Paul Pezanis-Christou
Names
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Paul |
| last: |
Pezanis-Christou |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of Adelaide
/ School of Economics and Public Policy
Research profile
author of:
- Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-07)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou - Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2015-13)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Guth - Counter Intuitive Learning: An Exploratory Study (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2016-12)
by Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alan Kirman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Structural Analysis of First-Price Auction Data: Insights from the Laboratory (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2016-17)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu - A Naïve Approach to Bidding (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2017-03)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu - More Money vs More Certainty? Behaviour in Stochastic Alternating-Offer Experiments (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2017-06)
by Anna Conte & Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou - An evolutionary analysis of bidding behaviour in fair division games (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2017-12)
by Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Structural Analysis of First-Price Auction Data: Insights from the Laboratory (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2018-08)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andrés Romeu - An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2018-09)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Güth - Exploration vs Exploitation, Impulse Balance Equilibrium and a specification test for the El Farol bar problem (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2018-11)
by Alan Kirman & François Laisney & Paul Pezanis-Christou - A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions (RePEc:adl:wpaper:2018-12)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu - Organizational Structure, Communication, and Group Ethics (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:5:p:2478-91)
by Matthew Ellman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - The Spanish Auction for Government Securities: A Laboratory Analysis (RePEc:aub:autbar:482.02)
by Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments (RePEc:aub:autbar:531.02)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu - Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs (RePEc:aub:autbar:551.02)
by Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis (RePEc:aub:autbar:558.03)
by Tibor Neugebauer & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions (RePEc:aub:autbar:578.03)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh - Competition with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design (RePEc:aub:autbar:581.03)
by Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Arthur Schram - Organisational structure, communication and group ethics (RePEc:aub:autbar:682.07)
by Matthew Ellman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: a Laboratory Analysis (RePEc:bge:wpaper:24)
by Tibor Neugebauer & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Organisational structure, communication and group ethics (RePEc:bge:wpaper:290)
by Matthew Ellman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Competitions with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design (RePEc:bge:wpaper:66)
by Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Arthur Schram - Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions (RePEc:bge:wpaper:85)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh - Loss Aversion and Learning to Bid (RePEc:bla:econom:v:79:y:2012:i:314:p:226-257)
by Dennis A. V. Dittrich & Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher & Paul Pezanis‐Christou - Counter Intuitive Learning: An Exploratory Study (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6029)
by Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alan P. Kirman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Competition with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000172)
by Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Arthur Schram - Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:525:p:192-214)
by Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Arthur Schram - Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:134:y:2015:i:c:p:1-3)
by Güth, Werner & Pezanis-Christou, Paul - Observational and reinforcement pattern-learning: An exploratory study (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:104:y:2018:i:c:p:1-21)
by Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Kirman, Alan & Pezanis-Christou, Paul - An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:505-530)
by Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Pezanis-Christou, Paul & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Selten, Reinhard - Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:61:y:2006:i:2:p:284-303)
by Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Pezanis-Christou, Paul - Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:1:p:55-72)
by Neugebauer, Tibor & Pezanis-Christou, Paul - Loss aversion and learning to bid (RePEc:esi:discus:2005-03)
by Dennis A. V. Dittrich & Werner Güth & Martin Kocher & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty (RePEc:fth:nesowa:96/15)
by Pezanis-Christou, P. - On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions (RePEc:fth:nesowa:97/05)
by Pezanis-Christou, P - Observational and Reinforcement Pattern-learning: An Exploratory Study (RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-24)
by Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alan Kirman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279157)
by Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Reinhard Selten - Auctions for government securities : A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279192)
by Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Bidding Behavior at Sequential First-Price Auctions With(out) Supply Uncertainty : A Laboratory Analysis (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279237)
by Tibor Neugebauer & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Competition with Forward Contracts : A Laboratories Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279255)
by Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Arthur Schram - Observational and reinforcement pattern-learning : An exploratory study (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01723513)
by Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alan Kirman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Counter intuitive learning: An exploratory study (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01358716)
by Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alan Kirman & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Relaxing the symmetry assumption in participation games: a specification test for cluster-heterogeneity (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:26:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-023-09797-8)
by Alan Kirman & François Laisney & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Strategic ambiguity and risk in alternating pie-sharing experiments (RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:66:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11166-022-09401-z)
by Anna Conte & Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Loss aversion and learning to bid (RePEc:lmu:muenar:18205)
by Dittrich, Dennis Alexis Valin & Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. & Pezanis-Christou, Paul - On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:69-89)
by Paul Pezanis-Christou - An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00739-9)
by Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Pareto's compensation principle (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:441-444)
by Murray C. Kemp & Paul Pezanis-Christou - Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:c037828e-dcce-4af4-9125-4bd20449f03b)
by Pezanis-Christou, P. & Sadrieh, A. - Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c037828e-dcce-4af4-9125-4bd20449f03b)
by Pezanis-Christou, P. & Sadrieh, A. - Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:525:p:192-214)
by Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis‐Christou & Arthur Schram - An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:252001)
by Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Pezanis-Christou, Paul & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Selten, Reinhard - Exploration vs exploitation, impulse balance equilibrium, and a specification test for the El Farol bar problem (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18038)
by Kirman, Alan P. & Laisney, François & Pezanis-Christou, Paul