional’ monetary policy; and by broadening central banks’ responsibilities particularly in the direction of safeguarding banking stability and financial stability at large. This raises several questions for the future: How long will ultra-easy monetary policies last? What are post-crisis growth trajectories, and how will the natural rate of interest rates evolve? How could an exit from ultra-easy monetary policy and a return towards higher nominal interest rates be eventually managed smoothly? Does ultra-easy monetary policy itself affect the economy in a lasting and structural way? Is the pre-crisis economic paradigm governing monetary policy still valid? If not, in what ways should it be adjusted? Are there any reasonable and practical alternatives? Against this background and given the larger post-crisis range of central banks’ responsibilities: is the current institutionalset-up governing central banks and their relationship to government, Parliament and the financial system still appropriate? What adaptations might be considered? Would they bring an improvement or, on the contrary, a set-back to the unsuccessful policy approaches of the 1960s and 1970s?
by 20 authors
edited by Ernest Gnan and Donato Masciandaro
Legal efficiency and consistency
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro
Mind-changes at the FOMC
by Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
by Piguillem, Facundo & Riboni, Alessandro
The Power of the Federal Reserve Chair
by Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J.
Nation-building, nationalism, and $$\hbox {wars}^*$$ wars ∗
by Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich & Alessandro Riboni
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
by ALESSANDRO RIBONI & FRANCISCO J. RUGE‐MURCIA
The Power of the Federal Reserve Chair
by Alessandro Riboni & Francisco Ruge-Murcia
Nation-Building, Nationalism, and Wars
by Alesina, Alberto F. & Reich, Bryony & Riboni, Alessandro

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pri86/