Eric LANGLAIS
Names
| first: |
Eric |
| last: |
LANGLAIS |
Identifer
Contact
| homepage: |
https://economix.fr/fr/page/langlais-eric |
|
| phone: |
+33 (0) 140 975 914 |
| postal address: |
EconomiX
University Paris Nanterre
200, Avenue de la République
Bâtiment G – Bureau 308 B
F-92001 Nanterre cedex
France |
Affiliations
-
Université Paris-Nanterre (Paris X)
/ EconomiX
Research profile
author of:
- Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ? (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_612_0263)
by Éric Langlais - Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_623_0589)
by Éric Langlais - On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis (RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_763_0229)
by Éric Langlais - Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: Lost Profit versus Unjust Enrichment (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_244_0519)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Éric Langlais - The Structure of Fines in the Light of Political Competition (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_255_0717)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties (RePEc:ctl:louvre:2008024)
by Eric LANGLAIS - On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis (RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010031)
by Eric Langlais - Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ? (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-11)
by Eric Langlais - Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-11)
by Eric Langlais - Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-14)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais - Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-15)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane - L’effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : Une étude empirique des décisions judiciaires (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2012-10)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane - Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem : An analysis of Article L. 615-7 (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-37)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-5)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi - On patent strength, litigation costs, and patent disputes under alternative damage rules (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-41)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - The structure of fi nes in the light of political competition (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-59)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-8)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais - On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2018-43)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte - Product liability when cumulative harm is incurred by both consumers and third parties (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2019-23)
by Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte - Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ? (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2020-25)
by Eric Langlais & Maxime Charreire - Endogenous market structures, product liability, and the scope of product differentiation (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2022-18)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais - Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2022-20)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais - Product Liability Influences Incentives for Horizontal Mergers (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-10)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Tim Friehe - On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:128-130)
by Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric & Schulte, Elisabeth - Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:18-27)
by Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric - Social Wealth and Optimal Care (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:2:p:271-284)
by Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Langlais, Eric - On the political economy of public safety investments (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:7-16)
by Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric - Prevention and cleanup of dynamic harm under environmental liability (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:83:y:2017:i:c:p:107-120)
by Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric - A Case for Information Sharing in Class Action Suits (RePEc:elg:eechap:13070_10)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais - Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse (RePEc:fie:wpaper:0806)
by Eric Langlais - On insurance contract design for low probability events (RePEc:fie:wpaper:0809)
by Eric Langlais - Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (RePEc:fie:wpaper:0810)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings? (RePEc:fie:wpaper:0902)
by Eric Langlais - On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations (RePEc:fie:wpaper:0903)
by Laetitia Hauret & Eric Langlais & Cartine Sonntag - On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01302563)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais - On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence, in an EU and a NEU framework (RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00194667)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais - Analyse économique de la criminalité (RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00605347)
by Eric Langlais & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet - Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279144)
by Eric Langlais - Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279184)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais - Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279250)
by Éric Langlais - Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279253)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi - L'économie des actions collectives (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279641)
by Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Eric Langlais - Analyse économique de la résolution des litiges (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00454659)
by Nathalie Chappe & Eric Langlais - On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01302563)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais - Social wealth and optimal care (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385819)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais - Personal bankruptcy law, fresh starts and judicial practice (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385890)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane - Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem : Lost Profit versus Unjust Enrichment (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385916)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - On the political economy of public safety investments (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385951)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais - L'effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : une étude empirique des décisions judicaires (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385983)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane - The structure of fines in the light of political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385985)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - A Case for Information Sharing in Class Action Suits (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01410693)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais - Chapter 5 : Asymmetries in rent-seeking (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01410725)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi - Safety and the allocation of costs in large accidents (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411623)
by Eric Langlais - Les sanctions financières aux entreprises (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411639)
by Eric Langlais - Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411641)
by Eric Langlais - The structure of fines in the light of political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411642)
by Eric Langlais - Political pressure and delegation in law enforcement (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411643)
by Eric Langlais - Marginal vs General Enforcement under Political Pressure (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411644)
by Eric Langlais - Specific vs general enforcement under political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411650)
by Eric Langlais - Patent litigations under asymmetric information (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411734)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - Deterrence and the punishment of offenses under political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411735)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411766)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - Elected vs appointed public law enforcers (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411768)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411775)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais - Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411776)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - Elected versus appointed law enforcers (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411778)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - Costly patent litigations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411779)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - Costly patent litigations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411780)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais - On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411782)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais - Political pressure and delegation in law enforcement (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411809)
by Eric Langlais - The structure of fines in the light of political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411810)
by Eric Langlais - Public law enforcers and political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411818)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - Specific vs general enforcement under political competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01411820)
by Eric Langlais - On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01302563)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais - Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:241-262)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais - Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201312)169:4__)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane - On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence, in an EU and a NEU framework (RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05034)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais - Law Enforcement with a Democratic Government (RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:19:y:2017:i:1:p:162-201.)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski - On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations (RePEc:pra:mprapa:14762)
by Hauret, Laetitia & Langlais, Eric & Sonntag, Carine - les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
[Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?] (RePEc:pra:mprapa:14892)
by Langlais, Eric - An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs (RePEc:pra:mprapa:22291)
by Langlais, Eric - Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations (RePEc:pra:mprapa:23016)
by Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric - Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents (RePEc:pra:mprapa:25710)
by Langlais, Eric - L'analyse géométrique de l'épargne de précaution. Des résultats complémentaires (RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_1_409439)
by Éric Langlais - Aversion au risque et prudence : le cas d'un risque de taux d'intérêt (RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_4_409724)
by Éric Langlais - On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:61:y:2016:i:1:p:169-182)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais - An Analysis Of Bounded Rationality In Judicial Litigations The Case With Loss Disappointment Averse Plaintiffs (RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:42-50)
by Eric LANGLAIS - On The Deterrent Effect Of Individual Versus Collective Liability In Criminal Organizations (RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:125-135)
by Laetitia HAURET & Eric LANGLAIS & Carine SONNTAG - Unknown item repec:srs:journl:jarle:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:42-50
- Unknown item repec:srs:journl:jarle:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:125-135
- Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ? (RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:4:y:2009:i:1(7)_spring2009:53)
by Eric LANGLAIS