Eric Rasmusen

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Contact

Affiliations

• Indiana University / Kelley School of Business / Department of Business Economics and Public Policy
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Naked Exclusion (repec:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:5:p:1137-45)
  by Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr
• Naked Exclusion: Reply (repec:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:310-311)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen & John Shepard Wiley
• Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records (repec:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:3:p:843-885)
  by Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen
• Entry for Buyout (repec:bla:jindec:v:36:y:1988:i:3:p:281-99)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty (repec:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:1:p:11-21)
  by Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen
• First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets (repec:bla:jindec:v:60:y:2012:i:3:p:374-405)
  by Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon
• Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs (repec:bpj:bejeap:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:2)
  by Rasmusen Eric Bennett
• Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions (repec:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:7)
  by Rasmusen Eric Bennett
• Letter: Must Homeowners Lose Wealth When House Prices Fall? (repec:bpj:evoice:v:3:y:2006:i:4:n:8)
  by Rasmusen Eric B.
• Letter: What Economists Can Contribute to the Global Warming Debate (repec:bpj:evoice:v:5:y:2008:i:3:n:2)
  by Rasmusen Eric Bennett
• Letter: Is There Research Economist Support for the Stimulus Bill? (repec:bpj:evoice:v:6:y:2009:i:3:n:6)
  by Rasmusen Eric Bennett
• Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives (repec:cla:uclawp:595)
  by Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen
• Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty (repec:ecm:wc2000:1309)
  by Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen
• Career concerns and ambiguity aversion (repec:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:2:p:175-177)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• A simple model of product quality with elastic demand (repec:eee:ecolet:v:29:y:1989:i:4:p:281-283)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• The Posner argument for transferring health spending from old women to olden men (repec:eee:ecolet:v:53:y:1996:i:3:p:337-339)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• The observed choice problem in estimating the cost of policies (repec:eee:ecolet:v:61:y:1998:i:1:p:13-15)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• How optimal penalties change with the amount of harm (repec:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:1:p:101-108)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and signaling (repec:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:3:p:323-345)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions1 (repec:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:3:p:369-382)
  by Posner, Richard A. & Rasmusen, Eric B.
• Political uncertainty's effect on judicial recruitment and retention: Japan in the 1990s (repec:eee:jcecon:v:35:y:2007:i:2:p:329-345)
  by Ramseyer, J. Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B.
• Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification : Timur Kuran, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995) (repec:eee:jeborg:v:33:y:1998:i:2:p:309-311)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Norms and the Law (repec:eee:lawchp:2-20)
  by McAdams, Richard H. & Rasmusen, Eric B.
• Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality (repec:fth:indian:92-019)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing : A Unified Approach (repec:fth:indian:92-020)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law (repec:fth:indian:92-022)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• Perfectly Contestable Monopoly and Adverse Selection (repec:fth:indian:93-016)
  by Rasmusen, E. & Fernandez, L.
• Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game (repec:fth:indian:93-017)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry (repec:fth:indian:94-004)
  by Petrakis, E. & Rasmusen, E. & Roy, S.
• A Model of Negotiation, not Bargainig (repec:fth:indian:94-007)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract (repec:fth:indian:97-001)
  by Rasmussen, E.
• Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self Incrimination (repec:fth:indian:98-001)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions (repec:fth:indian:98-005)
  by Posner, R.A. & Rasmusen, E.
• A Theory of Trustees, and Other Thoughts (repec:fth:indian:98-007)
  by Rasmusen, E.
• First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Mark (repec:inu:caeprp:2007017)
  by Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon
• Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem (repec:iuk:wpaper:2004-10)
  by Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen
• Norms in Law and Economics (repec:iuk:wpaper:2004-11)
  by Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen
• When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value? (repec:iuk:wpaper:2004-12)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions (repec:iuk:wpaper:2004-13)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Agency Law and Contract Formation (repec:iuk:wpaper:2004-14)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993 (repec:iuk:wpaper:2005-03)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen
• The BLP Method of Demand Curve Estimation in Industrial Organization (repec:iuk:wpaper:2006-04)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Parking Lot Problem (repec:iuk:wpaper:2007-04)
  by Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen
• Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery (repec:iuk:wpaper:2007-05)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• A Reputation Model of Quality in North-South Trade (repec:iuk:wpaper:2007-06)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Quality-Ensuring Profits (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-10)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Some Common Confusions about Hyperbolic Discounting (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-11)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Career Concerns and Ambiguity Aversion (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-12)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Internalities and Paternalism: Applying the Compensation Criterion to Multiple Selves across Time (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-13)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Price Discrimination between Retailers with and without Market Power (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-14)
  by Barick Chung & Eric Rasmusen
• First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Markets (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-15)
  by Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon
• Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-16)
  by Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer
• Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-17)
  by Minoru Nakazato & Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen
• The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar: Levels and Determinants of Attorney Income (repec:iuk:wpaper:2008-18)
  by Minoru Nakazato & Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen
• Are Americans More Litigious? Some Quantitative Evidence (repec:iuk:wpaper:2010-18)
  by Eric Rasmusen & Mark Ramseyer
• Leveraging of Reputation Through Umbrella Branding with and Without Market Power (repec:iuk:wpaper:2011-07)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Coarse Grades: Informing the Public by Withholding Information (repec:iuk:wpaper:2012-06)
  by Rick Harbaugh & Eric Rasmusen
• Concavifying the Quasiconcave (repec:iuk:wpaper:2012-10)
  by Christopher Connell & Eric Rasmusen
• Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond (repec:iuk:wpaper:2013-11)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen
• Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan (repec:iuk:wpaper:2013-12)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen
• The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax (repec:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:4:p:295-318)
  by Frank Buckley & Eric Rasmusen
• Book reviews (repec:kap:jeczfn:v:71:y:2000:i:3:p:316-342)
  by R. Luce & M. Raith & E. Rasmusen & S. Grosskopf & K. Velupillai & W. Pauwels & E. Furubotn & P. Schmitz & S. Napel
• Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy (repec:kap:pubcho:v:72:y:1991:i:2-3:p:167-91)
  by Rasmusen, Eric B & Zupan, Mark A
• Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information (repec:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:4:p:899-913)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators (repec:kap:pubcho:v:78:y:1994:i:3-4:p:305-27)
  by Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark
• Choosing among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games: A Reply to Sloof (repec:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:2:p:209-14)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Observed Choice and Optimism in Estimating the Effects of Government Policies (repec:kap:pubcho:v:97:y:1998:i:1-2:p:65-91)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Agency Law and Contract Formation (repec:oup:amlawe:v:6:y:2004:i:2:p:369-409)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• An Income-Satiation Model of Efficiency Wages (repec:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:3:p:467-78)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality when Buyers Do Not Know the Sellers' Cost? (repec:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:4:p:561-67)
  by Rasmusen, Eric B & Perri, Timothy J
• Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game (repec:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:63-83)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan (repec:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:259-86)
  by Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B
• Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts (repec:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:1:p:65-92)
  by Rasmusen, Eric & Zenger, Todd
• When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value? (repec:oup:rfinst:v:20:y:2007:i:5:p:1647-1667)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar: Levels and Determinants of Attorney Income (repec:pra:mprapa:1444)
  by Nakazato, Minoru & Ramseyer, J. Mark & Rasmusen, Eric
• Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams (repec:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:autumn:p:428-435)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry (repec:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:summer:p:248-268)
  by Emmanuel Petrakis & Eric Rasmusen & Santanu Roy
• Internalities and paternalism: applying the compensation criterion to multiple selves across time (repec:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:601-615)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty (repec:tky:fseres:2001cf117)
  by Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen
• Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments (repec:tky:fseres:2001cf118)
  by Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen
• The Parking Lot Problem (repec:tky:fseres:2001cf119)
  by Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen
• When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States (repec:tky:fseres:2001cf126)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen
• Starategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions (repec:tky:fseres:2001cf127)
  by Eric B. Rasmusen
• Mutual Banks and Stock Banks (repec:ucp:jlawec:v:31:y:1988:i:2:p:395-421)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality (repec:ucp:jlawec:v:39:y:1996:i:2:p:519-43)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law (repec:ucp:jlstud:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:309-43)
  by Rasmusen, Eric & Ayres, Ian
• The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities (repec:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-69)
  by Rasmusen, Eric
• Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? (repec:ucp:jlstud:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:53-88)
  by Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B
• Observed Choice, Estimation, and Optimism About Policy Changes (repec:wpa:wuwpem:9506004)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase the Value of Options? (repec:wpa:wuwpfi:0409004)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining (repec:wpa:wuwpga:9506001)
  by Eric Rasmusen & .
• Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games (repec:wpa:wuwpga:9607004)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Games and Information Reader, Table of Contents (repec:wpa:wuwpga:9907002)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Games and Information Reader, Preface (repec:wpa:wuwpga:9907003)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Notes on Writing, Talking, and Listening (repec:wpa:wuwpgt:9607002)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery (repec:wpa:wuwpio:0409001)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry (repec:wpa:wuwpio:9506001)
  by Emmanuel Petrakis & Eric Rasmusen & Santanu Roy
• Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty (repec:wpa:wuwpio:9607002)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Naked Exclusion: A Reply (repec:wpa:wuwpio:9907001)
  by Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer & John Wiley
• Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality When Buyers do not Know the Sellers' Cost? (repec:wpa:wuwpio:9907002)
  by Eric Rasmusen & Timothy Perri
• The Objectives of Sexual Harassment Law, with Application to 1998's Ellerth, Oncale, and Faragher Decisions (repec:wpa:wuwpla:9907002)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• An Economic Approach to Adultery Law (repec:wpa:wuwple:0003005)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• ``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality'' (repec:wpa:wuwple:9506001)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• ``The Economics of Agency Law and Contract Formation'' (repec:wpa:wuwple:9506002)
  by Eric Rasmusen & .
• ``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,'' (repec:wpa:wuwple:9506003)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? (repec:wpa:wuwple:9907001)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen
• Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses (repec:wpa:wuwple:9907003)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen
• Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions (repec:wpa:wuwple:9907004)
  by Richard Posner & Eric Rasmusen
• ames and Information, Third Edition, Preface (repec:wpa:wuwpmi:9907004)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan (repec:wpa:wuwppe:9603001)
  by J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen
• The Posner Argument for Transferring Health Spending from Old Women to Old Men (repec:wpa:wuwppe:9607003)
  by Eric Rasmusen
• The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax (repec:wpa:wuwppe:9907003)
  by Francis Buckley & Eric Rasmusen