Henrik Jensen

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• Københavns Universitet → Økonomisk Institut
  • website
  • location: København, Denmark

Research profile

author of:

• Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard with a Stability Pact
  by Roel Beetsma & Henrik Jensen
• Optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Structural Convergence under Reversible and Irreversible Monetary Unification.
  by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Henrik Jensen
• Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard with a Stability Pact
  by Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik
• Rules, discretion, and international monetary and fiscal policy coordination
  by Jay Bryson & Henrik Jensen & David Hoose
• Sustaining policy cooperation between economies of different size
  by Jensen, Henrik
• International monetary policy cooperation in economies with centralized wage setting
  by Henrik Jensen
• Structural Convergence Under Reversible and Irreversible Monetary Unification
  by Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik
• INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE: DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC THEORY
  by JENSEN, HENRIK & SÃRENSEN, PETER NORMAN & WHITTA-JACOBSEN, HANS JÃRGEN
• Structural convergence under reversible and irreversible monetary unification
  by Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik
• Note on 'Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game'
  by Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans & Jensen, Henrik
• Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?
  by Henrik Jensen
• Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?
  by Henrik Jensen
• Mark-Up Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy Stabilization in a Monetary Union
  by Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik
• Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation.
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Monetary policy cooperation and multiple equilibria
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive
  by Henrik Jensen
• Common Agency with Rational Expectations: Theory and Application to a Monetary Union
  by Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen
• Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences
  by Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik
• Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Micro-Funded Model of a Monetary Union
  by Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik
• Time inconsistency problems and commitments of monetary and fiscal policies
  by Henrik Jensen
• Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences.
  by Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik
• Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union
  by Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen
• Optimal Degrees of Tranaparency in Monetary Policymaking.
  by Henrik Jensen
• Mark-up fluctuations and fiscal policy stabilization in a monetary union
  by Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik
• To peg or not to peg?: A simple model of exchange rate regime choice in small economies
  by Berger, Helge & Jensen, Henrik & Schjelderup, Guttorm
• To Peg or Not To Peg? A Simple Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice In Small Economies
  by Helge Berger & Henrik Jensen & Guttorm Schjelderup
• Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment
  by Henrik Jensen & Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
• Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: Comment.
  by Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik
• The advantage of international fiscal cooperation under alternative monetary regimes
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Uncertainty in interdependent economies with monopoly unions
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
  by Henrik Jensen
• Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment.
  by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Henrik Jensen
• A note on discontinuous value functions and strategies in affine-quadratic differential games
  by Jensen, Henrik & Lockwood, Ben
• Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union
  by Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik
• Estimated Interest Rate Rules: Do they Determine Determinacy Properties?
  by Jensen, Henrik
• Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact
  by Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik
• Efficient Bargaining and Accomodation Policies
  by Henrik JENSEN
• A Note on Discontinuous Value Functions and Strategies in Affine-Quadratic Differential Games.
  by Jensen, H. & Lockwood, B.
• What Drives the European Central Bank's Interest-Rate Changes?
  by Aastrup, Morten & Jensen, Henrik
• Estimated Interest Rate Rules: Do they Determine Determinacy Properties?
  by Jensen Henrik
• Changing Credit Limits, Changing Business Cycles
  by Jensen, Henrik & Ravn, Søren Hove & Santoro, Emiliano
• Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences
  by Beetsma, R. M. W. J. & Jensen, H.
• Note on "Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game
  by Beetsma, R. M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. L. & Jensen, H.
• Deepening Contractions and Collateral Constraints
  by Jensen, Henrik & Ravn, Søren Hove & Santoro, Emiliano
• Leverage and Deepening Business Cycle Skewness
  by Jensen, Henrik & Petrella, Ivan & Ravn, S�ren Hove & Santoro, Emiliano
• Leverage and deepening business cycle skewness
  by Henrik Jensen & Ivan Petrella & Søren Hove Ravn & Emiliano Santoro
• Changing credit limits, changing business cycles
  by Jensen, Henrik & Ravn, Søren Hove & Santoro, Emiliano
• Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union
  by Jensen, Henrik & Beetsma, Roel
• Leverage and Deepening Business Cycle Skewness
  by Jensen, Henrik & Petrella, Ivan & Ravn, Soren & Santoro, Emiliano
• Kinks and Gains from Credit Cycles
  by Jensen, Henrik & Ravn, Søren Hove & Santoro, Emiliano
• Leverage and Deepening Business-Cycle Skewness
  by Henrik Jensen & Ivan Petrella & Søren Hove Ravn & Emiliano Santoro