Eric S. Maskin
Names
first:  Eric 
middle:  S. 
last:  Maskin 
Contact
homepage:  http://scholar.harvard.edu/maskin 
postal address:  Harvard University Department of Economics Littauer Center, Room 311 1805 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 
Affiliations

Harvard University
→ Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
 website
 location: Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)

Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE)
→ China Economics and Management Academy (weight: 25%)
 website
 location: Beijing, China

National Research University Higher School of Economics (weight: 25%)
 website
 location: Moscow, Russia
Research profile
author of:

Longterm investment by Japanese and American firms
by Maskin, Eric S. 
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks.
by Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D. & Maskin, Eric S. 
Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency.
by Maskin, Eric S. & Newbery, David M. 
Auction Theory with Private Values.
by Maskin, Eric S. & Riley, Joan G. 
Theories of the soft budgetconstraint
by Maskin, Eric S. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market.
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric S. 
The Invisible Hand and Externalities.
by Maskin, Eric S. 
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers.
by Maskin, Eric S. & Riley, John G. 
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidityconstrained buyers
by Maskin, Eric S. 
A Walrasian Theory of Money
by Abhijit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin 
On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts
by Maskin, Eric 
Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint
by Eric S. Maskin 
Auction Theory with Private Values*
by Eric S. Maskin & John G. Riley 
Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments
by Chen, Mark A. & Maskin, Eric S. 
Multiunit Auctions, Price Discrimination and Bundling
by Eric S. Maskin & John G. Riley 
Uncertainty and entry deterrence
by Eric S. Maskin 
Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market
by Maskin, Eric & Xu, ChengGang 
Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms
by Eric S. Maskin 
The PrincipalAgent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values.
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios.
by Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric 
The PrincipalAgent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values.
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
The Existence of Equilibrium with PriceSetting Firms.
by Maskin, Eric 
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles.
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric 
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs.
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms.
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric 
On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information about Consumers.
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric 
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I. & Maskin, Eric 
Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed highbid auctions
by Maskin, Eric & Riley, John 
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric 
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
Income v. Leisure
by Eric Maskin & John G. Riley 
JeanJacques Laffont: A Look Back
by Eric Maskin 
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Quan & Chenggang Xu 
Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes*
by Eric Maskin & John G. Riley 
Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs
by Eric Maskin & John G. Riley 
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu 
Implementation and Renegotiation  (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.3956.)
by Eric Maskin & John Moore 
BalancedBudget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Incentives, Scale Economies and Organizational Form
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chengagn Xu 
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
by Eric Maskin 
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
by Eric Maskin 
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin 
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
by Eric Maskin & John Riley 
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks
by Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart & Eric Maskin 
Implementation and Renegotiation
by Eric Maskin & John Moore 
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin 
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 2: Applications (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.2741.)
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Unforseen Contingencies, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
by János Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gérard Roland 
Wage Inequality and Segregation
by Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States
by Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Efficient Auctions
by P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill
by Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin 
The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass
by Eric Maskin 
The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions
by Eric Maskin & John G. Riley 
Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots: A Note
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.126.)
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information
by Dewatripont, M. & Maskin, E. 
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
by Eric Maskin & John G. Riley 
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information
by E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg 
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
by Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. 
Repeated Games with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin 
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. & MASKIN, E. 
Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill.
by Kremer, M. & Maskin, E. 
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with LargeFixed Costs
by J. Tirole & E. Maskin 
Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation
by M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin 
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I
by P. Diamond & E. Maskin 
Repeated Games with Longrun and Shortrun Players
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin 
The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey
by E. Maskin 
Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium
by E. Maskin 
On the Efficiency of Keynesian Equilibrium
by E. Maskin & J. Tirole 
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
by J. Riley & E. Maskin 
Rational Expectations With Market Power: The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff
by E. Maskin & D. Newbery 
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games.
by D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin. 
Renegotiation in Repeated Games.
by Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin. 
Voting Schemes for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule
by E. Maskin 
Mechanism design for the environment
by Baliga, Sandeep & Maskin, Eric
edited by 
Implementation theory
by Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas
edited by 
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation
by James Bessen & Eric Maskin 
Renegotiation in repeated games
by Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric 
Corrigendum to 'A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III, Cournot Competition' (vol. 31, no. 4)
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric 
Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric 
Rational expectations with imperfect competition : A BertrandEdgeworth Example
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric 
A progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures
by Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V. & Maskin, Eric 
A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
Efficient renegotiationproof equilibria in repeated games
by Evans, Robert & Maskin, Eric 
On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium
by Maskin, Eric S. & Tirole, Jean 
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
by J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland. 
Correlated equilibria and sunspots
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
by J. KORNAI & E. MASKIN & G. ROLAND. 
An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract II. A nonsteady state example
by Diamond, P. A. & Maskin, Eric 
Renegotiationproof equilibrium: Reply
by Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric 
Input versus output incentive schemes
by Maskin, Eric & Riley, John 
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
by Laffont, JeanJacques & Maskin, Eric 
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
by Janos Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gerard Roland 
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation
by James Bessen & Eric Maskin 
Publicprivate Partnerships and Government Spending Limits
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
Auctions and Efficiency
by Eric Maskin 
On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules
by Eric Maskin 
On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
by Eric Maskin 
Roy Radner and Incentive Theory
by Eric Maskin 
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium
by Eric Maskin & Kevin W. S. Roberts 
Implementation Theory
by Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom 
Mechanism Design for the Environment
by Sandeep Baliga & Eric Maskin 
The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass
by Eric Maskin 
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed HighBid Auctions
by Eric Maskin & John Riley 
JeanJacques Laffont: A Look Back
by Eric Maskin 
Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market
by Eric Maskin & Chenggang Xu 
PublicPrivate Partnerships and Government Spending Limits
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium
by Eric Maskin & Kevin Roberts 
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals
by Eric S. Maskin 
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games (based on work with D. Fudenberg)
by Eric Maskin 
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals
by Maskin, Eric S. 
Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson
by Maskin, Eric S. & Myerson, Roger B. 
Publicprivate partnerships and government spending limits
by Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean 
On The Robustness of Majority Rule
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals
by Eric S. Maskin 
The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions
by Wouter van den Bos & Jian Li & Tatiana Lau & Eric Maskin & Jonathan D. Cohen & P. Read Montague & Samuel M. McClure 
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design
by Eric Maskin 
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract
by Diamond, Peter & Maskin, Eric 
Rational Expectations with Market Power  The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff on Oil
by Maskin, Eric & Newbery, David 
Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation
by James Bessen & Eric Maskin 
Autobiography
by Maskin, Eric 
Incentives
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu 
The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go From Here?
by Eric Maskin 
A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday
by Dubey, Pradeep & Maskin, Eric & Tauman, Yair 
Centralized credit and longterm investment
by Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin 
Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies
by Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin 
Soft budget constraints and transition
by Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin & Gérard Roland 
Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information
by Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin 
Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies
by Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin 
Contractual contingencies and renegotiation
by Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin 
Bargaining and Destructive Power
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric S. Maskin 
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin 
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design
by Maskin, Eric 
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
by D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin 
Mechanism Design for the Environment
by Sandeep Baliga & Eric Maskin 
A puha költségvetési korlát  II.
by Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard 
A puha költségvetési korlát I.
by Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard 
Renegotiation in Repeated Games
by Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric 
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks
by Maskin, Eric S. & Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D. 
Implementation and renegotiation
by Maskin, Eric & Moore, John 
Incentives
by Maskin, Eric & Qian, Yingyi & Xu, ChengGang 
NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games
by Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. 
Repeated Games with Longrun and Shortrun Players
by Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Why Haven't Global Markets Reduced Inequality in Emerging Economies?
by E. Maskin 
Monopolistic quantity rationing
by BÃ–HM, Â Volker & MASKIN, Eric & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heraklis & POSTLEWAITE, Andrew 
Pandering and PorkBarrel Politics
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form  (Now published in 'Economics of Transition' (2201)).
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu 
Implementation and Renegotiation
by Eric Maskin & John Moore 
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
by Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin 
Repeated Games with Longrun and Shortrun Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin 
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality*
by Eric Maskin 
On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
by Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin 
Manifesto
by Olivier J. Blanchard & Eric S. Maskin & Lawrence H. Summers 
Two Remarks on the PropertyRights Literature
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.126.)
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
by Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu 
A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods
by JeanJacques Laffont & Eric Maskin 
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter
by Abhijit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin 
Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
by M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin 
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
by Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole 
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
by Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin 
A Theorem on Utilitarianism
by Eric Maskin 
Asymmetric Auctions
by Eric Maskin & John Riley 
Efficient Auctions
by Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin 
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
by Eric Maskin & John Riley 
Salute to János Kornai
by Eric Maskin 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS WITH MARKET POWER THE PARADOX OF THE DISADVANTAGEOUS TARIFF ON OIL
by Maskin, Eric & Newbery, David 
THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
by DREW FUDENBERG & ERIC MASKIN
edited by 
WHY HAS INEQUALITY INCREASED IN CHINA? TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL MATCHING
by E. MASKIN 
AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF SEARCH AND BREACH OF CONTRACT
by Diamond, Peter & Maskin, Eric 
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE & ERIC MASKIN
edited by 
Friedrich von Hayek and mechanism design
by Eric Maskin
editor of:

Economics Letters
edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office 
Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn
edited by Partha Dasgupta & Douglas Gale & Oliver Hart & Eric Maskin 
Planning, Shortage, and Transformation: Essays in Honor of János Kornai
edited by Maskin, Eric 
Environment and Development Economics: Essays in Honour of Sir Partha Dasgupta
edited by Barrett, Scott & Maler, KarlGoran & Maskin, Eric S. 
Recent Developments in Game Theory
edited by Eric S. Maskin