Bezalel Peleg
(Deceased since 20190509)
Names
first:  Bezalel 
last:  Peleg 
Contact
homepage:  http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~pelegba 
phone:  97226584134 
Research profile
author of:

Singlepeakedness and coalitionproofness
by Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg 
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton 
Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules.
by Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Peleg, Bezalel 
Markets with Countably Many Commodities.
by Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E. 
Efficiency prices in an infinitedimensional space
by Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E. 
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken 
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken 
An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces.
by Majumdar, Mukul & Peleg, Bezalel 
CoalitionProof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
by Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D. 
A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
by Kannai, Yakar & Peleg, Bezalel 
Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
by Bezalel Peleg 
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms.
by Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef 
A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case
by Peleg, Bezalel 
A theory of coalition formation in committees
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
by van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. 
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
by Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter 
Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games.
by Peleg, Bezalel & Potters, Jos A. M. & Tijs, Stef H. 
Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions
by Bezalel Peleg 
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia 
A note on Gale's example
by Aumann, R. J. & Peleg, B. 
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form.
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. 
Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
original papers : Constitutional implementation
by Eyal Winter & Bezalel Peleg 
A Price Characterization of Efficient Random Variables.
by Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, M. E. 
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
by Moulin, H. & Peleg, B. 
An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
by Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel 
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions.
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter SudhÃlter 
The DuttaRay Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties.
by Jens Leth Hougaard & Bezalel Peleg & Lars Peter Østerdal 
STRATEGYPROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES
by BARBERA, S. & PELEG, B. 
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition  proof
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Binary Effectivity Rules
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games
by Barry O'Neill & Bezalel Peleg 
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
The modified golden rule of a multisector economy
by Peleg, Bezalel & Ryder, Harl Jr. 
On the nonemptiness of the MasColell bargaining set
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter 
Shortrune stable matchings between bees and flowers
by Peleg, B. & Shmida, A. 
On the set of Lorenzmaximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
by Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars ThorlundPetersen & Bezalel Peleg 
An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter 
On the NonEmptiness of the MasColell Bargaining Set
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter 
When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis
by Werner G., th & Bezalel Peleg 
Consistent Voting Systems.
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
by Einy, Ezra & Peleg, Bezalel 
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Bargaining Sets of Voting Games
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter 
Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
Axiomatizations of the core
by Peleg, Bezalel
edited by 
Co‐evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust
by Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Bezalel Peleg 
A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von NeumannMorgenstern solution
by Peleg, Bezalel 
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmuller, Joachim 
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games
by Barry O'Neill & Bezalel Peleg 
On ring formation in auctions
by Guth, Werner & Peleg, Bezalel 
Correlated equilibria of games with many players
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
by Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel 
Efficient random variables
by Peleg, Bezalel 
The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation
by Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel 
Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism.
by Peleg, B. 
Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters
by B. Pezaleleleg & Hans Peters 
The MCvalue for monotonic NTUgames
by Bezalel Peleg & Stef Tijs & Peter Borm & GertJan Otten 
Utility Functions for Partially Ordered Topological Spaces.
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Gametheoretic analysis of voting in committees
by Peleg, Bezalel
edited by 
A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Walras Equilibrium.
by Peleg, B. 
On Ring Formation in Auctions.
by Guth, W. & Peleg, B. 
Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction.
by Peleg, B. 
A Weakly Maximal GoldenRule Program for a MultiSector Economy.
by Peleg, Bezalel 
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse.
by Peleg, B. 
Automata, Matching and Foraging Behavior of Bees.
by Thuijsman, F. & Peleg, B. & Amitai, M. & Shmida, A. 
Minimal of consitent solutions for strategic games,in paticular for potential games
by Bezalel Peleg & Stef Tijs & Jos Potters 
Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia 
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
Binary effectivity rules
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
Lexicographic composition of simple games
by O'Neill, Barry & Peleg, Bezalel 
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium
by Bezalel Peleg 
My joint work with Michael Maschler
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism
by Bezalel Peleg 
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans 
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam
by Robert J. Aumann & EinYa Gura & Sergiu Hart & Bezalel Peleg & Hana Shemesh & Shmuel Zamir 
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
by d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B. 
On BayesianNash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
by Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel 
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter 
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I  Symmetries
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter 
Implementation by mediated equilibrium
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel Procaccia 
A formal approach to Nash's program
by Peleg, Bezalel 
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II  Representation
by Sudhölter, Peter & Rosenmüller, Joachim 
A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Single peakedness and coalition proofness
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter 
On the Impact of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter & Jose M. Zarzuelo 
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M. 
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of twoperson NTU games
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter & José Zarzuelo 
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
Partial Equilibrium in Pure Exchange Economies
by Peleg, B. 
A Formal Approach to Nash´s Program
by Peleg, B. 
When will the fittest survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B. 
Coevolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust
by Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel 
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization
by Bezalel Peleg 
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
by Peleg Bezalel & Peters Hans 
Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters
by Peters Hans & Peleg Bezalel 
Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton 
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
by Peleg B. & Peters H. J. M. 
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
When will the fittest survive? : an indirect evolutionary analysis
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B. 
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees
by Thuijsman, F. & Peleg, B. & Amitai, M. & Shmida, A. 
The consistency principle for games in strategic form
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. 
The MCvalue for monotonic NTUgames
by Otten, G. J. M. & Borm, P. E. M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. 
Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
by Peleg, B. & Potters, J. A. M. & Tijs, S. H. 
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter 
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games
by van Heumen, R. W. J. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. & Borm, P. E. M. 
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games
by van Heumen, R. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. & Borm, P. E. M. 
On Ring Formation in Auctions
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B. 
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
by van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. 
The consistency principle for games in strategic form
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. 
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
by van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S. H. 
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
by Bezalel Peleg & Menahem E. Yaari 
Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions
by David Levhari & Jacob Paroush & Bezalel Peleg 
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter 
On Optimal Consumption Plans in a Multisector Economy
by Bezalel Peleg & Harl E. Ryder 
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
by d'ASPREMONT, Claude & PELEG, Bezalel 
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization
by Peleg, B. & Peters, H. J. M. 
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg 
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
Sequential aggregation judgments: Logical derivation of relevance relation
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games: A Correction
by Bezalel Peleg 
Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
by M. Maschler & B. Peleg & L. S. Shapley 
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
by Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter 
An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
by Bezalel Peleg 
A Note on an Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
by Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg 
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
by Rosenmüller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel 
The kernel of homogeneous games with steps
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter 
THE DUTTARAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES
by JENS LETH HOUGAARD & BEZALEL PELEG & LARS PETER ØSTERDAL 
An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter 
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans 
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter 
Sequential aggregation of judgments
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans 
Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME
by PETER SUDHÖLTER & BEZALEL PELEG 
Selfimplementation of social choice correspondences in strong Equilibrium
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans 
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter 
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
by Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman 
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
by Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman 
Selfimplementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters 
Judgements aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir 
An inductive method for constructing mimmal balanced collections of finite sets
by Bezalel Peleg 
Utility functions of money for clear games
by Bezalel Peleg 
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
by Peleg, Bezalel & Zamir, Shmuel 
The dummy paradox of the bargaining set
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter 
A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games
by Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel 
Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees
by Peleg, Bezalel 
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games
by Barry ONeill & Bezalel Peleg 
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
by Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter 
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia