Paul Milgrom
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Stanford University
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:2:p:603-07)
by Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom - Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:2:p:585-623)
by Eric Budish & Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima & Paul Milgrom - Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:10:p:2852-66)
by Nick Arnosti & Marissa Beck & Paul Milgrom - Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:5:p:1383-1405)
by Paul Milgrom - Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:2:p:184-93)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:2:p:154-59)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:3:p:511-28)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:2:p:84-88)
by Milgrom, Paul R & Qian, Yingyi & Roberts, John - Comparing Equilibria (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:84:y:1994:i:3:p:441-59)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - The Firm as an Incentive System (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:84:y:1994:i:4:p:972-91)
by Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul - The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Reply (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:4:p:997-99)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - The LeChatelier Principle (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:1:p:173-79)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Matching with Contracts (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:913-935)
by John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom - The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:4:p:1653-74)
by Robert E. Hall & Paul R. Milgrom - Assignment Messages and Exchanges (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:1:y:2009:i:2:p:95-113)
by Paul Milgrom - Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:3:p:160-85)
by John H. Kagel & Yuanchuan Lien & Paul Milgrom - What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:22:y:2008:i:2:p:115-131)
by Paul Milgrom - Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:3:y:1989:i:3:p:3-22)
by Milgrom, Paul - Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations (RePEc:anr:reveco:v:11:y:2019:p:383-405)
by Paul Milgrom - Critical Issues In The Practice Of Market Design (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:49:y:2011:i:2:p:311-320)
by Paul Milgrom - The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs (RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:1-23)
by Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast* - Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:1:p:9-35)
by Meyer, Margaret & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Communication and Inventory as Substitutes in Organizing Production (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:90:y:1988:i:3:p:275-89)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:frontiers.1:y:2002:i:1:n:1)
by Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R - Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_533_0391)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul R. Milgrom - Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt32s7d4jv)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Adverse Selection Without Hidden Information (RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt62t1w8hf)
by Milgrom, Paul - employment contracts, influence activities and efficient organization design (RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt6pf6c5j6)
by Milgrom, Paul R. - Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future (RePEc:cje:issued:v:21:y:1988:i:3:p:444-58)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence (RePEc:cla:levarc:1460)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cla:levarc:239)
by David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson - Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (RePEc:cla:levarc:245)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal-Form Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:418)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complements (RePEc:cla:levarc:449)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Information and timing in repeated partnerships (RePEc:cla:levarc:636)
by Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce - Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000780)
by John W. Hatfield & Paul Milgrom - Ascending Proxy Auctions (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000785)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom - Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001454)
by Paul Milgrom - Substitutes Valuations with Divisible Goods (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000126)
by Paul Milgrom & Bruno Strulovici - Package Auctions and Package Exchanges: the 2004 Fisher-Schultz Lecture (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000131)
by Paul Milgrom - The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000135)
by Robert E. Hall & Paul R. Milgrom - Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000503)
by Paul Milgrom - Substitute Valuations, Auctions and Equilibrium with Discrete Goods (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000713)
by Paul Milgrom & Bruno Strulovici - What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000045)
by Paul Milgrom - When Should Control Be Shared? (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000050)
by Paul Milgrom & Eva M Meyersson Milgrom & Ravi Singh - Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:665)
by Meyer, Margaret A & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, Donald John - Putting Auction Theory to Work (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521536721)
by Milgrom,Paul - Putting Auction Theory to Work (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521551847)
by Milgrom,Paul - Organizing Production in a Large Economy (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:672)
by Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber - Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:708r)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:709)
by Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts - Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:742)
by Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom - Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:749)
by Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts - A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:775r)
by John Geanakoplos & Paul R. Milgrom - Auction Theory (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:779)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Quasirents, Influence and Organization Form (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:797)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:875)
by David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom - Redesigning Spectrum Licenses to Encourage Innovation and Investment (RePEc:ecl:stabus:repec:ecl:stabus:3587)
by Milgrom, Paul R. & Weyl, E. Glen & Zhang, Anthony Lee - A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:3:p:679-88)
by Milgrom, Paul R - An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:49:y:1981:i:1:p:219-22)
by Milgrom, Paul - Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:49:y:1981:i:4:p:921-43)
by Milgrom, Paul R - Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:2:p:443-59)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:5:p:1089-1122)
by Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J - Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:2:p:303-28)
by Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul - Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:6:p:1255-77)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:6:p:1713-33)
by Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David - Monotone Comparative Statics (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:1:p:157-80)
by Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris - Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:2:p:583-601)
by Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal - Package Auctions and Exchanges (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:75:y:2007:i:4:p:935-965)
by Paul Milgrom - Game theory and the spectrum auctions (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:771-778)
by Milgrom, Paul - Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:113-128)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:1:p:62-70)
by Milgrom, Paul - Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:210-231)
by Kagel, John H. & Lien, Yuanchuan & Milgrom, Paul - Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing (RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:19:y:1995:i:2-3:p:179-208)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:212-247)
by Milgrom, Paul & Strulovici, Bruno - Extended proper equilibrium (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000752)
by Milgrom, Paul & Mollner, Joshua - Information, trade and common knowledge (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:26:y:1982:i:1:p:17-27)
by Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy - Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:245-252)
by Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert - Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:280-312)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:51:y:1990:i:1:p:1-31)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul - Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:14:y:1985:i:1:p:71-100)
by Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R. - A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention (RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:5:y:1991:i:3:p:205-225)
by Geanakoplos, John & Milgrom, Paul - The value of information in a sealed-bid auction (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:10:y:1982:i:1:p:105-114)
by Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J. - Competitive bidding and proprietary information (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:11:y:1983:i:2:p:161-169)
by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J. - Complementarities and systems: Understanding japanese economic organization (RePEc:emx:esteco:v:9:y:1994:i:1:p:3-42)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Monotone Comparative Statics (RePEc:fth:stante:11)
by Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C. - When Should Control Be Shared? (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:1:p:404-418)
by Eva M Meyersson Milgrom & Paul Milgrom & Ravi Singh - Taming the Communication and Computation Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: The FUEL Bid Language (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:4:p:2217-2238)
by Martin Bichler & Paul Milgrom & Gregor Schwarz - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:10:y:1985:i:4:p:619-632 (article)
- Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships (RePEc:mit:worpap:468)
by Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom - How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design (RePEc:nbr:nberch:14008)
by Paul R. Milgrom & Steven Tadelis - Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation (RePEc:nbr:nberch:14942)
by Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Neil Newman & Ilya Segal - Market Design for Surface Water (RePEc:nbr:nberch:14943)
by Billy A. Ferguson & Paul Milgrom - The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (RePEc:nbr:nberch:7235)
by Timothy F. Bresnahan & Paul Milgrom & Jonathan Paul - The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11245)
by Robert E. Hall & Paul R. Milgrom - Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14765)
by Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom - How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24282)
by Paul R. Milgrom & Steven Tadelis - Market Design for Surface Water (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32010)
by Billy A. Ferguson & Paul Milgrom - Unknown item RePEc:nos:voprec:2009-03-6 (article)
- What the Seller Wont Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2009:id:851)
by P. Milgrom - Concepts and Properties of Substitute Goods (RePEc:nuf:econwp:0602)
by Paul Milgrom & Bruno Strulovici - A Bidding Model of Price Formation Under Uncertainty (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:364)
by Paul Milgrom - Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:377r)
by Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey - An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:393r)
by Paul Milgrom - Equilibrium Limit Pricing Doesn't Limit Entry (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:399r)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Rational Expectations (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:406)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:407r)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:427)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:428r)
by Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber - A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:447r)
by Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber - The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:462)
by Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber - Topologies on Information and Strategies in Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:463)
by Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber - Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:570)
by Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom - Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52)
by Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul - Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:3:p:453-476.)
by Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster - Substitute Valuations, Auctions, and Equilibrium with Discrete Goods (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:339)
by Bruno Strulovici & Paul Milgrom - An Essay on Price Discrimination (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-08630-6_10)
by Paul Milgrom - The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit5)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10acmhc)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12acmec)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12acmhc)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra1b)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98cra2)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Package Bidding : Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions (RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_3_410411)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul R. Milgrom - Complementarity in Organizations
[The Handbook of Organizational Economics] (RePEc:pup:chapts:9889-1)
by Erik Brynjolfsson & Paul Milgrom - Auction Theory Evolving: Theorems and Applications (RePEc:ris:nobelp:2020_003)
by Milgrom, Paul R. - Biographical (RePEc:ris:nobelp:2020_006)
by Milgrom, Paul - Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (RePEc:rje:bellje:v:12:y:1981:i:autumn:p:380-391)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation (RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:summer:p:305-309)
by Paul R. Milgrom - Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:18-32)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (RePEc:sip:dpaper:03-034)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom - Ascending Proxy Auctions (RePEc:sip:dpaper:03-035)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom - The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (RePEc:sip:dpaper:03-036)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom - When Should Control Be Shared? (RePEc:sip:dpaper:06-037)
by Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom & Paul Milgrom & Ravi Singh - Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions (RePEc:sip:dpaper:07-008)
by Paul Milgrom - Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions (RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-013)
by Paul Milgrom - Assignment Messages and Exchanges (RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-014)
by Paul Milgrom - Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-023)
by Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom - The Case for Unlicensed Spectrum (RePEc:sip:dpaper:11-002)
by Paul Milgrom & Jonathan Levin & Assaf Eilat - Core-selecting package auctions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:393-407)
by Robert Day & Paul Milgrom - Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8731)
by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. - An Essay on Price Discrimination (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8732)
by Paul Milgrom. - Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8741)
by Paul R. Milgrom. - Adverse Selection without Hidden Information (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8742)
by Paul Milgrom. - Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704074)
by Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal - Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions? (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:3:p:607-15)
by Milgrom, Paul - Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:4:p:745-76)
by Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R - Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:108:y:2000:i:2:p:245-272)
by Paul Milgrom - Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:94:y:1986:i:4:p:796-821)
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John - Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:96:y:1988:i:1:p:42-60)
by Milgrom, Paul R - Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction (RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1986)
by Milgrom, Paul - Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:86:y:2018:i:1:p:219-261)
by Paul Milgrom & Joshua Mollner - Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:91:y:2023:i:6:p:1969-2003)
by Mohammad Akbarpour & Scott Duke Kominers & Kevin Michael Li & Shengwu Li & Paul Milgrom - Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (RePEc:wop:stanec:02004)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom - Matching with Contracts (RePEc:wop:stanec:03003)
by Paul Milgrom - Strongly Coalition-Proof Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:wop:stanec:95002)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - The LeChatelier Principle (RePEc:wop:stanec:95007)
by Paul Milgrom & John Roberts - Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (RePEc:wop:stanec:98002)
by Paul Milgrom - The Envelope Theorems (RePEc:wop:stanec:99016)
by Paul Milgrom