Wieland Müller

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Affiliations

• Universität Wien / Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Universität Wien / Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE) (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations (RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:8:y:2010:i:4:p:717-743)
  by Wieland Müller & Andrew Schotter
• Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:62:y:2014:i:1:p:137-166)
  by Jan Boone & Wieland Müller & Sigrid Suetens
• Why the Rich Are Nastier Than the Poor – A Note on the Distribution of Wealth When Individuals Care for Payoff Differentials (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:53:y:2000:i:2:p:153-160)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller
• Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach (RePEc:bla:metroe:v:51:y:2000:i:3:p:235-256)
  by Manfred Konigstein & Wieland Muller
• Attitudes Towards Risk: An Experiment (RePEc:bla:metroe:v:54:y:2003:i:1:p:89-124)
  by Jürgen Eichberger & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller
• Merger without Cost Advantages (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1461)
  by Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller
• Merger in Contests (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_241)
  by Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller
• Taxation and Market Power (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2880)
  by Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath & Wieland Müller
• Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_290)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Norman
• Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information, and Market Structure (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_435)
  by Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller
• Taxation and Market Power (RePEc:cje:issued:v:47:y:2014:i:1:p:173-202)
  by Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath & Wieland Müller
• The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6949)
  by Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland
• Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7303)
  by Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland & Suetens, Sigrid
• Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations (RePEc:cso:wpaper:0022)
  by Wieland Muller & Andrew Schotter
• Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:111:y:2001:i:474:p:749-65)
  by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• The Merger Paradox and why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:117:y:2007:i:522:p:1073-1095)
  by Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann
• The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:1:p:33-35)
  by Harmgart, Heike & Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland
• Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:134-137)
  by Boone, Jan & Larraín Aylwin, María Jose & Müller, Wieland & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita
• Divisionalization in contests (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:70:y:2001:i:1:p:89-93)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Muller, Wieland
• Why firms should care for customers (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:72:y:2001:i:1:p:47-52)
  by Konigstein, Manfred & Muller, Wieland
• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:73:y:2001:i:2:p:213-217)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Muller, Wieland
• Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:1:p:126-131)
  by Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Potters, Jan
• Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:65:y:2014:i:c:p:164-180)
  by Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:258-275)
  by Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James
• Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:144:y:2024:i:c:p:1-12)
  by Argenton, Cédric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
• Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:174-190)
  by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland
• The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:161-169)
  by Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland
• To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:240-264)
  by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:51:y:2005:i:1:p:109-127)
  by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:1:p:37-62)
  by Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:219-236)
  by Kübler, Dorothea & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:373-393)
  by Müller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron
• Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:102-119)
  by Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex
• Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:658-674)
  by Müller, Wieland & Tan, Fangfang
• Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:10:p:1437-1460)
  by Kubler, Dorothea & Muller, Wieland
• Strategic delegation in experimental markets (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:4:p:561-574)
  by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:2:p:265-276)
  by Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland
• Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:6:p:508-517)
  by Argenton, Cédric & Müller, Wieland
• Cooperation in infinitely repeated games of strategic complements and substitutes (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:188:y:2021:i:c:p:1191-1205)
  by Mermer, Ayşe Gül & Müller, Wieland & Suetens, Sigrid
• The quality of the signal matters -- a note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:45:y:2001:i:1:p:99-106)
  by Muller, Wieland
• Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:60:y:2006:i:1:p:100-111)
  by Muller, Wieland
• Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:79:y:2011:i:3:p:291-302)
  by Engelmann, Dirk & Müller, Wieland
• Framing effects and impatience: Evidence from a large scale experiment (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:84:y:2012:i:2:p:701-711)
  by van der Heijden, Eline & Klein, Tobias J. & Müller, Wieland & Potters, Jan
• Strategies, heuristics, and the relevance of risk-aversion in a dynamic decision problem (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:22:y:2001:i:4:p:493-522)
  by Muller, Wieland
• On the profitability of collusion in location games (RePEc:eee:juecon:v:54:y:2003:i:3:p:499-510)
  by Huck, Steffen & Knoblauch, Vicki & Muller, Wieland
• Process innovations and improvements as a determinant of the competitive position in the international plastic market (RePEc:eee:respol:v:4:y:1975:i:1:p:88-105)
  by Schott, B. & Muller, W.
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach (RePEc:esi:discus:2002-10)
  by Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth
• From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence (RePEc:esi:discus:2003-07)
  by Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller
• Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (RePEc:esi:discus:2005-25)
  by Wieland Müller & Werner Güth & Jan Potters & Susanne Büchner
• Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison (RePEc:hol:holodi:0402)
  by Dorothea Kuebler, Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann
• Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1794)
  by Kübler, Dorothea & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Framing Effects and Impatience: Evidence from a Large Scale Experiment (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7085)
  by van der Heijden, Eline & Klein, Tobias J. & Müller, Wieland & Potters, Jan
• An Experimental Analysis of Intertemporal Allocation Behavior (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1026589319018)
  by Vital Anderhub & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Martin Strobel
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:17-33)
  by Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler
• Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample (RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:44:y:2012:i:3:p:261-293)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller
• Taxation and market power (RePEc:lmu:muenar:22060)
  by Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian & Müller, Wieland
• The merger paradox and why aspiration levels let it fail in the laboratory (RePEc:lmu:muenar:22094)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Taxation and Market Power (RePEc:lmu:muenar:22170)
  by Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian & Müller, Wieland
• Merger and Collusion in Contests (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200212)158:4_563:macic_2.0.tx_2-z)
  by Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller
• Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A Rationale for Consistency (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200509)161:3_491:cvaesa_2.0.tx_2-g)
  by Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann
• Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_557:svwet_2.0.tx_2-v)
  by Steffen Huck & Vicki Knoblauch & Wieland Müller
• Who Acts More Like a Game Theorist? Group and Individual Play in a Sequential Market Game and the Effect of the Time Horizon (RePEc:mpi:wpaper:who_acts_more_like_a_game_theorist)
  by Wieland Mueller & Fangfang Tan
• Who Is (More) Rational? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16791)
  by Syngjoo Choi & Shachar Kariv & Wieland Müller & Dan Silverman
• Signaling without common prior: An experiment (RePEc:not:notcdx:2009-08)
  by Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Mueller & Alex Possajennikov
• The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: on Clustering in the Four-Player Hotelling Game (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:231-240)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland M¸ller
• Fairness in Stackelberg Games (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52337-1_15)
  by Steffen Huck & Manfred Königstein & Wieland Müller
• The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On Clustering in the Four-Player Hotelling Game (RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:409)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller & Nicolaas J. Vriend
• Unknown item RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp409 (paper)
• Cournot Meets Bayes-Nash: A Discontinuity in Behavior in Finitely Repeated Duopoly Games (RePEc:rco:dpaper:460)
  by Cédric Argenton & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Wieland Müller
• Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations (RePEc:spr:joevec:v:17:y:2007:i:1:p:53-61)
  by Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann
• Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:443-456)
  by Miguel Fonseca & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann
• Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110170)
  by Jeroen Hinloopen & Wieland Mueller & Hans-Theo Normann
• Allais for All : Revisiting the Paradox (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:07a8abb4-e971-4b54-83d2-fe7aea4c0b87)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• Collusion in Experimental Bertrand Duopolies with Convex Costs : The Role of Information and Cost Asymmetry (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3ac8a030-4aa1-4171-9898-bc42ed5c62d6)
  by Argenton, C. & Müller, W.
• The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:4902e2bb-47cb-4922-b4c8-64da5a8bb806)
  by Boone, J. & Müller, W.
• Naked Exclusion : Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:6613eb2c-6339-48e1-b940-64ea91eba827)
  by Boone, J. & Müller, W. & Suetens, S.
• Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:89ede7f9-cdab-4dfd-801d-eae502618c59)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Knoblauch, V.
• From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining : Theory and Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:8dc1ff84-fa0c-4fee-96eb-f2379374f3c4)
  by Fischer, S. & Güth, W. & Stiehler, A. & Müller, W.
• Taxation and Market Power (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:9573a1fc-e592-4d38-ae35-4af370b55cc0)
  by Konrad, K.A. & Morath, F. & Müller, W.
• Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a8169c9e-6667-42f7-b97e-6dee87821f4b)
  by Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A.
• Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability : A New Rationale for Consistency (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:af576ec2-1637-4390-8b59-168594455ca9)
  by Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Big Data and Democracy (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:be2ffeae-1e75-4a5b-9860-5261cb3d2ff5)
  by van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens
• Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:bec182fc-5222-4ec2-9632-3369a281269f)
  by Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
• Allowing for Two Production Periods in the Cournot Duopoly : Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:c074dc14-e2ff-406f-94dd-8eb79591c07c)
  by Müller, W.
• Endogenous Timing in Duopoly : Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:ddc44fc6-8a7a-4320-bfb2-b30cb8be0822)
  by Fonseca, M.A. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:e67ab3af-a90a-4c8e-8b62-a8f7b44746e4)
  by Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Potters, J.J.M.
• Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:ebb40f77-fdd6-4362-b88b-0b669284fce0)
  by Müller, W. & Schotter, A.
• Job Market Signalling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f25d3215-6181-4b68-89f9-1a50bb7027ea)
  by Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:03d1f1c4-0f0f-4d7c-8428-406bc1002e97)
  by Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
• The Miracle as Randomization Device : A Lesson from Richard Wagner's Romantic Opera Tannhauser und der Sangerkrieg auf Wartburg (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:2d5fd402-d8cf-4af2-9e1f-a53908331688)
  by Harmgart, H. & Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• Merger Without Costs Advantage (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:7769039c-6d8e-433c-b88a-4fcbcc4b53c3)
  by Huck, S. & Konrad, K.A. & Müller, W.
• Abuse of a Dominant Position : Cases and Experiments (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:7e471876-96e7-46c7-a956-e62e1029ebbb)
  by van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P. & Müller, W.
• Big Data and Democracy (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:ecc11d8d-1478-4dd2-b570-442383f694a3)
  by van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens
• Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantage : The role of intenal organization, information and market structure (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:028203f3-7fb8-485a-9701-fda9952d3945)
  by Huck, S. & Konrad, K.A. & Müller, W.
• Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:03d1f1c4-0f0f-4d7c-8428-406bc1002e97)
  by Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
• Allais for All : Revisiting the Paradox (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:07a8abb4-e971-4b54-83d2-fe7aea4c0b87)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• Merger and collusion in contests (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:1d331df7-67f7-49d8-afa8-e532f87b8077)
  by Huck, S. & Konrad, K.A. & Müller, W.
• The East End, the West End and King's Cross : On clustering in the four-player Hotelling game (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:1e3e12cd-ae62-49dc-8f43-1e6d2a467d1f)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Vriend, N.J.
• The Miracle as Randomization Device : A Lesson from Richard Wagner's Romantic Opera Tannhauser und der Sangerkrieg auf Wartburg (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2d5fd402-d8cf-4af2-9e1f-a53908331688)
  by Harmgart, H. & Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2f596fe7-d2d9-4429-8bcf-3e1fa97d118c)
  by Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y. & Yehezkel, Y.
• Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly : Experimental evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:357e4d3c-5d3b-43ee-8d03-30526bf3d6a9)
  by Müller, W.
• Collusion in Experimental Bertrand Duopolies with Convex Costs : The Role of Information and Cost Asymmetry (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:3ac8a030-4aa1-4171-9898-bc42ed5c62d6)
  by Argenton, C. & Müller, W.
• The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:4902e2bb-47cb-4922-b4c8-64da5a8bb806)
  by Boone, J. & Müller, W.
• Endogenous timing in duopoly : Experimental evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:4ce35136-68ab-4ee4-a119-4117913108b5)
  by Fonseca, M.A. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• To commit or not to commit : Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:52f12df4-ce93-42ae-b8f4-5e0c1f8f6e2b)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages : An experimental study on forward induction (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:572509ab-51a9-4b52-837d-0fc31dd8a3ec)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• Strategic delegation in experimental markets (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:64e031eb-d6bb-4b12-8b1e-1deebd886521)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Naked Exclusion : Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:6613eb2c-6339-48e1-b940-64ea91eba827)
  by Boone, J. & Müller, W. & Suetens, S.
• The miracle as a randomization device : A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera "Tannhauser und der Sanggerkrieg auf Wartburg" (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:67a2990e-304d-403f-a9b9-08203c2274c9)
  by Harmgart, H. & Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• The merger paradox and why aspiration levels let it fail in the laboratory (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:696552e2-c177-425b-8b47-f35c87f1185c)
  by Huck, S. & Konrad, K.A. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Merger Without Costs Advantage (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7769039c-6d8e-433c-b88a-4fcbcc4b53c3)
  by Huck, S. & Konrad, K.A. & Müller, W.
• Abuse of a dominant position : Cases and experiments (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7e29244c-5b35-4759-ab63-b5c813dedc8a)
  by van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P. & Müller, W.
• Abuse of a Dominant Position : Cases and Experiments (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7e471876-96e7-46c7-a956-e62e1029ebbb)
  by van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P. & Müller, W.
• Attitudes towards risk : An experiment (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:801c3440-0ba5-49f7-bb3b-c91d6e1c1bcc)
  by Eichberger, J. & Güth, W. & Müller, W.
• Spatial voting with endogenous timing (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:8838210a-a44f-44e6-b42d-996cd2f1d718)
  by Huck, S. & Knoblauch, V. & Müller, W.
• Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:89ede7f9-cdab-4dfd-801d-eae502618c59)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Knoblauch, V.
• From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining : Theory and Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:8dc1ff84-fa0c-4fee-96eb-f2379374f3c4)
  by Fischer, S. & Güth, W. & Stiehler, A. & Müller, W.
• Taxation and Market Power (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9573a1fc-e592-4d38-ae35-4af370b55cc0)
  by Konrad, K.A. & Morath, F. & Müller, W.
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining : Theory and experimental evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9d8fded2-0338-4217-afa9-1f80c82ee1d8)
  by Fischer, S. & Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Stiehler, A.
• Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a8169c9e-6667-42f7-b97e-6dee87821f4b)
  by Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A.
• Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability : A new rationale for consistency (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a9dba38c-5ab2-4ec3-ba6f-254742fd66a9)
  by Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• On the profitability of collusion in location games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:acfc82a2-59ee-401b-9e40-cbec73007674)
  by Huck, S. & Knoblauch, V. & Müller, W.
• Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability : A New Rationale for Consistency (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:af576ec2-1637-4390-8b59-168594455ca9)
  by Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b5bac987-362f-46e4-b478-cae33e125a7d)
  by Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b7c31ae9-6e3b-479f-a868-7921ca46ebdd)
  by Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Potters, J.J.M.
• Tax liability side equivalence in an experimental posted offer market (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:bac0e339-660b-4215-99d4-c253b77c5cf0)
  by Borck, R. & Engelmann, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Big Data and Democracy (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:be2ffeae-1e75-4a5b-9860-5261cb3d2ff5)
  by van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens
• Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:bec182fc-5222-4ec2-9632-3369a281269f)
  by Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
• Allowing for Two Production Periods in the Cournot Duopoly : Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c074dc14-e2ff-406f-94dd-8eb79591c07c)
  by Müller, W.
• Framing effects and impatience : Evidence from a large scale experiment (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c90d9213-54eb-41d6-8334-2cce85f63f3f)
  by van der Heijden, E.C.M. & Klein, T.J. & Müller, W. & Potters, J.J.M.
• Absent-minded drivers in the lab : Testing Gilboa's model (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d741c924-4e37-40ec-b617-445bd4ad8d25)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W.
• Endogenous Timing in Duopoly : Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ddc44fc6-8a7a-4320-bfb2-b30cb8be0822)
  by Fonseca, M.A. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Noisy leadership : An experimental approach (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e4796461-8862-4085-a867-8934e11fbe6f)
  by Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y.
• Job-market signalling and screening : An experimental study (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e60074dd-75cb-47df-965c-acdb35b012d5)
  by Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e67ab3af-a90a-4c8e-8b62-a8f7b44746e4)
  by Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Potters, J.J.M.
• Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ebb40f77-fdd6-4362-b88b-0b669284fce0)
  by Müller, W. & Schotter, A.
• Big Data and Democracy (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ecc11d8d-1478-4dd2-b570-442383f694a3)
  by van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens
• Job Market Signalling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f25d3215-6181-4b68-89f9-1a50bb7027ea)
  by Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T.
• Simultaneous and sequential price competition on heterogeneous duopoly markets : Experimental evidence (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f2d9029e-d44e-48af-8187-f1e2e528ea24)
  by Kübler, D. & Müller, W.
• Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:8:y:2010:i:4:p:717-743)
  by Wieland Müller & Andrew Schotter
• Who Is (More) Rational? (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1105)
  by Syngjoo Choi & Shachar Kariv & Wieland Mueller & Dan Silverman
• Naked exclusion in the lab: The case of sequential contracting (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1109)
  by Jan Boone & Wieland Müller & Sigrid Suetens
• Nudges and Impatience: Evidence from a Large Scale Experiment (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1110)
  by Wieland Mueller & Eline van der Heijden & Tobias J. Klein & Jan Potters
• Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1111)
  by Wieland Mueller & Fangfang Tan
• Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1112)
  by Jeroen Hinloopen & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann
• Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes (RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1603)
  by Ayse Gül Mermer & Wieland Müller & Sigrid Suetens
• Taxation and Market Power (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:47:y:2014:i:1:p:173-202)
  by Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath & Wieland Müller
• Tax Liability‐Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted‐Offer Markets (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:68:y:2002:i:3:p:672-682)
  by Rainald Borck & Dirk Engelmann & Wieland Müller & Hans‐Theo Normann
• Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result (RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:9804001)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Mueller
• The quality of the signal matters - A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves (RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:9902001)
  by Wieland Müller
• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets (RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:9906002)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann
• Absent–Minded Drivers In The Lab: Testing Gilboa'S Model (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:04:n:s0219198902000793)
  by Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller
• Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment (RePEc:yor:yorken:09/08)
  by Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov
• Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence (RePEc:zbw:dicedp:116)
  by Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• On Saving, Updating and Dynamic Programming -An Experimental Analysis- (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199732)
  by Anderhub, V. & Güth, W. & Härdle, Wolfgang & Müller, W.
• The relevance of equal splits: On a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19987)
  by Güth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland
• Why the rich are nastier than the poor: A note on optimal punishment (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19988)
  by Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland
• On the Emergence of Attitudes towards Risk - Some Simulation Results (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199912)
  by Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Strobel, M.
• The quality of the signal matters - A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199917)
  by Müller, W.
• Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199932)
  by Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199938)
  by Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics: The indirect evolutionary approach (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199939)
  by Königstein, Manfred & Müller, Wieland
• Strategies, heuristics and the relevance of risk aversion in a dynamic decision problem (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199961)
  by Müller, Wieland
• Dynamic decision structure and risk taking (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199995)
  by Eichberger, Jürgen & Güth, Werner & Müller, Wieland
• Why firms should care for customers (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:2000102)
  by Königstein, Manfred & Müller, Wieland
• Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:2000113)
  by Güth, Sandra & Güth, Werner & Müller, Wieland
• On the profitability of collusion in location games (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200023)
  by Huck, Steffen & Knoblauch, Vicki & Müller, Wieland
• The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On clustering in the four-player hotelling game (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200024)
  by Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Vriend, Nicolaas J.
• Profitable horizontal mergers: A market structure-oriented view (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200027)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland
• Merger in contests (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:20003)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland
• Strategic delegation in experimental markets (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200039)
  by Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Absent-minded drivers in the lab: Testing Gilboa's model (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200045)
  by Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland
• Tax liability side equivalence in experimental posted-offer markets (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:20008)
  by Borck, Rainald & Engelmann, Dirk & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
• Divisionalization in contests (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:20009)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland
• Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: Experimental evidence (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200197)
  by Kübler, Dorothea & Müller, Wieland
• Cournot Meets Bayes-Nash: A Discontinuity in Behavior in Finitely Repeated Duopoly Games (RePEc:zbw:vfsc22:264079)
  by Argenton, Cédric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
• Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure (RePEc:zbw:wzbdiv:fsiv0105)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland
• Taxation and market power (RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii201007)
  by Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian & Müller, Wieland
• Merger and collusion in contests
  [Kollusion und Fusion in Contests] (RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0104)
  by Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland
• On the profitability of collusion in location games
  [Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen] (RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0222)
  by Huck, Steffen & Knoblauch, Vicki & Müller, Wieland