George J. Mailath

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• University of Pennsylvania → Department of Economics
  • website
  • location: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (United States)

Research profile

author of:

• Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research
  by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A.
• Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
• Who wants a good reputation?
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
• Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations
  by Cripps, M. W. & Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
• Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria
  by Mailath, G. J. & Postlewaite, A. & Samuelson, L.
• Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices
  by Mailath, G. J. & Postlewait, A. & Samuelson, L.
• EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.
  by MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. & SWINKELS, J.
• Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games.
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. M.
• Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games.
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. M.
• Evolution and Endogenous Interations.
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A.
• How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
• How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George Mailath & Stephen Morris
• The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  by George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi
• Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Investment and Concern for Relative Position
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
  by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sroni
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
  by George J. mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels
• Class systems and the enforcement of social norms
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Efficient non-contractible investments
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• When do regulators close banks? When should they?
  by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
• When do regulators close banks? When should they?
  by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
• A positive analysis of bank closure
  by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
• A positive analysis of bank closure
  by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
• Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective.
  by Mailath, G. J. & Morris, S.
• Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
  by Andrew Abel & George J. Mailath
• Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
  by Andrew Abel & George J. Mailath
• FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS.
  by ABEL, A. B. & MAILATH, G. J.
• EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.
  by MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. & SWINKELS, J.
• EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES.
  by MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. & SWINKELS, J.
• Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games.
  by Kandori, M. & Mailath, G. J.
• extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.
  by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.
• Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
  by George J. Mailath
• Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games
  by George J. Mailath
• Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form?
  by George J. Mailath
• How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
  by George J. Mailath
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Investment and Concern for Relative Position
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information
  by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni
• "Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models''
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions''
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• "Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms''
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory''
  by George J. Mailath
• "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search''
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective''
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• "Who Wants a Good Reputation?''
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments''
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''
  by George Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Endogenous Interactions
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Investment and Concern for Relative Position
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
  by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni
• Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Evolution and Endogenous Interactions
  by George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
• Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search
  by Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath & Avner Shaked
• Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory
  by George J. Mailath
• Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory].
  by George J. Mailath
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types.
  by Mailath, George J.
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games.
  by Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J. & Rob, Rafael
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.
  by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
  by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)
  by Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath
• original papers : Investment and concern for relative position
  by George J. Mailath & Harold L. Cole & Andrew Postlewaite
• Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth.
  by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
• Aristocratic Equilibria: Response.
  by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
  by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
• The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example
  by Mailath, George J.
• Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics
  by Mailath, George J.
• The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  by Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi
• Class systems and the enforcement of social norms
  by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
• Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games
  by Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew
• Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
  by Abel Andrew B. & Mailath George J.
• A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure
  by Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J.
• Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions
  by Mailath George J.
• Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
  by Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M.
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version)
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Social Assets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
  by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
  by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite
• Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria
  by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
  by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
  by Mailath, George J.
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
  by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
  by Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter
• Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
  by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
  by Cripps, M. W. & Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by Stephen Morris & George J. Mailath
• Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets
  by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Social Assets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
  by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• The Social Context of Economic Decisions
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown
  by George J. Mailath & Georg Noldeke
• Common Learning
  by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria
  by Mailath, George J.
• On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
  by Mailath, George J.
• Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Steven A. Matthews & Tadashi Sekiguchi
• SOCIAL ASSETS
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
  by Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry
• Common Learning
  by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Common Learning
  by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?
  by George J. Mailath & Georg Noldeke
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
  by Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy
• Reputation Effects
  by George J. Mailath
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski
• Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring
  by George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski
• Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
  by George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski
• Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
  by Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg
• Common Learning
  by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies
  by Cole Harold Linh & Mailath George J. & Postlewaite Andrew
• Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
  by Mailath George J. & Matthews Steven A. & Sekiguchi Tadashi
• Pricing in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version
  by George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski
• Pricing in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications
  by George J. Mailath & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
• "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships
  by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry
• Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
  by Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech
• Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown
  by Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg
• Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence
  by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series
  by George J. Mailath & Rosa L. Matzkin
• Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Pricing in Matching Markets
  by Larry Samuelson & Andrew Postlewaite & George Mailath
• Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
  by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
  by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Matching with Incomplete Information
  by Quingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Matching with Incomplete Information
  by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Common learning with intertemporal dependence
  by Martin Cripps & Jeffrey Ely & George Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
  by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni
• Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
  by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Reputations in Repeated Games
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-*
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications
  by Mailath, George J. & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
• Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
  by Mailath, George J. & Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
  by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Extensive form reasoning in normal form games
  by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.
• When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
• Buying Locally
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Buying Locally
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Buying Locally
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
• When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
• When and how the punishment must fit the crime
  by Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy
• Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics
  by George Mailath
• Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Posltewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
  by George J. Mailath
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
  by Bhaskar, V. & Mailath, George & Morris, Stephen
• Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
  by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• The curse of long horizons
  by Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Mailath, George
• Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
  by Harold L. Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J. Mailath & Yena Park
• Normal and Extensive Form Games
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Principal Agency
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Topics in Dynamic Games
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design
  by George J. Mailath
• Signaling
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• A First Look at Equilibrium
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Repeated Games
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Laws and Authority
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite
• Laws and authority
  by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew
• Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• The curse of long horizons
  by Bhaskar, V. & Mailath, George J.
• WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME
  by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
• Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Introduction to Mechanism Design
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital
  by Yena Park & George Mailath & Dirk Krueger & Harold Cole
• Appendices
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Games with Nature
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Laws and Authority
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite
• The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• The Curse of Long Horizons
  by Venkataraman Bhaskar & George Mailath
• The Curse of Long Horizons
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath
• The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Bargaining
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Bayesian Mechanism Design
  by George J. Mailath
  edited by
• Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
  by Harold L. Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J. Mailath & Yena Park
• BUYING LOCALLY
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• The Social Context of Economic Decisions
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
• Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Pricing in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Common Learning
  by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
  by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Matching with Incomplete Information
  by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games
  by M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob
• Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
  by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
  by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
• Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
  by Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
  by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
  by Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
  by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
• Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown
  by George J. Mailath & Georg Nöldeke
• Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
  by Cole, Harold & Krueger, Dirk & Mailath, George J. & Park, Yena
• Extensive form reasoning in normal form games
  by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.