Zvika Neeman
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Zvika |
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Neeman |
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Contact
Affiliations
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Tel Aviv University
/ Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Water Auctions Within The Agricultural Sector: Conduct And Performance In Israel (RePEc:ags:aaea12:125278)
by DiSegni, Dafna M. & Zvika, Neeman & Feder, Amity - Corruption And Openness (RePEc:ags:huaedp:14977)
by Neeman, Zvika & Paserman, Daniele & Simhon, Avi - Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:8:y:1999:i:2:p:191-221)
by Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman - The Quality Of Information And Incentives For Effort (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:3:p:642-660)
by Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman - Are Career Women Good for Marriage? (RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-167)
by Zvika Neeman & Andrew F. Newman & Claudia Olivetti - Are Working Women Good for Marriage? (RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-039)
by Zvika Neeman & Andrew F. Newman & Claudia Olivetti - Corruption and Openness (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:50)
by Neeman Zvika & Paserman M. Daniele & Simhon Avi - Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.1:y:2002:i:1:n:6)
by Neeman Zvika & Orosel Gerhard Oskar - Contestable Licensing (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.3:y:2004:i:1:n:1)
by Neeman Zvika & Orosel Gerhard Oskar - Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:6)
by Neeman Zvika & Vulkan Nir - Corruption and Openness (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4057)
by Simhon, Avi & Paserman, Daniele & Neeman, Zvika - Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6864)
by Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika - Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8548)
by Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika - Geography, Transparency and Institutions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9625)
by Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika - Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:122:y:2012:i:563:p:933-956)
by Omer Moav and & Zvika Neeman - On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:1:p:213-233)
by Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman - Contestable Licensing (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1430)
by Zvika Neeman - Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:162-164)
by Neeman, Zvika - Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:77-96)
by Neeman, Zvika - The effectiveness of English auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:2:p:214-238)
by Neeman, Zvika - Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:1:p:121-134)
by Kugler, Tamar & Neeman, Zvika & Vulkan, Nir - On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:4:p:536-556)
by Neeman, Zvika & Orosel, Gerhard O. - Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:303-324)
by Minehart, Deborah & Neeman, Zvika - The relevance of private information in mechanism design (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:117:y:2004:i:1:p:55-77)
by Neeman, Zvika - Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:473-501)
by Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory - Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:85:y:1999:i:1:p:91-121)
by Neeman, Zvika & Orosel, Gerhard O. - On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:29:y:1995:i:3:p:195-212)
by Neeman, Zvika - On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:31:y:1996:i:1:p:54c-54c)
by Neeman Z. - Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis (RePEc:fth:bosecd:100)
by Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel - Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders (RePEc:fth:bostec:92)
by Neeman, Z. & Orosel, G.O. - The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design (RePEc:fth:bostec:93)
by Neeman, Z. - The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions (RePEc:fth:bostec:95)
by Neeman, Z. - Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (RePEc:fth:bostin:0083)
by Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman - Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders (RePEc:fth:bostin:0092)
by Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel - The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design (RePEc:fth:bostin:0093)
by Zvika Neeman - The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions (RePEc:fth:bostin:0095)
by Zvika Neeman - Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (RePEc:fth:bostin:83)
by Minehart, D. & Neeman, Z. - Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance (RePEc:fth:waslbp:9904)
by Neeman, Z. & Orosel, G.O. - Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp290)
by Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman - Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp319)
by Tamar Kugler & Zvika Neeman & Nir Vulkan - Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp349)
by Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman - On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp350)
by Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman - Corruption and Openness (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp353)
by Zvika Neeman & M. Daniele Paserman & Avi Simhon - Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5693)
by Attali, Yigal & Neeman, Zvika & Schlosser, Analia - Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_130:plsad_2.0.tx_2-x)
by Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman - Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_52:cjramd_2.0.tx_2-t)
by Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman - Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (RePEc:nbr:nberch:12190)
by Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman - Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13702)
by Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman - Judging Under Public Pressure (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28894)
by Alma Cohen & Zvika Neeman & Florian Auferoth - Adversarial Selection (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35031)
by Alma Cohen & Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman & Eilon Solan - On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1002)
by Zvika Neeman - A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1029)
by Zvika Neeman - Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1052)
by Zvika Neeman - Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1083)
by Enriqueta Aragones & Zvika Neeman - Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1092)
by Zvika Neeman - The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:685-703)
by Neeman, Zvika - Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:21:y:2005:i:2:p:285-314)
by Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman - Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:23:y:2010:i:3:p:1089-1119)
by Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman - Corruption and Openness (RePEc:red:sed006:164)
by Zvika Neeman & Daniele Paserman & Avi Simhon - Robustness against inefficient manipulation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:55-67)
by Eyal Baharad & Zvika Neeman - Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State (RePEc:tbs:wpaper:11-002)
by Joram Mayshar & Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman - Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:7:y:2009:i:2-3:p:377-387)
by Vincent P. Crawford & Tamar Kugler & Zvika Neeman & Ady Pauzner - Status and Poverty (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:8:y:2010:i:2-3:p:413-420)
by Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman - Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy? (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/669717)
by Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman - Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition (RePEc:upf:upfgen:162)
by Enriqueta Aragonés & Zvika Neeman - Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design (RePEc:uwo:uwowop:20101)
by Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov - Unknown item RePEc:vie:viennp:0004 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:vie:viennp:0103 (paper)
- Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie9711)
by Zvika NEEMAN & Gerhard O. OROSEL - Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie9904)
by Zvika NEEMAN & Gerhard O. OROSEL