Roger B. Myerson
Names
| first: |
Roger |
| middle: |
B. |
| last: |
Myerson |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Chicago
/ Harris School of Public Policy (weight: 80%)
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University of Chicago
/ Department of Economics (weight: 20%)
Research profile
author of:
- Working Paper 300 - Village Communities and Global Development (RePEc:adb:adbwps:2399)
by Myerson Roger B. - Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:68:y:1978:i:2:p:231)
by Myerson, Roger B - Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:5:p:1182-1196)
by Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier - Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:586-603)
by Roger B. Myerson - Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:37:y:1999:i:3:p:1067-1082)
by Roger B. Myerson - Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:47:y:2009:i:4:p:1109-25)
by Roger B. Myerson - Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's The Bankers' New Clothes (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:52:y:2014:i:1:p:197-210)
by Roger B. Myerson - Game Theory and the First World War (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:61:y:2023:i:2:p:716-35)
by Roger B. Myerson - Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:77-89)
by Roger B. Myerson - Economic Effects of Constitutions (RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:287:p:555-556)
by Roger B. Myerson - Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three‐way, Experimental Elections (RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:3:p:185-218)
by T. Reitz & R. Myerson & R. Weber - A macroeconomic model of Russian transition (RePEc:bla:etrans:v:15:y:2007:i:1:p:77-107)
by Serguey Braguinsky & Roger Myerson - Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:4:p:727-742)
by Roger B. Myerson - Construction de l'Etat, leadership et démocratie locale (RePEc:cai:rferfe:rfe_112_0003)
by Roger Myerson - Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept (RePEc:cla:levarc:537)
by R. Myerson - The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:102:y:2008:i:01:p:125-139_08)
by Myerson, Roger B. - A Theory of Voting Equilibria (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09)
by Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J. - Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:04:p:856-869_10)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1542)
by Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson - Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:45:y:1977:i:7:p:1631-37)
by Myerson, Roger B - Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:1:p:61-73)
by Myerson, Roger B - Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:49:y:1981:i:4:p:883-97)
by Myerson, Roger B - Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:4:p:911-30)
by Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B - Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:6:p:1767-97)
by Myerson, Roger B - Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:6:p:1799-819)
by Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B - Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:52:y:1984:i:2:p:461-87)
by Myerson, Roger B - Multistage Games with Communication (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:2:p:323-58)
by Myerson, Roger B - Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information (RePEc:ecm:nasm04:659)
by Roger Myerson - Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0686)
by Roger B. Myerson - Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:671-697)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:767-778)
by Myerson, Roger - Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility (RePEc:eee:gamchp:2-24)
by Myerson, Roger B. - John Nash's Contribution to Economics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:2:p:287-295)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Dual Reduction and Elementary Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:183-202)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:111-131)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Viscous population equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:101-109)
by Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:36:y:2001:i:1:p:20-25)
by Myerson, Roger - Game-Theoretic Models of Politics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:1-2)
by Banks Jeffrey S. & Myerson Roger B. - Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:118-132)
by Myerson Roger B. - Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:60:y:2007:i:1:p:104-134)
by Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B. - Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:35-65)
by Myerson Roger B. - A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:4:y:1983:i:4:p:309-351)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:219-251)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:260-285)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:74-102)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:29:y:1983:i:2:p:265-281)
by Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A. - Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:264-303)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Large Poisson Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:94:y:2000:i:1:p:7-45)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Linking the best and worst of global trends (RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:39:y:2017:i:4:p:608-610)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:10:y:1982:i:1:p:67-81)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan (RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:53:y:2014:i:c:p:46-54)
by Myerson, Roger - The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics (RePEc:feb:natura:00635)
by Ufuk Akcigit & Fernando Alvarez & Stephane Bonhomme & George M Constantinides & Douglas W Diamond & Eugene F Fama & David W Galenson & Michael Greenstone & Lars Peter Hansen & Uhlig Harald & James J H - Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04302684)
by Roger Myerson & Jörgen W. Weibull - Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information" (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:50:y:2004:i:12_supplement:p:1818-1824)
by Roger B. Myerson - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:2:y:1977:i:3:p:225-229 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:3:y:1978:i:4:p:265-274 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:6:y:1981:i:1:p:58-73 (article)
- Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200406)160:2_187:peatwd_2.0.tx_2-2)
by Roger B. Myerson - Unknown item RePEc:nos:voprec:2010-06-3 (article)
- Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory (RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2010:id:1034)
by R. Myerson - Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy (RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00000002)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory (RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00013006)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1000)
by Roger B. Myerson - Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1023)
by Rebecca B. Morton & Roger B. Myerson - Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1063)
by Roger B. Myerson - Bargaining (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1089)
by Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson - Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1095)
by Roger B. Myerson - Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1102)
by Roger B. Myerson - Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1102r)
by Roger B. Myerson - Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1103)
by Roger B. Myerson - Dual Reduction and Elementary Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1133)
by Roger B. Myerson - Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1134)
by Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson - John Nash's Contribution to Economics (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1154)
by Roger B. Myerson - Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1155)
by Roger B. Myerson - Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1162)
by Roger B. Myerson - Large Poisson Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1189)
by Roger B. Myerson - Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1214)
by Roger B. Myerson - Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1216r)
by Roger B. Myerson - Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1242)
by Roger B. Myerson - Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1261)
by Roger B. Myerson - Economic Analysis of Constitutions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1291)
by Roger B. Myerson - Value of Games in Partition Function Form (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:244)
by Roger B. Myerson - An Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:245)
by Roger B. Myerson - Graphs and Cooperation in Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:246)
by Roger B. Myerson - Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:247)
by Roger B. Myerson - Values of Games Without Sidepayments (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:267)
by Ehud Kalai & Roger B. Myerson - Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:272)
by Ehud Kalai & Roger B. Myerson - Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:284)
by Roger B. Myerson - Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:288)
by Roger B. Myerson - Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:295)
by Roger B. Myerson - Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:321)
by Roger B. Myerson - An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:338)
by Roger B. Myerson - Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:339)
by Roger B. Myerson - Optimal Auction Design (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:362)
by Roger B. Myerson - Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:363)
by Roger B. Myerson - A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:381)
by Roger B. Myerson - An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:392r)
by Roger Myerson - Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:412)
by David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson - Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:429)
by Roger B. Myerson - Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:432)
by Roger B. Myerson - A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:433)
by Roger B. Myerson - Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:469s)
by Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite - Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:481)
by Roger B. Myerson - Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:495)
by Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson - Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:527)
by Roger B. Myerson - Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:528)
by Roger B. Myerson - Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:548)
by Roger B. Myerson - Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:582)
by Roger B. Myerson - Multistage Games with Communication (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:590)
by Roger B. Myerson - Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:591)
by Roger B. Myerson - An Introduction to Game Theory (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:623)
by Roger B. Myerson - Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:658)
by Roger B. Myerson - Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:671)
by Roger B. Myerson - Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:691)
by Roger B. Myerson - Dynamic Matching Problems With Incentive Constraints (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:721)
by Roger B. Myerson - Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:767)
by Roger B. Myerson - A Theory of Voting Equilibria (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:782)
by Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber - Mechanism Design (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:796)
by Roger B. Myerson - Viscous Population Equilibria (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:906)
by Roger B. Myerson - Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:907)
by Roger B. Myerson - Proportional Representation (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:928)
by Roger B. Myerson - Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:956)
by Roger B. Myerson - An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria (RePEc:oup:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:1:p:59-69.)
by Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin - Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions (RePEc:pal:buseco:v:56:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1057_s11369-020-00199-9)
by Roger B. Myerson - Standards for State-Building Interventions (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-38359-4_13)
by Roger B. Myerson - Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights (RePEc:red:issued:06-195)
by Serguey Braguinsky & Roger Myerson - Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment (RePEc:red:sed005:49)
by Roger Myerson & Serguey Braguinsky - Oligarchic Property Rights And The Transition To A Market Economy In Russia (RePEc:red:sed006:288)
by Serguey Braguinsky & Roger Myerson - Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents (RePEc:red:sed012:182)
by Roger Myerson - Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson (RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_005)
by Maskin, Eric S. & Myerson, Roger B. - Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory (RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_006)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Autobiography (RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_008)
by Myerson, Roger - A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:3:p:470-482)
by Roger B. Myerson - Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:416-433)
by Roger B. Myerson - On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:62-73)
by Roger B. Myerson - Population uncertainty in contests (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:469-474)
by Roger Myerson & Karl Wärneryd - Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:571-590)
by Rebecca Morton & Roger Myerson - Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:133-54)
by Myerson, R B - An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:355-83)
by Forsythe, Robert & Rietz, Thomas & Myerson, Roger & Weber, Robert - Population uncertainty and Poisson games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392)
by Roger B. Myerson - Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:59-75)
by Roger Myerson - Cooperative games with incomplete information (RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_25)
by R.B. Myerson - Local agency costs of political centralization (RePEc:the:publsh:3763)
by Myerson, Roger B. - Capitalist investment and political liberalization (RePEc:the:publsh:570)
by , B. - A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/668839)
by Roger B. Myerson - Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/694634)
by Roger Myerson - An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections (RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-04)
by Forsythe, R. & Myerson, R. & Rietz, T. & Weber, R. - An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories (RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-31)
by Forsythe, R. & Myerson, R. & Rietz, T. & Weber, R. - Local foundations for better governance : A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's Localizing Development (RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7131)
by Myerson, Roger B. - The strength of American federal democracy : lessons for global development (RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7512)
by Myerson,Roger B. - Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i::p:2083-2126)
by Roger B. Myerson - Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i:3:p:943-976)
by Roger Myerson & Jörgen Weibull - Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:88:y:2020:i:2:p:495-531)
by Roger B. Myerson & Philip J. Reny