Jordi Masso
Names
Contact
Affiliations
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
→ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
→ Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
→ Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
location: Barcelona, Spain
email: research@barcelonagse.eu[email hidden, enable JavaScript to see it]
fax: +34 93 542-1223
Research profile
author of:
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.
Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues by Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi
Voting under Constraints by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
On Exiting after Voting by Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games. by Masso, J. & Neme, A.
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model by Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi
MEMORY STARTEGIES IN NONATOMIC REPEATED GAMES. by MASSO, J.
Voting by Committees with Exit by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme
Voting Under Constraints. by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A.
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. by Masso, J. & Barbera, S.
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem by Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS. by Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model by Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo
Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players by Masso, Jordi
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games. by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem by Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme
Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues. by Dutta, B. & Masso, J.
Voting by Committees Under Constraints by Salvador Barbera & Jordi Masso & Alejandro Neme
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings by Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge
MAXIMAL DOMAIN OF PREFERENCES IN THE DIVISION PROBLEM by Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme
A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox by Masso, Jordi
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings by Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador BARBER? & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro NEME
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejdanro Neme & Jorge Oviedo
Voting by committees under constraints by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Stability and voting by committees with exit by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem by Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On Exiting After Voting by D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme
Weighted Approval Voting by Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz
More on the "anti-folk theorem" by Masso, Jordi & Rosenthal, Robert W.
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes by Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ
THE CHI-COMPROMISE VALUE FOR NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES. by Gustavo Berganti?os & Jordi Massó
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit by Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets by Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information by EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó
Weighted approval voting by Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences by Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information by EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria by Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness by Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets by Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness by Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés
The division problem with voluntary participation by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets by Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo
The division problem with maximal capacity constraints by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge
On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit by Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme
The Division Problem under Constraints by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Weighted approval voting by Massó, J. & Vorsatz, M.
On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicoloó & Tridib Sharma & Levent Ülkü
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó
The Division Problem under Constraints by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model by Klijn, F. & Masso, J.
On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria by Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi
On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good by Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Sharma, Tridib & Ülkü, Levent
Matching markets under (in)complete information by Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness by Jordi Massó & Shurojit Chatterji
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness by Shurojit Catterji & Jordi Massó
The division problem under constraints by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massé & Alejandro Neme
Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance by EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi
Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance by Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO
Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Jordi Massó
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Jordi Massó
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model by Klijn, F. & Masso, J.
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy by Shurojit Chatterji & Jordi Massó & Shigehiro Serizawa
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi