David Levine
Names
first:  David 
middle:  Knudsen 
last:  Levine 
Contact
email:  
homepage:  http://www.dklevine.com 
Affiliations

Washington University in St. Louis
→ Department of Economics (weight: 30%)
 website
 location: St. Louis, Missouri (United States)

European University Institute
→ Department of Economics (weight: 30%)
 website
 location: Firenze, Italy

European University Institute
→ Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) (weight: 30%)
 website
 location: Firenze, Italy

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
→ Research Division (weight: 10%)
 website
 location: St. Louis, Missouri (United States)
Research profile
author of:

Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
InfiniteHorizon Models of Bargaining with OneSided Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole 
On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer 
Debt Constrained Asset Markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game
by Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood
by David K. Levine 
When are NonAnonymous Players Negligible
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium
by David K. Levine 
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets
by David K. Levine & William Zame 
Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Edward Prescott 
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment
by David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli 
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models
by David K. Levine 
The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development
by David Backus & Herminio Blanco & David K. Levine 
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game
by David K. Levine 
Growth Cycles and Market Crashes
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
by David K. Levine 
Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Andreu MasColell & Michael Woodford 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
An Easier Way to Calibrate
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Castle on the Hill
by David K. Levine 
Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame 
Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell
by Dean Foster & David K. Levine & Rakesh Vohra 
Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities
by Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David K. Levine 
Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population
by David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue
by David K. Levine & Aldo Rustichini 
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
by Phillip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Efficiency and the Value of Money
by David K. Levine 
Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
SubgamePerfect Equilibria of Finite and InfiniteHorizon Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Economics of Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Models
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud 
Open and ClosedLoop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine 
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy
by David K. Levine 
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Andreu MasColell & William Zame 
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Conditional Universal Consistency
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error
by David K. Levine 
Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
by David K. Levine 
Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
BalancedBudget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming
by David K. Levine 
Learning in the Stock Flow Model
by David K. Levine 
Does Market Incompleteness Matter
by David K. Levine & William Zame 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul M. Romer 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Payoff information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium.
by Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies
by T. J. Kehoe & D. K. Levine 
Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models
by T. J. Kehoe & D. K. Levine 
Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies
by T. J. Kehoe & D. K. Levine 
Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models
by D. K. Levine & T. J. Kehoe 
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. & MASKIN, E. 
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONGRUN AND SHORTRUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 
SelfConfirming Equilibrium .
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 
Efficiency and Obsevability with LongRun and ShortRun Players.
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 
Changes in Managerial Pay Structures 19861992 and Rising Returns to Skill
by K. C. O'Shaughnessy & David I. Levine & Peter Cappelli 
When are Agents Negligible?
by Wolfgang Pesendorfer & David Levine 
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies.
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Maintaining a Reputation against a LongLived Opponent.
by Celentani, Marco & et al 
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment
by David K. Levine 
Introduction
by David K. Levine & Aldo Rustichini 
The Castle on the Hill
by David Levine 
On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems.
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Romer, Paul M. 
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Growth and Intellectual Property
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz, Jr. 
wjecon.php3, a script converting ReDIF data to html
by David K. Levine 
Farm Size and Reaper Diffusion in the Antebellum Midwest
by David Levine 
Factor Saving Innovation
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David 
Does Market Incompleteness Matter?
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame 
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Theory of Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps
by Mark Grinblatt & Bhagwan Chowdhry & David Levine 
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation
by Helios Herrera & David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli 
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models
by David Levine 
Extrapolative Investment Equilibrium
by David Levine 
Limit games and limit equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE 'WAR ON TERROR'
by David Levine & Robert Levine 
Comments on Bruce Smith’s work
by David Levine & Arthur Rolnick & Karl Shell 
Perfectly Competitive Innovation
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David 
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Learning in games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics
by David Levine 
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Information Aggregation, Security Design and Currency Swaps
by Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine 
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
The Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error
by David Levine 
The sensitivity of MLE to measurement error
by Levine, David 
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly
by David Levine 
Subgameperfect equilibria of finite and infinitehorizon games,
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly I: Equilibrium
by David Levine 
The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly II: Stability
by David Levine 
Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity
by Michele Boldrin & David Levine 
The Case Against Intellectual Property
by Michele Boldrin & David Levine 
The Case Against Intellectual Property
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David 
Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly
by David Levine 
A Simple Durable Goods Market*
by David Levine 
A remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood
by Levine, David 
Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps
by Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood
by David Levine 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang 
The Nashthreats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria
by Levine, David K. 
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Prescott, Edward C. 
Local Almost Perfect Equilibrium with Large Adjustment Costs*
by David Levine 
Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets.
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. 
Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets
by Levine, David K. 
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K. 
Introduction to the Special Issue
by Vohra, Rakesh & Levine, David K. & Foster, Dean 
Intertemporal separability in overlappinggenerations models
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. 
Openloop and closedloop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Gross substitutability in largesquare economies
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & MasColell, Andreu & Woodford, Michael 
Learning to play Bayesian games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
The evolution of cooperation through imitation
by Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I. & Maskin, Eric 
Growth Cycles and Market Crashes
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
Factor Saving Innovation
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
Evolution and Information in a GiftGiving Game
by Johnson, Philip & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang 
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru 
Perfectly competitive innovation
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
When Are Agents Negligible?
by Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K. 
Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation
by Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César 
The economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. 
Determinacy of equilibrium in largescale economies
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & MasColell, Andreu & Zame, William R. 
Reverse regression for latentvariable models
by Levine, David K. 
Rentseeking and innovation
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Romer, Paul M. 
Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. 
Selfconfirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets
by Levine, David K. & Zame, William R. 
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment
by Levine, David K. & Martinelli, Cesar 
Consistency and cautious fictitious play
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Conditional Universal Consistency
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium
by Levine David K. 
SelfConfirming Equilibrium.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Against Intellectual Monopoly
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy
by Levine, David K. 
An Easier Way to Calibrate
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
When is reputation bad?
by Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Production Chains
by David K. Levine 
A Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study
by Levine, David & Palfrey, Thomas 
¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer? Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario
by Levine, David K. 
Neuroeconomics?
by David Levine 
Production Chains
by David Levine 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew 
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew 
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
by Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
by Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient
by Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew 
The NashThreats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
An Easier Way to Calibrate
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Conditional Universal Consistency
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
An Economist's Perspective on MultiAgent Learning
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
A DualSelf Model of Impulse Control
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Learning and Equilibrium
by Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew 
Selfconfirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Michael Woodford 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine 
On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul M. Romer 
The Theory of Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
by Maniadis, Zacharias & Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew 
The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study
by David K. Levine & Thomas R. Palfrey 
Production Chains
by David K. Levine 
The optimum quantity of money revisited
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Michael Woodford 
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Neuroeconomics?
by David K. Levine 
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz 
Nash Equilibria Equal Competitive Equilibria
by David K. Levine 
Monopoly and the incentive to innovate when adoption involves switchover disruptions
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz 
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi 
Perfectly Competitive Innovation (Growth)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Quantum Games Have No News For Economics
by David K. Levine 
Market for Degrees and Educational Standards
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Reexamining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz Jr 
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi 
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Perfectly Competitive Innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Perfectly Competitive Innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Learning and Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Learning and BeliefBased Trade
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Perfectly competitive innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Perfectly Competitive Innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation
by Helios Herrera & David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli 
LearningTheoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Learning and Belief Based Trading
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the FarmerSheriff Game
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments
by David K. Levine 
Intellectual property and market size
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?
by David K. Levine 
2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the FarmerSheriff Game
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Production Chains
by David K. Levine 
Rent Seeking and Innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Estatica comparativa y prevision perfecta en economias con horizonte infinito
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Innovations
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments
by David K. Levine & Jie Zheng 
Intellectual Property
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Rentseeking and innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
IP and Market Size
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Governance of the Internet
by David K. Levine 
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
by D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: the case against intellectual monopoly
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Growth cycles and market crashes
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Innováció  a verseny szemszögéből
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole 
Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
by David K. Levine 
Review: Beyond Individual Choice by Michael Bacharach with Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden
by David K. Levine 
The economics of ideas and intellectual property
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmersheriff game
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the FarmerSheriff Game
by Federico Weinschelbaum & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Felipe Zurita 
Globalization, Intellectual Property, and Economic Prosperity
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation
by David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Factor saving innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Risk, Delay, and Convex SelfControl Costs
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Game Theory
by David K. Levine 
Risk, Delay, and Convex SelfControl Costs
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Factor Saving Innovation
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame 
Efficiency and the Value of Money
by David K. Levine 
The Slippery Slope of Concession
by Jack Hirshleifer & Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame 
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
by Phillip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the FarmerSheriff Game
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION
by JACK HIRSHLEIFER & MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE 
DebtConstrained Asset Markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Conflict and the evolution of societies
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Comments on Bruce Smith's Work
by David K. Levine & Arthur J. Rolnick & Karl Shell 
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
by Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Competition and Innovation
by Michele Boldrin & Juan C. Allamand & David K. Levine & Carmine Ornaghi 
COMMENTS ON GREENZHOU "MONEY AS A MECHANISM IN A BEWLEY ECONOMY"
by David K. Levine 
The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use'
by Boldrin Michele & Levine David K. 
Comparitive Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror
by David K. Levine & Robert A. Levine 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?
by Boldrin Michele & Levine David K. 
Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Debt constrained asset markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
The Case Against Patents
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
The Case against Patents
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine 
Timing and SelfControl
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Case Against Intellectual Property
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Technological diversification  discussion
by David K. Levine 
The case against patents
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
When Are Agents Negligible?
by David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine 
The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 2
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
The Brother in Law Effect
by David K. Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
THE BROTHERINLAW EFFECT
by David K. Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Timing and SelfControl
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?
by David K. Levine & Balázs Szentes 
When is Reputation Bad
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Brother in Law Effect
by David K. Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita 
Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?
by David Levine & Balázs Szentes 
Timing and Self‐Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Auctions and Relationships
by David K. Levine 
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Models
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Voting Leaders and Voting Participation
by Cesar Martinelli & Helios Herrera & David K. Levine 
Virtual Model Validation for Economics
by David K. Levine 
Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine 
Voter Participation with Collusive Parties
by David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi 
Virtual Model Validation for Economics
by David K. Levine 
Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine
edited by 
A Simple Durable Goods Model
by David Levine 
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
What’s Intellectual Property Good for?
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
A Unifying Learning Framework for Building Artificial GamePlaying Agents
by W. Chen & Y. Chen & D. Levine 
What's Intellectual Property Good for?
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
A DualSelf Model of Impulse Control
by David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg 
A Simple Durable Goods Model
by David K. Levine 
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
An Economists Perspective on MultiAgent Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
AntiMalthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore 
Appropriation and Intellectual Property
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
An approximate dualself model and paradoxes of choice under risk
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias 
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
An approximate dualself model and paradoxes of choice under risk
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias 
An approximate dualself model and paradoxes of choice under risk
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Altruism and Self Control
by Anna Dreber & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & David G. Rand 
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Model of Discovery
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
An Approximate DualSelf Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
A Model of Discovery
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David Saul 
All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine 
What can we do with money ?
by David Levine 
Against Intellectual Monopoly
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. 
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Peer discipline and incentives within groups
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore 
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi
edited by 
Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore 
OpenLoop and ClosedLoop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Whither Game Theory?
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study
by LEVINE, DAVID K. & PALFREY, THOMAS R. 
The Political Economy of Policy Implementation
by David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi 
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID M. KREPS & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
by Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE
edited by 
Whither game theory? Towards a theory of learning in games
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine. 
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer
edited by 
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE
edited by 
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONGLIVED OPPONENT
by MARCO CELENTANI & DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE & WOLFGANG PESENDORFER
edited by 
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Nashthreats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine
edited by 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons
by Juan I. Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
When is reputation bad?
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine
edited by 
A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine 
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Nicholas W. Papageorge & Lemin Wu 
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Imitation
by David K. Levine 
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE & ERIC MASKIN
edited by 
A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine 
Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version)
by David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi 
Collusion constrained equilibrium
by Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore 
Editorial
by David K. Levine & Nicholas C. Yannelis 
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine
edited by 
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine 
Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: Two Masters
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica
editor of:

THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION
edited by David K. Levine & Steven A. Lippman 
A LongRun Collaboration on LongRun Games
edited by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine