George J. Mailath
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| first: |
George |
| middle: |
J. |
| last: |
Mailath |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Pennsylvania
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2015-622)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White - Buying Locally (RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2015-624)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:5:p:1464-1501)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:46-72)
by Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath & Avner Shaked - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:896-918)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:1347-1374)
by George J. Mailath - Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:36:y:1998:i:4:p:1941-1941)
by George J. Mailath - Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:064)
by Harold L. Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J. Mailath & Yena Park - Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research (RePEc:att:wimass:199813r)
by Mailath,G. & Samuelson,L. & Shaked,A. - Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be (RePEc:att:wimass:199818)
by Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L. - Who wants a good reputation? (RePEc:att:wimass:199819)
by Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L. - Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations (RePEc:att:wimass:200217)
by Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L. - Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria (RePEc:att:wimass:20025)
by Mailath,G.J. & Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L. - Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices (RePEc:att:wimass:200311)
by Mailath,G.J. & Postlewait,A. & Samuelson,L. - Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (RePEc:att:wimass:20045)
by Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L. - Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games (RePEc:att:wimass:90-13)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. - Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games (RePEc:att:wimass:9205)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.M. - Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games (RePEc:att:wimass:9314)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.M. - Evolution and Endogenous Interations (RePEc:att:wimass:9426)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A. - How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (RePEc:att:wimass:9611)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. - How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (RePEc:att:wimass:9611r)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. - Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:13:y:2004:i:4:p:617-633)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:2)
by Cole Harold Linh & Mailath George J. & Postlewaite Andrew - Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2)
by Mailath George J. & Matthews Steven A. & Sekiguchi Tadashi - Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown (RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2006/09)
by Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg - When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5225)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White - Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levarc:2107)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:500)
by M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob - The Social Context of Economic Decisions (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000315)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000060)
by Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000257)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000011)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000162)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Matching with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000551)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000028)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000086)
by Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000340)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001105)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001513)
by V Bhaskar & George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000152)
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000170)
by V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000267)
by George J. Mailath & Georg Nöldeke - Common Learning (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000355)
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000019)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001202)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000257)
by George J Mailath & Stephen Morris - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments (RePEc:cla:penntw:08d6793d32cab8f6e1f46dac0dbb3611)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy (RePEc:cla:penntw:452f3f87415f37596752b399575585f0)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (RePEc:cla:penntw:5d82f80bcea2483b6387c5b68db8a6c2)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions (RePEc:cla:penntw:65b8832286a695ab9adcaad9f495a23b)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:penntw:6bf0f633ff55148107994e0926f677bd)
by George Mailath & Stephen Morris - The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cla:penntw:83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb90facc5)
by George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi - Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search (RePEc:cla:penntw:90ff654ed11b714e3f7530c57af25d2c)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - Who Wants a Good Reputation? (RePEc:cla:penntw:a3e3219aee004bd237f8112f9e924401)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Investment and Concern for Relative Position (RePEc:cla:penntw:adb2940730338ff113d930aa2e42ccdf)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be (RePEc:cla:penntw:bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027ce53d445)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (RePEc:cla:penntw:bdb2c3969ad56e98068513c7c1faebb0)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Market Selection and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:cla:penntw:d50f0ddbbf9f79b6e05bb90a5d0d23c1)
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sroni - Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:penntw:e7304519c6d1562163dbaf18101da17e)
by George J. Mailath & Steven A. Matthews & Tadashi Sekiguchi - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:cla:penntw:e9e0aca257b20d3bb6bb4a52a98edeb8)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - The curse of long horizons (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11431)
by Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Mailath, George J. - Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14333)
by Krueger, Dirk & Cole, Harold & Mailath, George J. & Park, Yena - When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4793)
by Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1236)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1451)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479r)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1571)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1573)
by George J. Mailath & Georg Noldeke - Common Learning (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1575)
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Common Learning (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1575r)
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1752)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1810)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Matching with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1870)
by Quingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Buying Locally (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1992)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2024)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Posltewaite & Larry Samuelson - The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2161)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2161r)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1349-65)
by Mailath, George J - Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:1:p:29-56)
by Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael - Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:2:p:273-302)
by Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M - Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:2:p:407-432)
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Common Learning (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:76:y:2008:i:4:p:909-933)
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:79:y:2011:i:1:p:341-343)
by George J. Mailath & Rosa L. Matzkin - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0661)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:333-338)
by Mailath, George J. - Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:42:y:1993:i:2-3:p:291-299)
by Mailath, George J. - Reputations in Repeated Games (RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:165-238)
by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry - How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:193-218)
by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:467-486)
by Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter - The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:40:y:2002:i:1:p:99-122)
by Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:1:p:126-140)
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry - Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:174-192)
by Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:333-373)
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:189-228)
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen - Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:287-316)
by Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry - Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:140:y:2008:i:1:p:97-125)
by Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg - Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:1841-1861)
by Mailath, George J. & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:44:y:1988:i:2:p:413-424)
by Mailath, George J. - An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:46:y:1988:i:2:p:373-394)
by Mailath, George J. - Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:57:y:1992:i:2:p:259-277)
by Mailath, George J. - Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:59:y:1993:i:1:p:169-182)
by Mailath George J. - Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:60:y:1993:i:2:p:241-276)
by Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew - Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:2:p:325-371)
by Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M. - Financing Losers in Competitive Markets (RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:3:y:1994:i:2:p:139-165)
by Abel Andrew B. & Mailath George J. - A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure (RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:3:y:1994:i:3:p:272-299)
by Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J. - The curse of long horizons (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:74-89)
by Bhaskar, V. & Mailath, George J. - Class systems and the enforcement of social norms (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:70:y:1998:i:1:p:5-35)
by Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew - Laws and authority (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:1:p:32-42)
by Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew - Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions (RePEc:els:esrcls:030)
by George J. mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium (RePEc:els:esrcls:045)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RePEc:esx:essedp:8873)
by Bhaskar, V & Mailath, George & Morris, Stephen - Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models (RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1995:i:sum:p:12-21:n:v.19no.3)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Class systems and the enforcement of social norms (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:213)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient non-contractible investments (RePEc:fip:fedmsr:253)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - When do regulators close banks? When should they? (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:91-24)
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester - When do regulators close banks? When should they? (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:93-10)
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester - A positive analysis of bank closure (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:93-10:x:1)
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester - A positive analysis of bank closure (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:94-2)
by George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester - Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (RePEc:fth:aunaec:349)
by Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S. - Financing Losers in Competitive Markets (RePEc:fth:pennfi:02-90)
by Andrew Abel & George J. Mailath - Financing Losers in Competitive Markets (RePEc:fth:pennfi:2-90)
by Andrew Abel & George J. Mailath - Financing Losers In Competitive Markets (RePEc:fth:pennif:2-90)
by Abel, A.B. & Mailath, G.J. - Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games (RePEc:fth:pensta:1-90-1)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. - Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Games (RePEc:fth:priwdp:43)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. - Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games (RePEc:fth:priwol:71)
by Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J. - extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9130)
by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. - Social Assets (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:47:y:2006:i:4:p:1057-1091)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - When and how the punishment must fit the crime (RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37483)
by Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy - Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26667)
by Harold L. Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J. Mailath & Yena Park - Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1041)
by George J. Mailath - Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1042)
by George J. Mailath - Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1062)
by George J. Mailath - How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1161)
by George J. Mailath - Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1462)
by George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski - Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:2:p:417-427.)
by George J. Mailath - Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:351-367.)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:369-380.)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Who Wants a Good Reputation? (RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:2:p:415-441.)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Market Selection and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:343-368)
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory -super- (RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:3:p:925-948)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships (RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780195300796)
by Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (RePEc:pen:papers:03-014)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (RePEc:pen:papers:03-016)
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives (RePEc:pen:papers:03-018)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite - Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria (RePEc:pen:papers:03-021)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RePEc:pen:papers:04-004)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) (RePEc:pen:papers:04-007)
by George J.Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships (RePEc:pen:papers:04-008)
by Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Social Assets (RePEc:pen:papers:04-025)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:pen:papers:04-033)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games (RePEc:pen:papers:04-039)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:pen:papers:05-014)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Social Assets (RePEc:pen:papers:06-003)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Common Learning (RePEc:pen:papers:07-018)
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? (RePEc:pen:papers:07-022)
by George J. Mailath & Georg Noldeke - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:07-024)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Reputation Effects (RePEc:pen:papers:07-034)
by George J. Mailath - Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring (RePEc:pen:papers:08-019)
by George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski - Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:08-027)
by George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (RePEc:pen:papers:09-029)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:10-003)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version (RePEc:pen:papers:10-007)
by George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski - Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications (RePEc:pen:papers:10-032)
by George J. Mailath & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden - "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:10-037)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence (RePEc:pen:papers:11-012)
by Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory (RePEc:pen:papers:12-003)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:12-008)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Matching with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pen:papers:12-032)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:12-042)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (RePEc:pen:papers:12-043)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-028)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Reputations in Repeated Games (RePEc:pen:papers:13-034)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:13-044)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:13-060)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (RePEc:pen:papers:15-008)
by George J.Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White - Buying Locally (RePEc:pen:papers:15-012)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:pen:papers:15-034)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - The Curse of Long Horizons (RePEc:pen:papers:16-013)
by Venkataraman Bhaskar & George Mailath - Laws and Authority (RePEc:pen:papers:16-018)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - The Curse of Long Horizons (RePEc:pen:papers:18-029)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath - The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd:Model-Based Inference (RePEc:pen:papers:19-001)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference (RePEc:pen:papers:19-018)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Laws and Authority (RePEc:pri:metric:082_2016)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite - A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory (RePEc:pri:metric:wp031_2012_bhaskar_mailath_morris.pdf)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:red:issued:07-130)
by V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:red:sed005:25)
by Stephen Morris & George J Mailath - Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:red:sed005:301)
by George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Pricing in Matching Markets (RePEc:red:sed007:531)
by Larry Samuelson & Andrew Postlewaite & George Mailath - Fragile Financial Coalitions: the interaction between real returns and social capital (RePEc:red:sed016:1096)
by Yena Park & George Mailath & Dirk Krueger & Harold Cole - Time CVonsistency, Reputation, and the Importance of Perpetual Uncertainty: Implications for Macroeconomics (RePEc:red:sedpln:2003-3)
by George Mailath - Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:551-556)
by Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath - Common learning with intertemporal dependence (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:1:p:55-98)
by Martin Cripps & Jeffrey Ely & George Mailath & Larry Samuelson - original papers : Investment and concern for relative position (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:2:p:241-261)
by George J. Mailath & Harold L. Cole & Andrew Postlewaite - George J. Mailath on Hugo F. Sonnenschein (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-74057-5_21)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels - Pricing and investments in matching markets (RePEc:the:publsh:1189)
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry - Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (RePEc:the:publsh:167)
by , J. & , - Extensive form reasoning in normal form games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2a393209-5c6b-4fdd-bed2-51e777ccbe56)
by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. - Extensive form reasoning in normal form games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2a393209-5c6b-4fdd-bed2-51e777ccbe56)
by Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J. - The Social Context of Economic Decisions (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:2-3:p:354-362)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications (RePEc:trf:wpaper:447)
by Mailath, George J. & Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:6:p:1092-1125)
by Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew - Aristocratic Equilibria: Response (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:2:p:439-43)
by Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew - Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:604:p:2041-2065)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Stable Matching With Incomplete Information (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:82:y:2014:i:2:p:541-587)
by Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - Buying Locally (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:57:y:2016:i:4:p:1179-1200)
by George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson - When And How The Punishment Must Fit The Crime (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:58:y:2017:i:2:p:315-330)
by George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:wop:pennca:00-05)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Investment and Concern for Relative Position (RePEc:wop:pennca:00-06)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information (RePEc:wop:pennca:00-07)
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni - "Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-14)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:95-16)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - "Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:96-04)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-3)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-6)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-01)
by George J. Mailath - "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-06)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-07)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-11)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - "Who Wants a Good Reputation?'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-12)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:98-13)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:99-09)
by George Mailath & Stephen Morris - Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (RePEc:wop:pennca:almost-pub)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy (RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-finite)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Endogenous Interactions (RePEc:wop:pennca:endo-one)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (RePEc:wop:pennca:imp-mon)
by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris - Investment and Concern for Relative Position (RePEc:wop:pennca:invest)
by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite - Market Selection and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:wop:pennca:mkt-selection)
by George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni - Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be (RePEc:wop:pennca:rep-is-sep)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Who Wants a Good Reputation? (RePEc:wop:pennca:sell-rep)
by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson - Evolution and Endogenous Interactions (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410003)
by George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked - Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design (RePEc:wsi:wsbook:10981)
by George J Mailath - Normal and Extensive Form Games (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0001)
by George J. Mailath - A First Look at Equilibrium (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0002)
by George J. Mailath - Games with Nature (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0003)
by George J. Mailath - Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0004)
by George J. Mailath - Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0005)
by George J. Mailath - Signaling (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0006)
by George J. Mailath - Repeated Games (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0007)
by George J. Mailath - Topics in Dynamic Games (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0008)
by George J. Mailath - Bargaining (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0009)
by George J. Mailath - Introduction to Mechanism Design (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0010)
by George J. Mailath - Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0011)
by George J. Mailath - Bayesian Mechanism Design (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0012)
by George J. Mailath - Principal Agency (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0013)
by George J. Mailath - Appendices (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0014)
by George J. Mailath - Trust in risk sharing: A double-edged sword (RePEc:zbw:cfswop:697)
by Cole, Harold L. & Krueger, Dirk & Mailath, George J. & Park, Yena