Daniel Monte
Names
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Daniel |
| last: |
Monte |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV)
/ Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP)
Research profile
author of:
- The Daycare Assignment Problem (repec:aah:aarhec:2011-05)
by John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets (repec:aah:aarhec:2012-09)
by Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Matching with Quorums (repec:aah:aarhec:2012-10)
by Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (repec:aah:aarhec:2015-23)
by John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Daycare Choice and Ethnic Diversity: Evidence from a Randomized Survey (repec:aah:aarhec:2019-02)
by Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Mette Gørtz & John Kennes & Ran Sun Lyng & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems (repec:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:55-97)
by John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules (repec:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:1:p:359-98)
by Caio Lorecchio & Daniel Monte - The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem (repec:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:362-406)
by John Kennes Jr. & Daniel Monte Jr. & Norovsambuu Tumennasan Jr. - Sustaining International Rules in a Multipolar World (repec:aea:apandp:v:116:y:2026:p:127-132)
by Cecilia Carvalho & Nicolas Goulart & Daniel Monte & Emanuel Ornelas - Labor market competition over the business cycle (repec:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:4:p:1593-1615)
by Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro - A Theory of Credibility under Commitment (repec:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:33)
by Monte Daniel - Equilibrium trade regimes: power- vs. rules-based (repec:cep:cepdps:dp2128)
by Cecilia Carvalho & Daniel Monte & Emanuel Ornelas - Sustaining international rules in a multipolar world (repec:cep:cepdps:dp2152)
by Cecilia Carvalho & Nicolas Goulart & Daniel Monte & Emanuel Ornelas - Equilibrium Trade Regimes: Power- vs. Rules-Based (repec:ces:ceswps:_12203)
by Cecilia Carvalho & Daniel Monte & Emanuel Ornelas - Sustaining International Rules in a Multipolar World (repec:ces:ceswps:_12395)
by Cecilia Carvalho & Nicolas Goulart & Daniel Monte & Emanuel Ornelas - Equilibrium Trade Regimes: Power- vs. Rules-Based (repec:cpr:ceprdp:20751)
by Carvalho, Cecilia & Monte, Daniel & Ornelas, Emanuel - Sustaining International Rules in a Multipolar World (repec:cpr:ceprdp:21050)
by Carvalho, Cecilia & Goulart, Nicolas & Monte, Daniel & Ornelas, Emanuel - Matching with quorums (repec:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:14-17)
by Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device (repec:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:18-21)
by Monte, Daniel - The limits in the adoption of batteries (repec:eee:eneeco:v:107:y:2022:i:c:s0140988321006174)
by Moita, Rodrigo & Monte, Daniel - Bad reputation with simple rating systems (repec:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:150-178)
by Lorecchio, Caio & Monte, Daniel - Learning with bounded memory in games (repec:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:204-223)
by Monte, Daniel - Costly information intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers (repec:eee:jeborg:v:239:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125003889)
by Monte, Daniel & Pinheiro, Roberto - Bounded memory and permanent reputations (repec:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:5:p:345-354)
by Monte, Daniel - Centralized allocation in multiple markets (repec:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:74-85)
by Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - Centralized allocation in multiple markets (repec:fgv:eesptd:322)
by Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - Competition in cascades (repec:fgv:eesptd:456)
by Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simões & Monte, Daniel - Hydroeletric Generators Competing in Cascades (repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:74:y:2020:i:1:a:76860)
by Moita, Rodrigo Menon & Monte, Daniel - Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly (repec:fip:fedcwp:1721)
by Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro - Costly Information Intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers (repec:fip:fedcwq:172101)
by Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro - Oligopsonies over the Business Cycle (repec:fip:fedcwq:87536)
by Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro - Competitive Equilibrium and Optimal Capacity Matrix in Electricity Markets with Renewables (repec:idb:brikps:10078)
by Moita, Rodrigo & Monte, Daniel - Discrimination and Daycare Choice: Evidence from a Randomized Survey (repec:iza:izadps:dp14874)
by Batsaikhan, Mongoljin & Gørtz, Mette & Kennes, John & Lyng, Ran Sun & Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - Discrimination and Daycare Choice: Evidence from a Randomized Survey (repec:kud:kucebi:1914)
by Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Mette Goertz & John Kennes & Ran Sun Lyng & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan - Baggage fees in airlines: Is this a good idea? (repec:pra:mprapa:101864)
by Botteon Costa, Raone & Ferman, Bruno & Monte, Daniel - Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation (repec:pra:mprapa:115926)
by Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique - Diversity Fosters Learning in Environments with Experimentation and Social Learning (repec:pra:mprapa:117095)
by Cunha, Douglas & Monte, Daniel - Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory (repec:pra:mprapa:23854)
by Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher - The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world (repec:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:59-82)
by Daniel Monte & Maher Said - Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory (repec:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:137-143)
by Daniel Monte - Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets (repec:spr:reecde:v:23:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-019-00224-0)
by Daniel Monte & Ideen Riahi & Nikolaus Robalino - Discrimination and Daycare Choice Evidence from a Randomized Survey (repec:uwp:jhriss:v:61:y:2026:i:3:p:898-922)
by Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Mette Gørtz & John Kennes & Ran Sun Lyng & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan