Johan N. M. Lagerlöf
Names
| first: |
Johan |
| middle: |
N. M. |
| last: |
Lagerlof |
Identifer
Contact
| homepage: |
http://www.johanlagerlof.com |
|
| phone: |
+45 35323013 |
| postal address: |
Johan Lagerlof
Department of Economics
University of Copenhagen
Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26
DK-1353 Copenhagen K
Denmark |
Affiliations
-
Københavns Universitet
/ Økonomisk Institut
Research profile
author of:
- Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:12:y:2020:i:4:p:144-69)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a “Liberal” Central Banker (RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:221-236)
by Johan Lagerlöf - Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:72:y:2024:i:1:p:253-283)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information? (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:106:y:2004:i:1:p:123-142)
by Johan Lagerlöf - A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:109:y:2007:i:1:p:49-70)
by Lars Frisell & Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets: What Are the Welfare Effects? (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:120:y:2018:i:2:p:465-502)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schottmüller - Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:19)
by Lagerlöf Johan N.M. - On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3841)
by Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan - Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3842)
by Lagerlof, Johan - Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3884)
by Lagerlof, Johan - Insisting on a Non-negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare and Multiple Equilibria (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3901)
by Lagerlof, Johan - Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4313)
by Lagerlof, Johan & Frisell, Lars - Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5343)
by Lagerlof, Johan & Frisell, Lars - A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5893)
by Lagerlof, Johan - The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6895)
by Lagerlof, Johan & Seltzer, Andrew - Does Cost Uncertainty in the Bertrand Model Soften Competition? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8817)
by Lagerlof, Johan - Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets?What Are the Welfare Effects? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9753)
by Lagerlof, Johan & Schottmüller, Christoph - Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9774)
by Lagerlof, Johan & Schottmüller, Christoph - Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:114:y:2004:i:492:p:55-69)
by Johan Lagerl–f - Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: An argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:421-424)
by Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M. - Strategic gains from discrimination (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:122:y:2020:i:c:s0014292119302156)
by Lagerlöf, Johan N.M. - Hiding information in electoral competition (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:42:y:2003:i:1:p:48-74)
by Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan - On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:23:y:2005:i:9-10:p:803-827)
by Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul - Insisting on a non-negative price: Oligopoly, uncertainty, welfare, and multiple equilibria (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:25:y:2007:i:4:p:861-875)
by Lagerlof, Johan N.M. - Surfing incognito: Welfare effects of anonymous shopping (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:87:y:2023:i:c:s0167718722000923)
by Lagerlöf, Johan N.M. - Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:3:p:615-637)
by Lagerlof, Johan - A welfare analysis of strategic information revelation (RePEc:hhs:hastef:0109)
by Lagerlöf, Johan - On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control (RePEc:hol:holodi:0424)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues - Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations (RePEc:hol:holodi:0510)
by Lars Frisell & Johann Lagerloef - A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations (RePEc:hol:holodi:0604)
by Johan N.M. Lagerlöf - The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: A Natural Experiment (RePEc:hol:holodi:0703)
by Johan N.M. Lagerlöf & Andrew J. Seltzer - Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:114:y:2003:i:3-4:p:319-47)
by Lagerlof, Johan - Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets - What Are the Welfare Effects? (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1312)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schottmüller - Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1315)
by Johan N.M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schotmüller - Does Cost Uncertainty in the Bertrand Model Soften Competition? (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1408)
by Johan N.M. Lagerlöf - Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1602)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - Strategic Gains from Labor Market Discrimination (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1603)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1720)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - Surfing Incognito: Welfare Effects of Anonymous Shopping (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1813)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf - A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations (RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:3:p:197-218)
by Johan Lagerlöf - The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (RePEc:taf:jeduce:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:115-137)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Andrew J. Seltzer - Monopoly Insurance And Endogenous Information (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:1:p:233-255)
by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schottmüller - Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria (RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0304007)
by Johan Lagerlof - Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations (RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0510011)
by Lars Frisell & Johan N.M. Lagerlof - Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0207001)
by Johan Lagerlof - Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0304006)
by Johan Lagerlof - Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0402013)
by Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell - Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information? (RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0209001)
by Johan Lagerlof - Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0402003)
by Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell - Hiding Information in Electoral Competition (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv00-06)
by Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf - Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv00-17)
by Johan Lagerlöf - On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv02-08)
by Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues - Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Know How the Economy Works? (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv98-7)
by Johan Lagerlöf - Incomplete Information in the Samaritan's Dilemma: The Dilemma (Almost) Vanishes (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-12)
by Johan Lagerlöf - Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-18)
by Johan Lagerlöf - Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-04)
by Johan Lagerlöf - Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2004-02)
by Johan Lagerlöf & Lars Frisell - Fusionskontrolle und Anreize zum Lobbying (RePEc:zbw:wirtdi:42120)
by Lagerlöf, Johan & Heidhues, Paul