Jordi Masso
Names
Contact
Affiliations
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
→ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
→ Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
→ Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
location: Barcelona, Spain
email: research@barcelonagse.eu[email hidden, enable JavaScript to see it]
fax: +34 93 542-1223
Research profile
author of:
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges by Barbera, S. Masso, J. Serizawa, S.
Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues by Dutta, Bhaskar Masso, Jordi
Voting under Constraints by Barbera, Salvador Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
On Exiting after Voting by Berga, Dolors Bergantiños, Gustavo Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games. by Masso, J. Neme, A.
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model by Klijn, Flip Masso, Jordi
MEMORY STARTEGIES IN NONATOMIC REPEATED GAMES. by MASSO, J.
Voting by Committees with Exit by Dolors Berga Gustavo Berganti?s Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es Alejandro Neme
Voting Under Constraints. by Barbera, S. Masso, J. Neme, A.
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. by Masso, J. Barbera, S.
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem by Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem by Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es Alejandro Neme
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS. by Ruth Mart?ez Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme Jorge Oviedo
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. by Barbera, S. Masso, J. Serizawa, S.
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model by Ruth Mart?ez Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es Alejandro Neme Jorge Oviedo
Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players by Masso, Jordi
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games. by Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem by Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es Alejandro Neme
Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues. by Dutta, B. Masso, J.
Voting by Committees Under Constraints by Salvador Barbera Jordi Masso Alejandro Neme
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings by Martinez, Ruth Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro Oviedo, Jorge
MAXIMAL DOMAIN OF PREFERENCES IN THE DIVISION PROBLEM by Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme
A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox by Masso, Jordi
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings by Martinez, Ruth Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro Oviedo, Jorge
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador BARBER? Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es Alejandro NEME
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model by Ruth Martínez Jordi Massó Alejdanro Neme Jorge Oviedo
Voting by committees under constraints by Barbera, Salvador Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Stability and voting by committees with exit by Dolors Berga Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem by Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On Exiting After Voting by D. Berga G. Bergantiños J. Massó A. Neme
Weighted Approval Voting by Jordi Massó Marc Vorsatz
More on the "anti-folk theorem" by Masso, Jordi Rosenthal, Robert W.
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes by Alejandro Neme Jordi MassÔ Salvador BarberÁ
THE CHI-COMPROMISE VALUE FOR NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES. by Gustavo Berganti?os Jordi Massó
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit by Berga, Dolors Bergantinos, Gustavo Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets by Ehlers, Lars Masso, Jordi
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences by Jordi Massó Antonio Nicolò
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem by Masso, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information by EHLERS, Lars MASSÓ, Jordi
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) by Bettina Klaus Flip Klijn Jordi Massó
Weighted approval voting by Jordi Massó Marc Vorsatz
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles by Ruth Martínez Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme Jorge Oviedo
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences by Massó, Jordi Nicolò, Antonio
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information by EHLERS, Lars MASSÓ, Jordi
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria by Daniel Jaume Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria by Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness by Jordi Massó Inés Moreno de Barreda
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences by Jordi Massó Antonio Nicolò
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets by Lars Ehlers Jordi Massó
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles by Ruth Martínez Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme Jorge Oviedo
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador Barberà Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria by Daniel Jaume Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model by Martínez, Ruth Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro Oviedo, Jorge
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness by Massó, Jordi Moreno de Barreda, Inés
The division problem with voluntary participation by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets by Lars Ehlers Jordi Massó
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences by Jordi Massó Antonio Nicolò
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) by Bettina Klaus Flip Klijn Jordi Massó
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria by Daniel Jaume Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles by Ruth Martínez Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme Jorge Oviedo
The division problem with maximal capacity constraints by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador Barberà Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles by Martínez, Ruth Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro Oviedo, Jorge
On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit by Dolors Berga Alejandro Neme Jordi Massó Gustavo Bergantiños
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Inés Moreno de Barreda Alejandro Neme
The Division Problem under Constraints by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Weighted approval voting by Massó, J. Vorsatz, M.
On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good by Jordi Massó Antonio Nicoloó Tridib Sharma Levent Ülkü
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó
The Division Problem under Constraints by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Inés Moreno de Barreda Alejandro Neme
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria by Daniel Jaume Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model by Klijn, F. Masso, J.
On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria by Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability by Arribillaga, R. Pablo Massó, Jordi
On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good by Massó, Jordi Nicolò, Antonio Sen, Arunava Sharma, Tridib Ülkü, Levent
Matching markets under (in)complete information by Ehlers, Lars Massó, Jordi
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness by Jordi Massó Shurojit Chatterji
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness by Shurojit Catterji Jordi Massó
The division problem under constraints by Bergantiños, Gustavo Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massé Alejandro Neme
Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Inés Moreno de Barreda Alejandro Neme
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency by Gustavo Bergantiños Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance by EHLERS, Lars MASSO, Jordi
Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance by Lars EHLERS Jordi MASSO
Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous by Bergantiños, Gustavo Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency by Bergantiños, Gustavo Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness by Agustín G. Bonifacio Jordi Massó
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness by Agustín G. Bonifacio Jordi Massó
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game by R. Pablo Arribillaga Jordi Massó Alejandro Neme
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness by Arribillaga, R. Pablo Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model by Klijn, F. Masso, J.
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy by Shurojit Chatterji Jordi Massó Shigehiro Serizawa
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness by Bonifacio, Agustín G. Massó, Jordi