Hideshi Itoh
Names
first: |
Hideshi |
last: |
Itoh |
Contact
Affiliations
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Waseda University
→ Faculty of Commerce
→ Graduate School of Business and Finance
Research profile
author of:
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Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations.
by Itoh, Hideshi
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GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
by Itoh, Hideshi
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Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis
by Itoh, Hideshi
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Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective.
by Itoh, Hideshi
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Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing
by Itoh Hideshi
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The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences
by Kohei Daido & Hideshi Itoh
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Information processing capacities of the firm
by Itoh, Hideshi
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem
by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita
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The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An Agency Model with Reference-Dependent Preferences and Applications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
by Kohei Daido & Hideshi Itoh
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Moral Hazard and Other‐Regarding Preferences
by Hideshi Itoh
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Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?
by Hideshi Itoh
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Organizational innovation and corporate performance
by Baker, George & Hoshi, Takeo & Itoh, Hideshi
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Complementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups
by Itoh, Hideshi & Kikutani, Tatsuya & Hayashida, Osamu
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Effort Incentives : Evidence from Japanese Data.
by Itoh, H. & Teruyama, H.
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Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production.
by Itoh, H.
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Moral Hazard and Size Trade in Agency Contracts
by Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H.
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Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.
by Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H.
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Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance
by George Baker & Takeo Hoshi & Hideshi Itoh & Sadao Nagaoka
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Organizational Innovation and Corporate Performance
by George Baker & Takeo Hoshi & Hideshi Itoh
edited by
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Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups
by Hideshi Itoh & Tatsuya Kikutani & Osamu Hayashida
edited by
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita
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The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration : A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics
by Hideshi Itoh
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"Tsuyoshi Tsuru and Japanese Electrical Electronic & Information Union(eds.), Selecting and Focusing : An Empirical Analysis of Electronics and Information Technology Firms in Japan"
by "Itoh, Hideshi"
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Job design and incentives in hierarchies with team production
by Itoh, Hideshi
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita
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Organizing for Change: Preference diversity, effort incentives, and separation of decision and execution
by ITOH Hideshi
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Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents
by Shingo Ishiguro & Hideshi Itoh
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Announcement
by Hideshi Itoh
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Announcement
by Hideshi Itoh