David Levine
Names
| first: |
David |
| middle: |
Knudsen |
| last: |
Levine |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Washington University in St. Louis
/ Department of Economics (weight: 30%)
-
European University Institute
/ Department of Economics (weight: 30%)
-
European University Institute
/ Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) (weight: 30%)
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
/ Research Division (weight: 10%)
Research profile
author of:
- Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (repec:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:10:p:3298-3314)
by David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - When Are Agents Negligible? (repec:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:5:p:1160-70)
by Levine, David K & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - The Case Against Intellectual Property (repec:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:2:p:209-212)
by Michele Boldrin & David Levine - Superstition and Rational Learning (repec:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:3:p:630-651)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control (repec:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:5:p:1449-1476)
by David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg - A Model of Discovery (repec:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:2:p:337-42)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments (repec:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:353-77)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs (repec:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:3:p:34-68)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments (repec:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:131-45)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions (repec:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:1-33)
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz - Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (repec:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:295-317)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay (repec:aea:jeclit:v:58:y:2020:i:2:p:471-87)
by David K. Levine - The Case against Patents (repec:aea:jecper:v:27:y:2013:i:1:p:3-22)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games (repec:aea:jecper:v:30:y:2016:i:4:p:151-70)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning and Equilibrium (repec:anr:reveco:v:1:y:2009:p:385-420)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability (repec:aoz:wpaper:362)
by David Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - The Slippery Slope Of Concession (repec:bla:ecinqu:v:47:y:2009:i:2:p:197-205)
by Jack Hirshleifer & Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses, And Economic Growth (repec:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:1:p:358-380)
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Nicholas W. Papageorge & Lemin Wu - The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization (repec:bla:jpbect:v:23:y:2021:i:5:p:858-894)
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica - Twin peaks: Expressive externality in group participation (repec:bla:jpbect:v:25:y:2023:i:5:p:897-929)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Junze Sun - Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' (repec:bpj:evoice:v:1:y:2004:i:2:n:3)
by Boldrin Michele & Levine David K - Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation? (repec:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:3:n:2)
by Boldrin Michele & Levine David K. - What's Intellectual Property Good for? (repec:cai:recosp:reco_641_0029)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation (repec:cie:wpaper:0503)
by Helios Herrera & David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli - Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (repec:cie:wpaper:9805)
by Phillip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (repec:cla:levarc:103)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models (repec:cla:levarc:108)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information (repec:cla:levarc:1098)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole - Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000006)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - State Power and Conflict Driven Evolution (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000014)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - The Whip and the Bible: Punishment Versus Internalization (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000024)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Polarization and Electoral Balance (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000049)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000059)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica - Twin Peaks: Expressive Externality in Group Participation (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000078)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Junze Sun - Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000094)
by David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli - A Theory of the Dynamics of Factor Shares (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000102)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine & Yong Wang & Lijun Zhu - Cooperating Through Leaders (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000112)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Aldo Rustichini - True Myths (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000123)
by David K Levine - Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000130)
by Roberto Corrao & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Phoenix From the Ashes: The Evolution of Mechanism Designers (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000141)
by David K Levine - Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000148)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica - When to Appease and When to Punish: Hitler, Putin, and Hamas (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000159)
by David K Levine & Lee Ohanian - Chapter 1: The Enforcement of Collusion in a Quadratic Symmetric Oligopoly (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000172)
by David K Levine - Chapter 1 Appendix: The Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000178)
by David K Levine - Chapter 2: Long Run Collusion in a Partially Myopic Industry (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000183)
by David K Levine - Behavioral Mechanism Design in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000190)
by David K Levine - Vote or Fight? (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000199)
by David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli & Nicole Stoelinga - Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood in the Laboratory (repec:cla:levarc:11694000000000208)
by David K Levine - The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000000631)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Perfectly Competitive Innovation (Growth) (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000000886)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Globalization, Intellectual Property, and Economic Prosperity (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000001328)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000001920)
by Thomas J Holmes & David K Levine & James A Schmitz Jr - Appropriation and Intellectual Property (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000002262)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000002269)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis (repec:cla:levarc:122247000000002317)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems (repec:cla:levarc:124)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer - Debt Constrained Asset Markets (repec:cla:levarc:1276)
by Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine - Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets (repec:cla:levarc:14)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game (repec:cla:levarc:162)
by Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers (repec:cla:levarc:165)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:cla:levarc:172)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood (repec:cla:levarc:176)
by David K. Levine - When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible (repec:cla:levarc:180)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies (repec:cla:levarc:1873)
by Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine - Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium (repec:cla:levarc:189)
by David K. Levine - Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets (repec:cla:levarc:1954)
by David K. Levine & William Zame - Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints (repec:cla:levarc:1974)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Edward Prescott - Reputation with Noisy Precommitment (repec:cla:levarc:1987)
by David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli - Perfectly Competitive Innovation (repec:cla:levarc:1996)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models (repec:cla:levarc:1997)
by David K. Levine - The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development (repec:cla:levarc:2005)
by David Backus & Herminio Blanco & David K. Levine - Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent (repec:cla:levarc:2015)
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game (repec:cla:levarc:2022)
by David K. Levine - Growth Cycles and Market Crashes (repec:cla:levarc:2028)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited (repec:cla:levarc:2035)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Michael Woodford - Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models (repec:cla:levarc:2042)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments (repec:cla:levarc:2047)
by David K Levine - Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics (repec:cla:levarc:2057)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Andreu Mas-Colell & Michael Woodford - The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (repec:cla:levarc:2058)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin - An Easier Way to Calibrate (repec:cla:levarc:2059)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Castle on the Hill (repec:cla:levarc:2068)
by David K Levine - Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness (repec:cla:levarc:2080)
by David K Levine & William R Zame - Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell (repec:cla:levarc:2091)
by Dean Foster & David K Levine & Rakesh Vohra - Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities (repec:cla:levarc:2106)
by Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David K Levine - Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population (repec:cla:levarc:2122)
by David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue (repec:cla:levarc:2127)
by David K Levine & Aldo Rustichini - Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (repec:cla:levarc:2138)
by Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:cla:levarc:2147)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Efficiency and the Value of Money (repec:cla:levarc:2161)
by David K. Levine - Nash Equilibria Equal Competitive Equilibria (repec:cla:levarc:2172)
by David K. Levine - Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies (repec:cla:levarc:2184)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games (repec:cla:levarc:219)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Economics of Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Models (repec:cla:levarc:2193)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (repec:cla:levarc:220)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality (repec:cla:levarc:2205)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud - Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players (repec:cla:levarc:221)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning in Games (repec:cla:levarc:2222)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (repec:cla:levarc:227)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine - Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (repec:cla:levarc:229)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole - The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1 (repec:cla:levarc:234936000000000028)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 2 (repec:cla:levarc:234936000000000033)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games (repec:cla:levarc:370)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (repec:cla:levarc:373)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (repec:cla:levarc:394)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin - Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy (repec:cla:levarc:43)
by David K. Levine - Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies (repec:cla:levarc:46)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Andreu Mas-Colell & William Zame - Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (repec:cla:levarc:470)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Conditional Universal Consistency (repec:cla:levarc:471)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error (repec:cla:levarc:48)
by David K. Levine - Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets (repec:cla:levarc:49)
by David K. Levine - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (repec:cla:levarc:508)
by D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents (repec:cla:levarc:52)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (repec:cla:levarc:571)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information (repec:cla:levarc:59)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin - Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets (repec:cla:levarc:603)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (repec:cla:levarc:607)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - The Case Against Intellectual Property (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000003)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - When is Reputation Bad (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000016)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000030)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Rent Seeking and Innovation (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000465)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000493)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Superstition and Rational Learning (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000731)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Comments on Bruce Smith's Work (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000739)
by David K Levine & Arthur J Rolnick & Karl Shell - IP and Market Size (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000836)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000865)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi - A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000876)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000925)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000935)
by Helios Herrera & David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli - Perfectly Competitive Innovation (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000954)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000968)
by David K Levine & Thomas R Palfrey - Learning and Belief Based Trading (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000975)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Auctions and Relationships (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000982)
by David K Levine - Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000000992)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Quantum Games Have No News For Economics (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000001000)
by David K Levine - Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000001015)
by David K Levine & Balázs Szentes - Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000001023)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - The Slippery Slope of Concession (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000001057)
by Jack Hirshleifer & Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror (repec:cla:levarc:618897000000001068)
by David K Levine & Robert A Levine - The Theory of Learning in Games (repec:cla:levarc:624)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Factor Saving Innovation (repec:cla:levarc:625018000000000088)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Game Theory (repec:cla:levarc:625018000000000140)
by David K Levine - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (repec:cla:levarc:625018000000000151)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Perfectly Competitive Innovation (repec:cla:levarc:625018000000000192)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (repec:cla:levarc:627)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming (repec:cla:levarc:628)
by David K. Levine - Learning in the Stock Flow Model (repec:cla:levarc:629)
by David K. Levine - Production Chains (repec:cla:levarc:659843000000000001)
by David K Levine - Timing and Self-Control (repec:cla:levarc:659843000000000008)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth (repec:cla:levarc:661465000000000028)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments (repec:cla:levarc:661465000000000098)
by David K Levine & Jie Zheng - Virtual Model Validation for Economics (repec:cla:levarc:661465000000000155)
by David K Levine - On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments (repec:cla:levarc:661465000000000312)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' (repec:cla:levarc:671757000000000001)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Eric Maskin - A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games (repec:cla:levarc:671757000000000010)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments (repec:cla:levarc:671757000000000016)
by David K Levine - Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent (repec:cla:levarc:699152000000000019)
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (repec:cla:levarc:699152000000000028)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Predicting Cooperation with Trembles (repec:cla:levarc:735347000000000007)
by David K Levine - The Evolution of Resilience (repec:cla:levarc:735347000000000013)
by David K Levine - Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win (repec:cla:levarc:735347000000000020)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica - Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (repec:cla:levarc:7571)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation (repec:cla:levarc:7630)
by David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Does Market Incompleteness Matter (repec:cla:levarc:78)
by David K. Levine & William Zame - The Brother in Law Effect (repec:cla:levarc:784828000000000587)
by David K Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning (repec:cla:levarc:784828000000000683)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Innovations (repec:cla:levarc:784828000000000690)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Models (repec:cla:levarc:784828000000000698)
by Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine - All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons (repec:cla:levarc:784828000000000706)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Review: Beyond Individual Choice by Michael Bacharach with Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden (repec:cla:levarc:784828000000000713)
by David K Levine - Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000001)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Virtual Model Validation for Economics (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000008)
by David K Levine - Neuroeconomics? (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000030)
by David K Levine - What’s Intellectual Property Good for? (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000082)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000177)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - Competition and Innovation (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000232)
by Michele Boldrin & Juan C Allamand & David K Levine & Carmine Ornaghi - The Case Against Patents (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000465)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000472)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000480)
by Juan I Block & David K Levine - Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000685)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000692)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Market for Degrees and Educational Standards (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000699)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Altruism and Self Control (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000962)
by Anna Dreber & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & David G Rand - Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000973)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000982)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Intellectual Property (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000000990)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - A Unifying Learning Framework for Building Artificial Game-Playing Agents (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001002)
by W Chen & Y Chen & D Levine - Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001011)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Voter Participation with Collusive Parties (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001234)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Collusion Constrained Equilibrium (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001288)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Whither Game Theory? (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001307)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001316)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001323)
by Juan I Block & David K Levine - Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001365)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Nicholas W Papageorge & Lemin Wu - Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001375)
by Juan I Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version) (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001401)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: Two Masters (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001420)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - The Political Economy of Policy Implementation (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001435)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Imitation (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001441)
by David K Levine - Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001449)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001458)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Introduction to Special Issue in Honor of Lloyd Shapley: Seven Topics in Game Theory (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001474)
by David K Levine - Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels? (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001489)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica - Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001509)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Reputation Trap (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001516)
by David K Levine - Radical Markets by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl: a review essay (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001522)
by David K Levine - Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001547)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Fine Cartels (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001554)
by David K Levine - Success in Contests (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001563)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001577)
by Bernard Cornet & M Ali Khan & David K Levine & Edward C Prescott - Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001758)
by Juan I Block & Rohan Dutta & David K Levine - Failing to Provide Public Goods: Why the Afghan Army did not Fight (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001766)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Review of Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters (By Stephen E. Koonin) (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001775)
by David K Levine - Reforming Patent Law: The Case of Covid‐19 (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001782)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - On Concave Functions over Lotteries (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001804)
by Roberto Corrao & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001811)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica - Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001821)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Efficiently Breaking the Folk Theorem by Reliably Communicating Long Term Commitments (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001832)
by David K Levine - Behavioral Mechanism Design as a Benchmark for Experimental Studies (repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001843)
by David K Levine - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (repec:cla:levarc:81)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays (repec:cla:levarc:814577000000000002)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (repec:cla:levarc:814577000000000009)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - A Model of Discovery (repec:cla:levarc:814577000000000092)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? (repec:cla:levarc:814577000000000274)
by David K Levine - A Simple Durable Goods Model (repec:cla:levarc:84)
by David K. Levine - Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique (repec:cla:levarc:843644000000000022)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs (repec:cla:levarc:843644000000000332)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Estatica comparativa y prevision perfecta en economias con horizonte infinito (repec:cla:levarc:86)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - When Are Agents Negligible? (repec:cla:levarc:96)
by David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Against Intellectual Monopoly (repec:cla:levrem:122247000000002371)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (repec:cla:levrem:321307000000000188)
by David K. Levine & Thomas R. Palfrey - New Approaches to Rewarding Pharmaceutical Innovation (repec:cla:levrem:661465000000000169)
by Paul Grootendorst & Aidan Hollis & David K Levine & Thomas Pogge & Aled M Edwards - Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the Evolution of Societies (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000000148)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000000713)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Learning with Recency Bias (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000000846)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000000853)
by Lemin Wu & Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Nicholas W Papageorge - Dynamics in Stochastic Evolutionary Models (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000000864)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - The Relationship between Economic Theory and Experiments (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000001257)
by David K. Levine & Jie Zheng - An Evolutionary Model of Intervention and Peace (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000001391)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000001479)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000001500)
by David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Freedom Isn’t the Same as Free Beer (repec:cla:levrem:786969000000001873)
by David K Levine - Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source (repec:cla:levrem:814577000000000211)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation (repec:cla:levrem:814577000000000423)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Local Almost Perfect Equilibrium with Large Adjustment Costs (repec:cla:uclawp:210)
by David Levine - The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly (repec:cla:uclawp:211)
by David Levine - The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly I: Equilibrium (repec:cla:uclawp:212)
by David Levine - The Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly II: Stability (repec:cla:uclawp:213)
by David Levine - A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood (repec:cla:uclawp:215)
by David Levine - Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (repec:cla:uclawp:216)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Extrapolative Investment Equilibrium (repec:cla:uclawp:234)
by David Levine - Farm Size and Reaper Diffusion in the Antebellum Midwest (repec:cla:uclawp:241)
by David Levine - Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (repec:cla:uclawp:242)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly (repec:cla:uclawp:247)
by David Levine - The Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error (repec:cla:uclawp:251)
by David Levine - Comparitive Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies (repec:cla:uclawp:259)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - A Simple Durable Goods Market (repec:cla:uclawp:275)
by David Levine - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (repec:cla:uclawp:289)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models (repec:cla:uclawp:319)
by David Levine - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (repec:cla:uclawp:398)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine - Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets (repec:cla:uclawp:418)
by David K. Levine - Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets (repec:cla:uclawp:666)
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame - Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets (repec:cla:uclawp:703)
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame - Polarization and Electoral Balance (repec:cpr:ceprdp:17538)
by Mattozzi, Andrea & Levine, David - The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem (repec:cpr:ceprdp:17936)
by Levine, David & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore - Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence (repec:cpr:ceprdp:18155)
by Levine, David & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore - Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout (repec:cpr:ceprdp:18807)
by Levine, David & Martinelli, Cesar - Efficiently Breaking the Folk Theorem by Reliably Communicating Long Term Commitments (repec:cpr:ceprdp:18808)
by Levine, David - Factor Saving Innovation (repec:cpr:ceprdp:3262)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - The Case Against Intellectual Property (repec:cpr:ceprdp:3273)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - Perfectly Competitive Innovation (repec:cpr:ceprdp:3274)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (repec:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:01:p:143-158_07)
by Levine, David K. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Against Intellectual Monopoly (repec:cup:cbooks:9780521127264)
by Boldrin,Michele & Levine,David K. - Against Intellectual Monopoly (repec:cup:cbooks:9780521879286)
by Boldrin,Michele & Levine,David K. - Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries (repec:don:donwpa:034)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Can A Turing Player Identify Itself? (repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-06a00001)
by David Levine & Balázs Szentes - A Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (repec:ecl:prirpe:09-19-2005a)
by Levine, David & Palfrey, Thomas - Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:2:p:433-53)
by Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:4:p:759-78)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K - Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:3:p:523-45)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K - Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:3:p:547-73)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K - The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:5:p:997-1039)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric - Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:64:y:1996:i:3:p:691-704)
by Celentani, Marco, et al - Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:3:p:575-98)
by Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K - Does Market Incompleteness Matter? (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:5:p:1805-1839)
by David K. Levine & William R. Zame - Timing and Self‐Control (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:1:p:1-42)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Voting Leaders and Voting Participation (repec:ecm:latm04:319)
by Cesar Martinelli & Helios Herrera & David K. Levine - Consistency and cautious fictitious play (repec:eee:dyncon:v:19:y:1995:i:5-7:p:1065-1089)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria (repec:eee:ecolet:v:25:y:1987:i:4:p:301-302)
by Levine, David K. - A remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood (repec:eee:econom:v:23:y:1983:i:3:p:337-342)
by Levine, David - The sensitivity of MLE to measurement error (repec:eee:econom:v:28:y:1985:i:2:p:223-230)
by Levine, David - Reverse regression for latent-variable models (repec:eee:econom:v:32:y:1986:i:2:p:291-292)
by Levine, David K. - The tripartite auction folk theorem (repec:eee:eecrev:v:162:y:2024:i:c:s0014292123002842)
by Levine, David K. & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore - Learning in games (repec:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:631-639)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Introduction to the Special Issue (repec:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:1-6)
by Vohra, Rakesh & Levine, David K. & Foster, Dean - Conditional Universal Consistency (repec:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:104-130)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - An Easier Way to Calibrate (repec:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:131-137)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Learning to play Bayesian games (repec:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:282-303)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - The evolution of cooperation through imitation (repec:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:2:p:293-315)
by Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient (repec:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:1:p:27-49)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru - When is reputation bad? (repec:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:2:p:498-526)
by Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Peer discipline and incentives within groups (repec:eee:jeborg:v:123:y:2016:i:c:p:19-30)
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore - Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules (repec:eee:jeborg:v:204:y:2022:i:c:p:394-421)
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore - Leaders and social norms: On the emergence of consensus or conflict (repec:eee:jeborg:v:233:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000903)
by Block, Juan I. & Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David K. - Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems (repec:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:606-612)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game (repec:eee:jetheo:v:100:y:2001:i:1:p:1-21)
by Johnson, Philip & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (repec:eee:jetheo:v:104:y:2002:i:2:p:473-478)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Factor Saving Innovation (repec:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:1:p:18-41)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints (repec:eee:jetheo:v:107:y:2002:i:1:p:39-69)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Prescott, Edward C. - The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (repec:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:461-473)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique (repec:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:6:p:2354-2371)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters (repec:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:101-125)
by Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore - The evolution of resilience (repec:eee:jetheo:v:230:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125001243)
by Levine, David K. - Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games (repec:eee:jetheo:v:31:y:1983:i:2:p:251-268)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models (repec:eee:jetheo:v:34:y:1984:i:2:p:216-226)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. - Limit games and limit equilibria (repec:eee:jetheo:v:38:y:1986:i:2:p:261-279)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players (repec:eee:jetheo:v:44:y:1988:i:1:p:1-18)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - On the robustness of equilibrium refinements (repec:eee:jetheo:v:44:y:1988:i:2:p:354-380)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K. - Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers (repec:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:1:p:1-21)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Romer, Paul M. - Gross substitutability in large-square economies (repec:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Mas-Colell, Andreu & Woodford, Michael - Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy (repec:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:1:p:148-164)
by Levine, David K. - An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information (repec:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:1:p:26-47)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium (repec:eee:jetheo:v:59:y:1993:i:2:p:239-256)
by Levine David K. - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (repec:eee:jetheo:v:62:y:1994:i:1:p:103-135)
by Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K. - Reputation with Noisy Precommitment (repec:eee:jetheo:v:78:y:1998:i:1:p:55-75)
by Levine, David K. & Martinelli, Cesar - When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (repec:eee:jetheo:v:79:y:1998:i:1:p:46-71)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:2:p:165-185)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Growth Cycles and Market Crashes (repec:eee:jetheo:v:96:y:2001:i:1-2:p:13-39)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk (repec:eee:joepsy:v:41:y:2014:i:c:p:55-67)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias - On concave functions over lotteries (repec:eee:mateco:v:110:y:2024:i:c:s0304406823001295)
by Corrao, Roberto & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies (repec:eee:mateco:v:13:y:1984:i:1:p:69-93)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. - Determinacy of equilibrium in large-scale economies (repec:eee:mateco:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:231-262)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Mas-Colell, Andreu & Zame, William R. - Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets (repec:eee:mateco:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:357-376)
by Levine, David K. - Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets (repec:eee:mateco:v:26:y:1996:i:1:p:103-131)
by Levine, David K. & Zame, William R. - A theory of the dynamics of factor shares (repec:eee:moneco:v:148:y:2024:i:c:s0304393224000631)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. & Wang, Yong & Zhu, Lijun - Rent-seeking and innovation (repec:eee:moneco:v:51:y:2004:i:1:p:127-160)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - Perfectly competitive innovation (repec:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:3:p:435-453)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations (repec:eee:poleco:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:71-83)
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore - The economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models (repec:eee:pubeco:v:42:y:1990:i:2:p:219-243)
by Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. - Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation (repec:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:501-513)
by Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César - Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies (repec:eee:reecon:v:67:y:2013:i:4:p:289-306)
by Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore - Manifesto for research in economics (repec:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:2:p:169-170)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - The Economics Of Information (repec:elg:eebook:567)
by David K. Levine & Steven A. Lippman (ed.) - Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets (repec:elg:eechap:13236_5)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:els:esrcls:032)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:els:esrcls:040)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - ¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer? Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario (repec:elt:journl:v:77:y:2010:i:307:p:509-531)
by Levine, David K. - Technological diversification - discussion (repec:fip:fedfpr:y:2007:i:nov:x:6)
by David K. Levine - Failing to Provide Public Goods: Why the Afghan Army Did Not Fight (repec:fip:fedlrv:93841)
by Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica - Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games (repec:fip:fedlwp:2012-031)
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine - Conflict and the evolution of societies (repec:fip:fedlwp:2012-032)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica - Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game (repec:fip:fedlwp:2012-033)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk (repec:fip:fedlwp:2012-034)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - The case against patents (repec:fip:fedlwp:2012-035)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state (repec:fip:fedlwp:2013-023)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica - Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers (repec:fip:fedmsr:118)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul M. Romer - Growth cycles and market crashes (repec:fip:fedmsr:279)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Factor saving innovation (repec:fip:fedmsr:301)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Perfectly competitive innovation (repec:fip:fedmsr:303)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: the case against intellectual monopoly (repec:fip:fedmsr:339)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Rent-seeking and innovation (repec:fip:fedmsr:347)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - The economics of ideas and intellectual property (repec:fip:fedmsr:357)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Intellectual property and market size (repec:fip:fedmsr:360)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets (repec:fip:fedmsr:380)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Monopoly and the incentive to innovate when adoption involves switchover disruptions (repec:fip:fedmsr:402)
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz - The optimum quantity of money revisited (repec:fip:fedmwp:404)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Michael Woodford - On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems (repec:fip:fedmwp:436)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul M. Romer - Debt constrained asset markets (repec:fip:fedmwp:445)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:fth:harver:1774)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (repec:fth:harver:1926)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (repec:fth:harver:1961)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When is Reputation Bad? (repec:fth:harver:1962)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi (repec:fth:harver:2034)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When is Reputation Bad? (repec:fth:harver:2035)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (repec:fth:harver:2049)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient (repec:fth:harver:2051)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi - A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (repec:fth:harver:2112)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Superstition and Rational Learning (repec:fth:harver:2114)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:fth:teavfo:9-99)
by Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Timing and Self-Control (repec:hrv:faseco:11005331)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments (repec:hrv:faseco:11005333)
by Maniadis, Zacharias & Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew - Tail probabilities for triangular arrays (repec:hrv:faseco:13041349)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David Saul - An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk (repec:hrv:faseco:13051803)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias - Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium (repec:hrv:faseco:13477947)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (repec:hrv:faseco:3160491)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games (repec:hrv:faseco:3160492)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (repec:hrv:faseco:3196301)
by Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Superstition and Rational Learning (repec:hrv:faseco:3196330)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (repec:hrv:faseco:3196334)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control (repec:hrv:faseco:3196335)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient (repec:hrv:faseco:3196336)
by Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - When is Reputation Bad? (repec:hrv:faseco:3196337)
by Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew - Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (repec:hrv:faseco:3198694)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (repec:hrv:faseco:3200611)
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (repec:hrv:faseco:3200612)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning (repec:hrv:faseco:3200613)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:hrv:faseco:3200614)
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (repec:hrv:faseco:3203772)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - An Easier Way to Calibrate (repec:hrv:faseco:3203773)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (repec:hrv:faseco:3203774)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (repec:hrv:faseco:3203775)
by Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Conditional Universal Consistency (repec:hrv:faseco:3204826)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (repec:hrv:faseco:3350443)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (repec:hrv:faseco:3350444)
by Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Learning and Equilibrium (repec:hrv:faseco:4382413)
by Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew - Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique (repec:hrv:faseco:4686412)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly (repec:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:2:p:327-350)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Comments On Green-Zhou "Money As A Mechanism In A Bewley Economy" (repec:ier:iecrev:v:46:y:2005:i:2:p:373-375)
by David K. Levine - Market Size And Intellectual Property Protection (repec:ier:iecrev:v:50:y:2009:i:3:p:855-881)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - The Brother-In-Law Effect (repec:ier:iecrev:v:51:y:2010:i:2:p:497-507)
by David K. Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - Learning and Belief-Based Trade (repec:ioe:cuadec:v:42:y:2005:i:126:p:199-208)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Brother in Law Effect (repec:ioe:doctra:303)
by David K Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (repec:ioe:doctra:397)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita - Innováció - a verseny szemszögéből
[Innovation: the competitive view] (repec:ksa:szemle:768)
by Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K. - Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies (repec:mit:worpap:312)
by T. J. Kehoe & D. K. Levine - Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models (repec:mit:worpap:313)
by T. J. Kehoe & D. K. Levine - Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies (repec:mit:worpap:314)
by T. J. Kehoe & D. K. Levine - Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models (repec:mit:worpap:315)
by D. K. Levine & T. J. Kehoe - Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers (repec:mit:worpap:366)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player (repec:mit:worpap:461)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales (repec:mit:worpap:490)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information (repec:mit:worpap:523)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E. - Equilibrium Payoffs Long-Run And Short-Run Players And Imperfect Public Information (repec:mit:worpap:524)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information (repec:mit:worpap:525)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Monopoly And Credibility In Asset Markets: An Example (repec:mit:worpap:539)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Self-Confirming Equilibrium (repec:mit:worpap:581)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (repec:mit:worpap:591)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - The Theory of Learning in Games (repec:mtp:titles:0262061945)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets (repec:nbr:nberwo:12656)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Growth and Intellectual Property (repec:nbr:nberwo:12769)
by Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine - Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions (repec:nbr:nberwo:13864)
by Thomas J. Holmes & David K. Levine & James A. Schmitz, Jr. - Production Chains (repec:nbr:nberwo:16571)
by David K. Levine - Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (repec:nbr:nberwo:19221)
by David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica - When to Appease and When to Punish: Hitler, Putin, and Hamas (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32280)
by David K. Levine & Lee E. Ohanian - Changes in Managerial Pay Structures 1986-1992 and Rising Returns to Skill (repec:nbr:nberwo:7730)
by K.C. O'Shaughnessy & David I. Levine & Peter Cappelli - Information Aggregation, Security Design and Currency Swaps (repec:nbr:nberwo:8746)
by Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine - Unknown
- Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games (repec:nos:voprec:y:2017:id:306)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - When are Agents Negligible? (repec:nwu:cmsems:1018)
by Wolfgang Pesendorfer & David Levine - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (repec:nwu:cmsems:1322)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When is Reputation Bad? (repec:nwu:cmsems:1358)
by Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Intervention and peace (repec:oup:ecpoli:v:33:y:2018:i:95:p:361-402.)
by David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique (repec:oup:jeurec:v:20:y:2022:i:1:p:39-78.)
by Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica - A Simple Durable Goods Model (repec:oup:qjecon:v:100:y:1985:i:3:p:775-788.)
by David Levine - Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (repec:oup:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:1:p:37-50.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole - Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games (repec:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:2:p:507-536.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (repec:oup:qjecon:v:124:y:2009:i:1:p:233-265.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Efficiency and the Value of Money (repec:oup:restud:v:56:y:1989:i:1:p:77-88.)
by David K. Levine - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (repec:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:3:p:561-579.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Debt-Constrained Asset Markets (repec:oup:restud:v:60:y:1993:i:4:p:865-888.)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine - Stephen E. Koonin: unsettled: what climate science tells us, what it doesn’t, and why it matters (repec:pal:buseco:v:57:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1057_s11369-021-00239-y)
by David K. Levine - The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development (repec:pal:intecp:978-1-349-06749-7_3)
by David Backus & Herminio Blanco & David Levine - Introduction (repec:pal:palchp:978-1-137-34679-7_1)
by David Levine - Political Consequences (repec:pal:palchp:978-1-137-34679-7_6)
by David Levine - Conclusion (repec:pal:palchp:978-1-137-34679-7_7)
by David Levine - Steady States and Determinacy of Equilibria in Economies With Infinitely Lived Agents (repec:pal:palchp:978-1-349-08633-7_18)
by Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul M. Romer - What can we do with money ? (repec:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_1985_num_10_1_1001)
by David Levine - EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics (repec:red:ecodyn:v:7:y:2006:i:2:interview)
by David Levine - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (repec:red:issued:06-189)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" (repec:red:issued:06-189c)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Production Chains (repec:red:issued:11-41)
by David Levine - Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment (repec:red:issued:v:1:y:1998:i:3:p:593-622)
by David K. Levine - Introduction (repec:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:213-215)
by David K. Levine & Aldo Rustichini - The Castle on the Hill (repec:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:330-337)
by David Levine - Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (repec:red:sed006:680)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth (repec:red:sed008:277)
by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine - Production Chains (repec:red:sed011:510)
by David K. Levine - wjecon.php3, a script converting ReDIF data to html (repec:rpc:script:wjecon)
by David K. Levine - Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Governance of the Internet (repec:rsc:rsceui:2013/24)
by David K. Levine - Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (repec:sad:wpaper:109)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Felipe Zurita - Editorial (repec:spr:etbull:v:1:y:2013:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0014-4)
by David K. Levine & Nicholas C. Yannelis - A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication (repec:spr:etbull:v:5:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-016-0107-y)
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine - Fine cartels (repec:spr:etbull:v:9:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-021-00205-z)
by David K. Levine - Neuroeconomics? (repec:spr:inrvec:v:58:y:2011:i:3:p:287-305)
by David Levine - On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems (repec:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:1:p:43-68)
by Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K & Romer, Paul M - Comments on Bruce Smith’s work (repec:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:733-739)
by David Levine & Arthur Rolnick & Karl Shell - Special issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis (repec:spr:joecth:v:71:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01360-x)
by Bernard Cornet & M. Ali Khan & David Levine & Edward C. Prescott - Success in contests (repec:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01367-4)
by David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi - Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis – Part II (repec:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-022-01420-w)
by Rabah Amir & Bernard Cornet & M. Ali Khan & David Levine & Edward C. Prescott - Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games (repec:spr:jogath:v:45:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0498-2)
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine - Intervention with limited information (repec:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00796-8)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity (repec:spr:specre:v:8:y:2006:i:1:p:23-34)
by Michele Boldrin & David Levine - Deterrence In The Cold War And The 'War On Terror' (repec:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:6:p:605-617)
by David Levine & Robert Levine - Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models (repec:the:publsh:1978)
by Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore - Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory (repec:the:publsh:2626)
by Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Collusion constrained equilibrium (repec:the:publsh:2762)
by Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore - Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps (repec:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:3:p:609-633)
by Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine - Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability (repec:udt:wpecon:2025_08)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & David K. Levine & Felipe Zurita - The Reputation Trap (repec:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:6:p:2659-2678)
by David K. Levine - Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels? (repec:wly:iecrev:v:62:y:2021:i:1:p:47-64)
by David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica - Razor‐Thin Mass Elections With High Turnout (repec:wly:iecrev:v:65:y:2024:i:4:p:1607-1624)
by David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli - A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games (repec:wsi:wsbook:6880)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.) - Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0001)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0002)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0003)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Finite Player Approximations To A Continuum Of Players (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0004)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0005)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine - When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0006)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0007)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0008)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0009)
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - When is reputation bad? (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0010)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0012)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0013)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0014)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0015)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0016)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi - Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring (repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0017)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps (repec:ysm:somwrk:ysm38)
by Mark Grinblatt & Bhagwan Chowdhry & David Levine - Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps (repec:ysm:wpaper:ysm38)
by Mark Grinblatt & Bhagwan Chowdhry & David Levine