Eric LANGLAIS

Names

first:	Eric
last:	LANGLAIS

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pla256

Contact

homepage:	https://economix.fr/fr/page/langlais-eric
phone:	+33 (0) 140 975 914
postal address:	EconomiX University Paris Nanterre 200, Avenue de la République Bâtiment G – Bureau 308 B F-92001 Nanterre cedex France

Affiliations

Université Paris-Nanterre (Paris X) / EconomiX
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

On the Ambiguous Effects of Repression (repec:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:327-348)
by Eric Langlais
Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic (repec:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:3:p:371-382)
by Eric Langlais
A Note on the Optimality of Domain-specific Liability (repec:bpj:rlecon:v:18:y:2022:i:2:p:283-295:n:4)
by Friehe Tim & Langlais Eric & Schulte Elisabeth
Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ? (repec:cai:recosp:reco_612_0263)
by Éric Langlais
Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus (repec:cai:recosp:reco_623_0589)
by Éric Langlais
Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties (repec:cai:reldbu:rel_742_0191)
by Éric Langlais
On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis (repec:cai:reldbu:rel_763_0229)
by Éric Langlais
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: Lost Profit versus Unjust Enrichment (repec:cai:repdal:redp_244_0519)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Éric Langlais
The Structure of Fines in the Light of Political Competition (repec:cai:repdal:redp_255_0717)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Elected vs appointed public law enforcers (repec:crb:wpaper:2013-06)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties (repec:ctl:louvre:2008024)
by Eric LANGLAIS
On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis (repec:ctl:louvre:2010031)
by Eric Langlais
Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse (repec:drm:wpaper:2008-30)
by Eric Langlais
Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque (repec:drm:wpaper:2008-31)
by Eric Langlais
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (repec:drm:wpaper:2008-32)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
On insurance contract design for low probability events (repec:drm:wpaper:2008-33)
by Eric Langlais
Social Wealth and Optimal Care (repec:drm:wpaper:2008-34)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais
On the Ambiguous Effects of Repression (repec:drm:wpaper:2008-40)
by Eric Langlais
Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises (repec:drm:wpaper:2009-10)
by Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ? (repec:drm:wpaper:2009-11)
by Eric Langlais
On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis (repec:drm:wpaper:2009-9)
by Eric Langlais
Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus (repec:drm:wpaper:2011-11)
by Eric Langlais
Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations (repec:drm:wpaper:2011-14)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice (repec:drm:wpaper:2011-15)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
Analyse économique et droit pénal : contributions, débats, limites (repec:drm:wpaper:2011-33)
by Eric Langlais
L’effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : Une étude empirique des décisions judiciaires (repec:drm:wpaper:2012-10)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
Elected vs appointed public law enforcers (repec:drm:wpaper:2013-35)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem : An analysis of Article L. 615-7 (repec:drm:wpaper:2013-37)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking (repec:drm:wpaper:2013-5)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi
On patent strength, litigation costs, and patent disputes under alternative damage rules (repec:drm:wpaper:2014-41)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
The structure of fi nes in the light of political competition (repec:drm:wpaper:2014-59)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (repec:drm:wpaper:2014-8)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Public law enforcers and political competition (repec:drm:wpaper:2015-40)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (repec:drm:wpaper:2018-43)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte
Product liability when cumulative harm is incurred by both consumers and third parties (repec:drm:wpaper:2019-23)
by Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte
Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ? (repec:drm:wpaper:2020-25)
by Eric Langlais & Maxime Charreire
Endogenous market structures, product liability, and the scope of product differentiation (repec:drm:wpaper:2022-18)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort (repec:drm:wpaper:2022-20)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
Product Liability Influences Incentives for Horizontal Mergers (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-10)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Tim Friehe
Which Liability Laws for Artificial Intelligence? (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-22)
by Eric Langlais & Nanxi Li
Law enforcement with unlawful investigations and enforcer's liability (RePEc:drm:wpaper:2025-21)
by Eric Langlais & Ken Yahagi
On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (repec:eee:ecolet:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:128-130)
by Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric & Schulte, Elisabeth
A measure of the sensitivity of saving to interest rate uncertainty with non-expected preferences (repec:eee:ecolet:v:48:y:1995:i:3-4:p:325-330)
by Langlais, Eric
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (repec:eee:irlaec:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:18-27)
by Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric
Social Wealth and Optimal Care (repec:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:2:p:271-284)
by Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Langlais, Eric
On the political economy of public safety investments (repec:eee:irlaec:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:7-16)
by Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric
Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability? (repec:eee:irlaec:v:67:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000144)
by Charreire, Maxime & Langlais, Eric
Environmental liability and product differentiation: Strict liability versus negligence revisited (repec:eee:irlaec:v:79:y:2024:i:c:s0144818824000346)
by Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Langlais, Eric
Product liability influences incentives for horizontal mergers (repec:eee:irlaec:v:84:y:2025:i:c:s0144818825000584)
by Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric
Prevention and cleanup of dynamic harm under environmental liability (repec:eee:jeeman:v:83:y:2017:i:c:p:107-120)
by Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric
A Case for Information Sharing in Class Action Suits (repec:elg:eechap:13070_10)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse (repec:fie:wpaper:0806)
by Eric Langlais
On insurance contract design for low probability events (repec:fie:wpaper:0809)
by Eric Langlais
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (repec:fie:wpaper:0810)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises (repec:fie:wpaper:0901)
by Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings? (repec:fie:wpaper:0902)
by Eric Langlais
On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations (repec:fie:wpaper:0903)
by Laetitia Hauret & Eric Langlais & Cartine Sonntag
Cycle de vie, epargne de precaution et risque de revenu: une approche empirique (repec:fth:pariem:92.53)
by Feve, P. & Langlais, L.
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (repec:hal:cesptp:hal-01302563)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence, in an EU and a NEU framework (repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00194667)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
Analyse économique de la criminalité (repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00605347)
by Eric Langlais & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet
Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption (repec:hal:journl:hal-00279144)
by Eric Langlais
Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law (repec:hal:journl:hal-00279184)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges (repec:hal:journl:hal-00279250)
by Éric Langlais
Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking (repec:hal:journl:hal-00279253)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi
L'économie des actions collectives (repec:hal:journl:hal-00279641)
by Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Eric Langlais
Analyse économique de la résolution des litiges (repec:hal:journl:hal-00454659)
by Nathalie Chappe & Eric Langlais
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (repec:hal:journl:hal-01302563)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
Social wealth and optimal care (repec:hal:journl:hal-01385819)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais
Personal bankruptcy law, fresh starts and judicial practice (repec:hal:journl:hal-01385890)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem : Lost Profit versus Unjust Enrichment (repec:hal:journl:hal-01385916)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
On the political economy of public safety investments (repec:hal:journl:hal-01385951)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
L'effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : une étude empirique des décisions judicaires (repec:hal:journl:hal-01385983)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
The structure of fines in the light of political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01385985)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
A Case for Information Sharing in Class Action Suits (repec:hal:journl:hal-01410693)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Chapter 5 : Asymmetries in rent-seeking (repec:hal:journl:hal-01410725)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi
Safety and the allocation of costs in large accidents (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411623)
by Eric Langlais
Les sanctions financières aux entreprises (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411639)
by Eric Langlais
Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411641)
by Eric Langlais
The structure of fines in the light of political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411642)
by Eric Langlais
Political pressure and delegation in law enforcement (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411643)
by Eric Langlais
Marginal vs General Enforcement under Political Pressure (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411644)
by Eric Langlais
Specific vs general enforcement under political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411650)
by Eric Langlais
Patent litigations under asymmetric information (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411734)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
Deterrence and the punishment of offenses under political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411735)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411766)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Elected vs appointed public law enforcers (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411768)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411775)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411776)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Elected versus appointed law enforcers (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411778)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Costly patent litigations (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411779)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
Costly patent litigations (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411780)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411782)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Political pressure and delegation in law enforcement (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411809)
by Eric Langlais
The structure of fines in the light of political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411810)
by Eric Langlais
Public law enforcers and political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411818)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Specific vs general enforcement under political competition (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411820)
by Eric Langlais
Prevention and Cleanup of Dynamic Harm Under Environmental Liability (repec:hal:journl:hal-01411822)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Prevention and Cleanup of Dynamic Harm Under Environmental Liability (repec:hal:journl:hal-01549786)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Judicial Independance in the European Court of Human Rights (repec:hal:journl:hal-01549904)
by Eric Langlais & Alessandro Melcarne & Giovanni Battista Ramello
Are judges harsher with repeated offenders? Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights (repec:hal:journl:hal-01549905)
by Eric Langlais & Alessandro Melcarne & Giovanni Battista Ramello
Law enforcement with a democratic government (repec:hal:journl:hal-01589283)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Compensation of Third-Party Victims and Liability Sharing Rules in Oligopolistic Markets (repec:hal:journl:hal-01671139)
by Maxime Charreire & Eric Langlais
Imperfect competition, joint harm and market share liability (repec:hal:journl:hal-01684992)
by Maxime Charreire & Eric Langlais
Imperfect competition, joint harm and market share liability (repec:hal:journl:hal-01684993)
by Maxime Charreire & Eric Langlais
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (repec:hal:journl:hal-01815022)
by Thomas Cortade & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais
On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (repec:hal:journl:hal-01887294)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte
Are judges harsher with repeat offenders? Evidence from the European court of Human Rights (repec:hal:journl:hal-02105906)
by Eric Langlais & Alessandro Melcarne & Giovanni Battista Ramello
Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ? (repec:hal:journl:hal-03208691)
by Maxime Charreire & Eric Langlais
Firm liability when third-parties and consumers incur cumulative harm (repec:hal:journl:hal-03352700)
by Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte
A Note on the Optimality of Domain-Specific Liability (repec:hal:journl:hal-03640759)
by Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte
Law enforcement with a democratic government (repec:hal:journl:hal-04034740)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Environmental liability and product customization choices : strict liability vs negligence revisited (repec:hal:journl:hal-04682845)
by Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Eric Langlais
Cournot Competition on the Hotelling Line Yields at Most Three Varieties (repec:hal:journl:hal-04682846)
by Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Eric Langlais
Product liability influences incentives for horizontal mergers (repec:hal:journl:hal-05271189)
by Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Unknown
Which Liability Laws for Robots? (repec:hal:journl:hal-05293540)
by Éric Langlais & Nanxi Li
Analyse Economique du Droit (repec:hal:journl:hal-05490617)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Economie des actions collectives (repec:hal:journl:hal-05490632)
by Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Eric Langlais
L’indemnisation des victimes de l’usine AZF : l’éclairage de l’économie du droit (repec:hal:journl:hal-05490657)
by Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Eric Langlais
Which Liability Laws for Robots? (repec:hal:journl:hal-05490931)
by Eric Langlais & Nanxi Li
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence, in an EU and a NEU framework (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00194667)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
Analyse économique de la criminalité (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00605347)
by Eric Langlais & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet
Unknown
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (repec:hal:pseptp:hal-01302563)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
Analyse économique de la criminalité (repec:hal:pseptp:halshs-00605347)
by Eric Langlais & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet
Amenities and risk in forest management
[Aménités et risque en gestion forestière] (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-01189499)
by Marielle Brunette & Stéphane Couture & Eric Langlais
On the Ambiguous Effects of Repression (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140712)
by Eric Langlais
Social Wealth and Optimal Care (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140721)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais
On insurance contract design for low probability events (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140722)
by Eric Langlais
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140723)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140724)
by Eric Langlais
Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140725)
by Eric Langlais
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ? (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140884)
by Eric Langlais
Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140885)
by Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais
On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140886)
by Eric Langlais
Analyse économique et droit pénal : contributions, débats, limites (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140948)
by Eric Langlais
Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04140999)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141000)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141006)
by Eric Langlais
L’effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : Une étude empirique des décisions judiciaires (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141122)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem : An analysis of Article L. 615-7 (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141167)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
Elected vs appointed public law enforcers (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141175)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141218)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi
The structure of fines in the light of political competition (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141283)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
On patent strength, litigation costs, and patent disputes under alternative damage rules (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141316)
by Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais
On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141360)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais
Public law enforcers and political competition (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141377)
by Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141684)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte
Product liability when cumulative harm is incurred by both consumers and third parties (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04141859)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte
Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ? (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04159694)
by Eric Langlais & Maxime Charreire
Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04159799)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
Endogenous market structures, product liability, and the scope of product differentiation (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04159801)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
Product Liability Influences Incentives for Horizontal Mergers (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04516113)
by Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Tim Friehe
Which Liability Laws for Artificial Intelligence? (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04638448)
by Eric Langlais & Nanxi Li
Law enforcement with unlawful investigations and enforcer's liability (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-05041878)
by Eric Langlais & Ken Yahagi
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank dependent utility framework (repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-597)
by A.Chateauneuf & G.Lakhnati & E.Langlais
Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations (repec:kap:ejlwec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:241-262)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Firm Liability When Third Parties and Consumers Incur Cumulative Harm (repec:kap:enreec:v:81:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-021-00617-2)
by Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking (repec:kap:pubcho:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:199-229)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi
Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law (repec:kap:reveho:v:4:y:2006:i:4:p:423-439)
by Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais
Cournot Competition on the Hotelling Line Yields at Most Three Varieties (repec:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09979-5)
by Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Eric Langlais
Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption (repec:kap:theord:v:59:y:2005:i:1:p:43-50)
by Eric Langlais
Hedging Strategies in Forest Management (repec:lef:wpaper:2007-07)
by Marielle Brunette & Stephane Couture & Eric Langlais
Amenities and Risk in Forest Managemen (repec:lef:wpaper:2009-01)
by Marielle Brunette & Stéphane Couture & Eric Langlais
Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges. Comment (repec:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200703)163:1_199:habibj_2.0.tx_2-d)
by Eric Langlais
Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice (repec:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201312)169:4__)
by Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence, in an EU and a NEU framework (repec:mse:wpsorb:b05034)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
Law Enforcement with a Democratic Government (repec:oup:amlawe:v:19:y:2017:i:1:p:162-201.)
by Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski
Detection avoidance and deterrence: some paradoxical arithmetics (repec:pra:mprapa:1148)
by Langlais, Eric
Criminals and risk attitude (repec:pra:mprapa:1149)
by Langlais, Eric
Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties
[Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmetric i (repec:pra:mprapa:1150)
by Langlais, Eric
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking (repec:pra:mprapa:1151)
by Giuseppe, Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno, Lovat & Eric, Langlais & Francesco, Parisi
Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises
[Strategic default and bankruptcy law] (repec:pra:mprapa:14366)
by Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric
On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis (repec:pra:mprapa:14368)
by Langlais, Eric
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings? (repec:pra:mprapa:14369)
by Langlais, Eric
Amenities and Risk in Forest Management (repec:pra:mprapa:14743)
by Brunette, Marielle & Couture, Stéphane & Langlais, Eric
On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations (repec:pra:mprapa:14762)
by Hauret, Laetitia & Langlais, Eric & Sonntag, Carine
les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
[Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?] (repec:pra:mprapa:14892)
by Langlais, Eric
An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs (repec:pra:mprapa:22291)
by Langlais, Eric
Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations (repec:pra:mprapa:23016)
by Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric
Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents (repec:pra:mprapa:25710)
by Langlais, Eric
Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits (repec:pra:mprapa:4846)
by Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric
Hedging Strategies in Forest Management (repec:pra:mprapa:5228)
by Brunette, Marielle & Couture, Stéphane & Langlais, Eric
Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse (repec:pra:mprapa:8844)
by Langlais, Eric
Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l'économie du risque
[The "judicial risk" and lay-offs in France from the point of view of the economic (repec:pra:mprapa:8845)
by Langlais, Eric
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties (repec:pra:mprapa:8995)
by Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric
Social wealth and optimal care (repec:pra:mprapa:9418)
by Darri-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Langlais, Eric
L'analyse géométrique de l'épargne de précaution. Des résultats complémentaires (repec:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_1_409439)
by Éric Langlais
Aversion au risque et prudence : le cas d'un risque de taux d'intérêt (repec:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_4_409724)
by Éric Langlais
On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence in the rank-dependent utility framework (repec:spr:joecth:v:61:y:2016:i:1:p:169-182)
by Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati & Eric Langlais
An Analysis Of Bounded Rationality In Judicial Litigations The Case With Loss Disappointment Averse Plaintiffs (repec:srs:jarle0:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:42-50)
by Eric LANGLAIS
On The Deterrent Effect Of Individual Versus Collective Liability In Criminal Organizations (repec:srs:jarle0:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:125-135)
by Laetitia HAURET & Eric LANGLAIS & Carine SONNTAG
Unknown
Unknown
Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking (repec:ulp:sbbeta:2007-02)
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi
Detection avoidance and deterrence: some paradoxical arithmetics (repec:ulp:sbbeta:2007-06)
by Eric Langlais
Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque juridique et risque comptable (repec:ulp:sbbeta:2007-32)
by Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais
Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprise (repec:ulp:sbbeta:2009-28)
by Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais
On Insurance Contract Design For Low Probability Events (repec:ush:jaessh:v:3:y:2008:i:2(4)_summer2008:24)
by Eric LANGLAIS
Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ? (repec:ush:jaessh:v:4:y:2009:i:1(7)_spring2009:53)
by Eric LANGLAIS
Firm Liability When Third Parties and Consumers Incur Cumulative Harm (repec:zbw:vfsc21:242339)
by Schulte, Elisabeth & Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric

The profile is maintained by Eric LANGLAIS

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pla256/