Hideshi Itoh

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• Waseda University → Faculty of Commerce → Graduate School of Business and Finance
  • website
  • location: Tokyo, Japan

Research profile

author of:

• Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations.
  by Itoh, Hideshi
• GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
  by Itoh, Hideshi
• Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis
  by Itoh, Hideshi
• Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective.
  by Itoh, Hideshi
• Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing
  by Itoh Hideshi
• The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences
  by Kohei Daido & Hideshi Itoh
• Information processing capacities of the firm
  by Itoh, Hideshi
• Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem
  by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita
• The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An Agency Model with Reference-Dependent Preferences and Applications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
  by Kohei Daido & Hideshi Itoh
• Moral Hazard and Other‐Regarding Preferences
  by Hideshi Itoh
• Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?
  by Hideshi Itoh
• Organizational innovation and corporate performance
  by Baker, George & Hoshi, Takeo & Itoh, Hideshi
• Complementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups
  by Itoh, Hideshi & Kikutani, Tatsuya & Hayashida, Osamu
• Effort Incentives : Evidence from Japanese Data.
  by Itoh, H. & Teruyama, H.
• Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production.
  by Itoh, H.
• Moral Hazard and Size Trade in Agency Contracts
  by Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H.
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.
  by Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H.
• Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance
  by George Baker & Takeo Hoshi & Hideshi Itoh & Sadao Nagaoka
• Organizational Innovation and Corporate Performance
  by George Baker & Takeo Hoshi & Hideshi Itoh
  edited by
• Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups
  by Hideshi Itoh & Tatsuya Kikutani & Osamu Hayashida
  edited by
• Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
  by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita
• The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration : A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics
  by Hideshi Itoh
• "Tsuyoshi Tsuru and Japanese Electrical Electronic ＆ Information Union（eds.）, Selecting and Focusing : An Empirical Analysis of Electronics and Information Technology Firms in Japan"
  by "Itoh, Hideshi"
• Job design and incentives in hierarchies with team production
  by Itoh, Hideshi
• Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
  by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita
• Organizing for Change: Preference diversity, effort incentives, and separation of decision and execution
  by ITOH Hideshi
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents
  by Shingo Ishiguro & Hideshi Itoh
• Announcement
  by Hideshi Itoh
• Announcement
  by Hideshi Itoh