George J. Mailath
Names
first: |
George |
middle: |
J. |
last: |
Mailath |
Contact
email: |
|
homepage: |
http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath/ |
postal address: |
Department of Economics
3718 Locust Walk
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
USA |
Affiliations
-
University of Pennsylvania
→ Department of Economics
- website
- location: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (United States)
Research profile
author of:
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Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research
by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A.
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Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
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Who wants a good reputation?
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
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Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations
by Cripps, M. W. & Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
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Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria
by Mailath, G. J. & Postlewaite, A. & Samuelson, L.
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Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices
by Mailath, G. J. & Postlewait, A. & Samuelson, L.
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EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.
by MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. & SWINKELS, J.
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Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games.
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. M.
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Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games.
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. M.
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Evolution and Endogenous Interations.
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A.
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How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
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How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
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Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
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Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George Mailath & Stephen Morris
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The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi
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Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
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Who Wants a Good Reputation?
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Investment and Concern for Relative Position
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sroni
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
by George J. mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
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How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels
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Class systems and the enforcement of social norms
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Efficient non-contractible investments
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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When do regulators close banks? When should they?
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
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When do regulators close banks? When should they?
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
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A positive analysis of bank closure
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
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A positive analysis of bank closure
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester
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Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective.
by Mailath, G. J. & Morris, S.
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Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
by Andrew Abel & George J. Mailath
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Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
by Andrew Abel & George J. Mailath
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FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS.
by ABEL, A. B. & MAILATH, G. J.
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EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.
by MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. & SWINKELS, J.
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EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES.
by MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. & SWINKELS, J.
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Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games.
by Kandori, M. & Mailath, G. J.
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extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.
by Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.
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Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
by George J. Mailath
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Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games
by George J. Mailath
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Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form?
by George J. Mailath
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How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
by George J. Mailath
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Investment and Concern for Relative Position
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni
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"Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models''
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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"Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions''
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
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"Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms''
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
-
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
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"Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory''
by George J. Mailath
-
"Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search''
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
-
"Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective''
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
"Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
"Who Wants a Good Reputation?''
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
"Efficient Non-Contractible Investments''
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
-
"Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''
by George Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
-
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Endogenous Interactions
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
-
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Investment and Concern for Relative Position
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
-
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni
-
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Who Wants a Good Reputation?
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Evolution and Endogenous Interactions
by George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked
-
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search
by Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath & Avner Shaked
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Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory
by George J. Mailath
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Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory].
by George J. Mailath
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Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types.
by Mailath, George J.
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Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games.
by Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J. & Rob, Rafael
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Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.
by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
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Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)
by Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath
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original papers : Investment and concern for relative position
by George J. Mailath & Harold L. Cole & Andrew Postlewaite
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Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth.
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
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Aristocratic Equilibria: Response.
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
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The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example
by Mailath, George J.
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Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics
by Mailath, George J.
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The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi
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Class systems and the enforcement of social norms
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
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Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games
by Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew
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Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
by Abel Andrew B. & Mailath George J.
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A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure
by Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J.
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Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions
by Mailath George J.
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Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
by Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M.
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Social Assets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite
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Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
by Mailath, George J.
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew
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Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen
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Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
by Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter
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Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry
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Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
by Cripps, M. W. & Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L.
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by Stephen Morris & George J. Mailath
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Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Social Assets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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The Social Context of Economic Decisions
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown
by George J. Mailath & Georg Noldeke
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Common Learning
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria
by Mailath, George J.
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On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
by Mailath, George J.
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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Steven A. Matthews & Tadashi Sekiguchi
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SOCIAL ASSETS
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
by Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry
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Common Learning
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Common Learning
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?
by George J. Mailath & Georg Noldeke
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
by Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy
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Reputation Effects
by George J. Mailath
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski
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Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring
by George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski
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Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
by George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski
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Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
by Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg
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Common Learning
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies
by Cole Harold Linh & Mailath George J. & Postlewaite Andrew
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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Mailath George J. & Matthews Steven A. & Sekiguchi Tadashi
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Pricing in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version
by George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski
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Pricing in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications
by George J. Mailath & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
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"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships
by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry
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Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
by Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech
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Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown
by Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg
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Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series
by George J. Mailath & Rosa L. Matzkin
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Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Pricing in Matching Markets
by Larry Samuelson & Andrew Postlewaite & George Mailath
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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Pricing and investments in matching markets
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Matching with Incomplete Information
by Quingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Matching with Incomplete Information
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Common learning with intertemporal dependence
by Martin Cripps & Jeffrey Ely & George Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni
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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Reputations in Repeated Games
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super-*
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications
by Mailath, George J. & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
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Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
by Mailath, George J. & Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von
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Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Extensive form reasoning in normal form games
by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.
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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
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Buying Locally
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Buying Locally
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Buying Locally
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
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When and how the punishment must fit the crime
by Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy
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Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics
by George Mailath
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Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Who Wants a Good Reputation?
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Posltewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
by George J. Mailath
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Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
by Bhaskar, V. & Mailath, George & Morris, Stephen
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Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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The curse of long horizons
by Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Mailath, George
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Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
by Harold L. Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J. Mailath & Yena Park
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Normal and Extensive Form Games
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Principal Agency
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Topics in Dynamic Games
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
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Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design
by George J. Mailath
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Signaling
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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A First Look at Equilibrium
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Repeated Games
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Laws and Authority
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite
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Laws and authority
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew
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Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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The curse of long horizons
by Bhaskar, V. & Mailath, George J.
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WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White
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Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Introduction to Mechanism Design
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital
by Yena Park & George Mailath & Dirk Krueger & Harold Cole
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Appendices
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Games with Nature
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Laws and Authority
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite
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The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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The Curse of Long Horizons
by Venkataraman Bhaskar & George Mailath
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The Curse of Long Horizons
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath
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The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
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Bargaining
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Bayesian Mechanism Design
by George J. Mailath
edited by
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Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
by Harold L. Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J. Mailath & Yena Park
-
BUYING LOCALLY
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
The Social Context of Economic Decisions
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite
-
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Pricing in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Common Learning
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Matching with Incomplete Information
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games
by M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob
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Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
-
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
by Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson
-
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
by Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson
-
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown
by George J. Mailath & Georg Nöldeke
-
Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
by Cole, Harold & Krueger, Dirk & Mailath, George J. & Park, Yena
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Extensive form reasoning in normal form games
by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.