Jordi Masso
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
/ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
/ Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
/ Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Research profile
author of:
- Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:74-107)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó - Preference restrictions for strategy-proof and simple rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains (RePEc:aep:anales:4441)
by Agustín Germán Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme - Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:121)
by Agustín Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme - False-name-proof and Strategy-proof Voting Rules under Separable Preferences (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:181)
by Federico Fioravanti & Massó Jordi - Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:293)
by Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:49)
by Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:6)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Memory Startegies In Nonatomic Repeated Games (RePEc:aub:autbar:134-90)
by Masso, J. - Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games (RePEc:aub:autbar:159.91)
by Masso, J. & Neme, A. - Voting Under Constraints (RePEc:aub:autbar:200.92)
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A. - Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues (RePEc:aub:autbar:325.96)
by Dutta, B. & Masso, J. - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (RePEc:aub:autbar:358.96)
by Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S - Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem (RePEc:aub:autbar:434.99)
by Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme - The Chi-Compromise Value For Non-Transferable Utility Games (RePEc:aub:autbar:456.00)
by Gustavo Berganti?os & Jordi Massó - An Algorithm To Compute The Set Of Many-To-Many Stable Matchings (RePEc:aub:autbar:457.00)
by Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Voting by Committees under Constraints (RePEc:aub:autbar:501.01)
by Salvador BARBER? & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro NEME - Voting by Committees under Constraints (RePEc:aub:autbar:505.01)
by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Voting by Committees with Exit (RePEc:aub:autbar:511.02)
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme - A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem (RePEc:aub:autbar:535.02)
by Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme - Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem (RePEc:aub:autbar:571.03)
by Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme - On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model (RePEc:aub:autbar:577.03)
by Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets (RePEc:aub:autbar:637.04)
by Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó - Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences (RePEc:aub:autbar:638.04)
by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò - Weighted Approval Voting (RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06)
by Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz - Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences (RePEc:aub:autbar:714.07)
by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò - The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:aub:autbar:802.09)
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles (RePEc:aub:autbar:803.09)
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo - The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation (RePEc:aub:autbar:807.10)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:aub:autbar:808.10)
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness (RePEc:aub:autbar:809.10)
by Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda - On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:aub:autbar:810.10)
by Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game (RePEc:aub:autbar:940.13)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions (RePEc:aub:autbar:941.13)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme - The Division Problem under Constraints (RePEc:aub:autbar:942.13)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability (RePEc:aub:autbar:946.14)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó - On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness (RePEc:aub:autbar:952.15)
by Jordi Massó & Shurojit Chatterji - On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness (RePEc:aub:autbar:965.19)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Jordi Massó - All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof (RePEc:aub:autbar:966.19)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness (RePEc:aub:autbar:967.19)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1087)
by Agustín G Bonifacio & Jordi Massó - All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1108)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1122)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1324)
by Agustín G Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme - Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1456)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:147)
by Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó - Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences (RePEc:bge:wpaper:148)
by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò - The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:bge:wpaper:389)
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles (RePEc:bge:wpaper:390)
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo - On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness (RePEc:bge:wpaper:421)
by Jordi Massé & Inés Moreno de Barreda - The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:437)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massé & Alejandro Neme - On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria (RePEc:bge:wpaper:438)
by Jordi Massé & Alejandro Neme - Voting by Committees under Constraints (RePEc:bge:wpaper:7)
by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions (RePEc:bge:wpaper:739)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme - On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game (RePEc:bge:wpaper:740)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - The Division Problem under Constraints (RePEc:bge:wpaper:745)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability (RePEc:bge:wpaper:753)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó - Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:bge:wpaper:78)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó - On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness (RePEc:bge:wpaper:828)
by Shurojit Catterji & Jordi Massó - Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:23:y:2021:i:2:p:376-401)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good (RePEc:cie:wpaper:1306)
by Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicoloó & Tridib Sharma & Levent Ülkü - On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1112)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Jordi Massó & Shigehiro Serizawa - On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70024)
by Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños - Voting by Committees Under Constraints (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1328)
by Salvador Barbera & Jordi Masso & Alejandro Neme - On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:219-238)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi - Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238] (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:684-689)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi - A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:1:p:55-81)
by Masso, Jordi - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:272-291)
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S. - Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:2:p:367-387)
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:42:y:2003:i:1:p:91-100)
by Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi - Bribe-proof rules in the division problem (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:2:p:331-343)
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:591-611)
by Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio - On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:467-484)
by Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés - On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:588-600)
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge - The division problem under constraints (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:56-77)
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Voting by committees under constraints (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:122:y:2005:i:2:p:185-205)
by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:587-600)
by Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi - On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:187-215)
by Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:30-49)
by Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Sharma, Tridib & Ülkü, Levent - Matching markets under (in)complete information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:295-314)
by Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi - On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s002205311930119x)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:75:y:1997:i:2:p:464-475)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi - Voting under Constraints (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:76:y:1997:i:2:p:298-321)
by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:91:y:2000:i:1:p:91-105)
by Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge - Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:106:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000381)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Pablo - More on the "anti-folk theorem" (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:281-290)
by Masso, Jordi & Rosenthal, Robert W. - Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:22:y:1993:i:3:p:243-264)
by Masso, Jordi - The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:937-949)
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge - An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:187-210)
by Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge - An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:54:y:2007:i:2:p:152-175)
by Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (RePEc:fth:inecpu:156)
by Masso, J. & Barbera, S. - On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game (RePEc:hin:jnljam:190614)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions (RePEc:kap:theord:v:79:y:2015:i:2:p:227-250)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme - On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency (RePEc:kap:theord:v:84:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9644-6)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences (RePEc:kap:theord:v:97:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-023-09973-5)
by Federico Fioravanti & Jordi Massó - Matching Markets under (In)complete Information (RePEc:mtl:montde:2007-01)
by EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi - Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-02)
by EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi - Matching Markets under (In)complete Information (RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2007)
by EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi - Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2018)
by Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO - On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91714)
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91721)
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Weighted approval voting (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:1:p:129-146)
by Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz - Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:4:p:437-53)
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:115-128)
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejdanro Neme & Jorge Oviedo - On Exiting After Voting (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:33-54)
by D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme - On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:497-518)
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo - The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:56:y:2002:i:2:p:269-286)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó - The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:161-187)
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:175-184)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó - The division problem with maximal capacity constraints (RePEc:spr:series:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:29-57)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:321-336)
by Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ - A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:187-206)
by Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Stability and voting by committees with exit (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:229-247)
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - The division problem with voluntary participation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:371-406)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1041-0)
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Salvador Barberà (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-62769-0_6)
by Carmen Beviá & Jordi Massó - Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability (RePEc:the:publsh:1910)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi - All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (RePEc:the:publsh:5111)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fecc2417-7dcd-4374-ac18-29a76a165b12)
by Klijn, F. & Masso, J. - Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fecc2417-7dcd-4374-ac18-29a76a165b12)
by Klijn, F. & Masso, J. - On Exiting after Voting (RePEc:udg:wpeudg:006)
by Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Weighted approval voting (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006038)
by Massó, J. & Vorsatz, M. - On Strategy†Proofness And The Salience Of Single†Peakedness (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:1:p:163-189)
by Shurojit Chatterji & Jordi Massó