Ronald Peeters

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Contact

Affiliations

• University of Otago → School of Business → Department of Economics (weight: 80%)
  • website
  • location: Dunedin, New Zealand
• University of Otago → School of Business (weight: 20%)
  • website
  • location: Dunedin, New Zealand

Research profile

author of:

• symposium articles: A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria of n -person games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
• Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald J. A. P.
• Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Schinkel, Maarten Pieter
• Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
• A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
  by P. J. J. Herings & R. Peeters
• Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!
  by Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald
• Intertemporal price competition with exogenous demand shocks
  by Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald
• Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
  by Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus
• Pricing behavior in asymmetric markets with differentiated products
  by Peeters, Ronald & Strobel, Martin
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
  by P. Herings & Ronald Peeters
• The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs
  by De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald
• Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments
  by Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald
• Competition against peer-to-peer networks
  by Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Peeters, Ronald & Yang, Michael S.
• Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies
  by Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vermeulen, Dries
• Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
  by Mengel, Friederike & Peeters, Ronald
• An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
  by Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc
• Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
  by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Market Capturing Opportunities
  by Ronald Peeters & Erik Pot & Dries Vermeulen & Janos Flesch
• The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs
  by De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald
• Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment
  by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl
• Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
  by Mengel, Friederike & Peeters, Ronald
• IMMATERIAL REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN A VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT
  by RONALD PEETERS & MARC VORSATZ
• Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?
  by Iwan Bos & Ronald Peeters & Erik Pot
• Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games
  by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl
• The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs
  by Dakshina De Silva & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Beatrice Pagel & Ronald Peeters
• The role of monetary incentives in prediction markets: a time series approach
  by Wolk, K. L. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M.
• Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? -- A dynamic approach
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Yang, M. .
• Noncooperative collusion and price wars with individual demand fluctuations
  by Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Peters, H. J. M. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Network characteristics enabling efficient coordination: A simulation study
  by Khan, A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Thuijsman, F. & Uyttendaele, P.
• Overcoming Moral Hazard with Social Networks in the Worksplace: An Experimental Approach
  by Dhillon, Amrita & Peeters, Ronald & Muge Yukse, Ayse
• Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons
  by Méder, Z. Z. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Strategic party formation on a circle
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Saran, R. R. S. & Yüksel, A. M.
• Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
  by Méder, Z. Z. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Rivalry information acquisition and disclosure
  by Li, X. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Competition against peer-to-peer networks
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Yang, M.
• Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes
  by Embrey, M. S. & Mengel, F. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Truth, trust, and sanctions: on institutional selection in sender-receiver games
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M.
• Competition versus collusion: the impact of consumer inertia
  by Bos, I. & Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Sequential versus simultaneous auctioning of procurement contracts with common value and private value components
  by De Silva, D. & Pagel, B. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Equilibrium and arbitrage in incomplete asset markets with fixed prices
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H. M.
• Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Sequential auctions with synergies: an experimental analysis
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vorsatz, M.
• Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
  by Mengel, F. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Alternating-move hotelling with demand shocks
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vorsatz, M.
• Differentiated product markets : an experimental test of two equilibrium concepts
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Strobel, M.
• Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
  by Khan, A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• The impact of the irrelevant - Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Strobel, M. & Vermeulen, A. J. & Walzl, M.
• Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?
  by Bos, I. & Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Intentional price wars on the equilibrium path
  by Pot, E. A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Peters, H. J. M. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Cheap talk with multiple strategically interacting audiences: An experimental study
  by Li, X. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
  by Khan, A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Dynamic competition with consumer inertia
  by Pot, Erik & Flesch, János & Peeters, Ronald & Vermeulen, Dries
• Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
  by Khan, A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Dynamic competition with consumer inertia
  by Pot, E. A. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Focal prices and price cycles in an alternating price duopoly experiment
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Dynamic competition with consumer inertia
  by Pot, E. A. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Accounting in de "Nieuwe Economie": op zoek naar een relevantere berichtgeving?
  by Vergauwen, P. G. M. C.
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Eliciting and aggregating individual expectations: An experimental study
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Wolk, K. L.
• Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
  by Khan, Abhimanyu & Peeters, Ronald
• Sender-Receiver Games
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Potters, J. A. M.
• Overcoming moral hazard with social networks in the workplace: An experimental approach
  by Dhillon, Amrita & Peeters, Ronald & Yuksel, Ayse Muge
• On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Potters, J. A. M.
• INCENTIVES IN PREDICTION MARKETS
  by Leonard Wolk & Ronald Peeters
• Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
  by Abhimanyu Khan & Ronald Peeters
• Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment
  by Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus
• Forecasting with Colonel Blotto
  by Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Wolk, K. L.
• Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market
  by Khan, A. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Do markets encourage risk-seeking behaviour?
  by Mengel, F. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Editorial comment on “A Note on the Equivalence of the Conjectural Variations Solution and the Coefficient of Cooperation” by Escrihuela-Villar, M., The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Volume 15, Issue 2, Pages 473–480, 2015
  by Peeters Ronald
• A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute All Nash Equilibria for n-Person Games
  by P. Herings & Ronald Peeters
• On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries
  by Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald
• Number of bidders and the winner's curse
  by Peeters, Ronald & Tenev, Anastas
• Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s Law
  by Ronald Peeters & Rene Saran & Ayşe Müge Yüksel
• The Impact of the Irrelevant: Temporary Buy-Options and Bidding Behavior in Auctions
  by Ronald Peeters & Martin Strobel & Dries Vermeulen & Markus Walzl
• Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion
  by Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters
• Eliciting strategies in indefinitely repeated games of strategic substitutes and complements
  by Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters
• On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries
  by Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald
• Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
  by Méder, Zsombor Z. & Flesch, János & Peeters, Ronald
• Competition versus collusion: The impact of consumer inertia
  by Iwan Bos & Ronald Peeters & Erik Pot
• A RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
  by RUUD HENDRICKX & RONALD PEETERS & JOS POTTERS
• Rivalry information acquisition and disclosure
  by Xinyu Li & Ronald Peeters
• Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games
  by Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank
• Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market
  by Khan, Abhimanyu & Peeters, Ronald
• EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES
  by P. JEAN-JACQUES HERINGS & RONALD J. A. P. PEETERS
• An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies
  by Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vorsatz, M.
• Simple guilt and cooperation
  by Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz
• Number of bidders and the winner’s curse
  by Ronald Peeters & Anastas P. Tenev
• Piracy on the Internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A dynamic approach
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Yang, Michael S.
• PRIZE‐BASED MECHANISMS FOR FUND‐RAISING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
  by Damian S. Damianov & Ronald Peeters
• Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse
  by Peeters Ronald & Tenev Anastas P.
• Elicitation of expectations using Colonel Blotto
  by Ronald Peeters & Leonard Wolk
• Naïve imitation and partial cooperation in a local public goods model
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Tenev, Anastas & Thuijsman, Frank
• Price Competition in a Vertizontally Differentiated Duopoly
  by Bos, Iwan & Peeters, Ronald
• Adaptive learning in weighted network games
  by Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank
• Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks
  by Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald
• Eliciting interval beliefs: An experimental study
  by Ronald Peeters & Leonard Wolk
• Strategy revision opportunities and collusion
  by Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters
• Evolution of Behavior When Duopolists Choose Prices and Quantities
  by Abhimanyu Khan & Ronald Peeters
• Cheap Talk with Multiple Strategically Interacting Audiences: An Experimental Study
  by Xinyu Li & Ronald Peeters