Harold Houba

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Affiliations

• Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam / School of Business and Economics / Afdeling Economie (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Tinbergen Instituut (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Transboundary Water Management: A joint management approach to the Mekong River Basin (RePEc:ags:aare12:125063)
  by Houba, Harold & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Zhu, Xueqin
• Bargaining for an efficient and fair allocation of emission permits to developing countries (RePEc:ags:pugtwp:331600)
  by Houba, Harold & Kremers, Hans
• Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:120:y:2018:i:3:p:859-893)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:15:y:2015:i:2:p:351-389:n:4)
  by Houba Harold & Motchenkova Evgenia & Wen Quan
• Odd Man Out: Bargaining Among Three Players (RePEc:cla:uclawp:662)
  by Elaine Bennett & Harold Houba
• Saving a river: a joint management approach to the Mekong River Basin (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:18:y:2013:i:01:p:93-109_00)
  by Houba, Harold & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Zhu, Xueqin
• Environmental Damage and Price Taking Behaviour by Firms and Consumers (RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp878)
  by Harold Houba & Hans Kremers
• On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70039)
  by Harold Houba & Quan Wen
• Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent fines and detection probabilities (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00308)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Can negotiations prevent fish wars? (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:24:y:2000:i:8:p:1265-1280)
  by Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix
• On continuous-time Markov processes in bargaining (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:280-283)
  by Houba, Harold
• Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:39-42)
  by Houba, Harold & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Wen, Quan
• Endogenous personalized pricing in the Hotelling model (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:225:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523000629)
  by Houba, Harold & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Wang, Hui
• An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:41:y:1993:i:3:p:253-256)
  by Houba, Harold
• The Nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:60:y:1998:i:1:p:41-48)
  by Houba, Harold & Tieman, Alexander F. & Brinksma, Rene
• Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:91:y:2006:i:2:p:273-279)
  by Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan
• Alternating offers in economic environments (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:96:y:2007:i:3:p:316-324)
  by Houba, Harold
• Correction of the material balance equation in dynamic input-output models (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:35:y:1991:i:5:p:1103-1108)
  by Houba, Harold & Kremers, Hans
• Holdouts, backdating and wage negotiations (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:9:p:1783-1800)
  by Houba, Harold & Bolt, Wilko
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:507-516)
  by Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan
• Market power in water markets (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:64:y:2012:i:2:p:237-252)
  by Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold
• The policy bargaining model (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:28:y:1997:i:1:p:1-27)
  by Houba, Harold
• Odd man out: the proposal-making model (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:28:y:1997:i:4:p:375-396)
  by Houba, Harold & Bennett, Elaine
• Backward induction and unacceptable offers (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:151-156)
  by Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan
• Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:98:y:2022:i:c:s030440682100121x)
  by Houba, Harold & Li, Duozhe & Wen, Quan
• Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow (RePEc:eee:resene:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:92-117)
  by Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold
• Bargaining for an Efficient and Fair Allocation of Emission Permits to Developing Countries (RePEc:ekd:000240:24000028)
  by Hans Kremers & Harold Houba
• Strategic Bargaining for the Control of Dynamic System in State-Space Form (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9236)
  by Houba, H. & De Zeeuw, A.
• International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:855-872)
  by Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng
• On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:71:y:2000:i:1:p:1-30)
  by Alexander Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard Laan
• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions (RePEc:kap:theord:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:269-295)
  by Harold Houba & Dinard Laan & Dirk Veldhuizen
• Options of optimal dam capacity under externality and uncertainty (RePEc:mas:dpaper:1807)
  by Harold Houba & Kim Hang Pham Do & Xueqin Zhu
• Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem (RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000049)
  by Houba, Harold & van der Laan, Gerard & Zeng, Yuyu
• Saving the Mekong River Basin (RePEc:pra:mprapa:37407)
  by Houba, Harold & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Zhu, Xueqin
• Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:11:y:1997:i:1:p:57-77)
  by Harold Houba & Wilko Bolt
• Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:81-99)
  by Harold Houba & Gijsbert van Lomwel
• On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:37:y:2008:i:3:p:509-519)
  by Harold Houba & Quan Wen
• Costless delay in negotiations (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:74:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01373-6)
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba
• Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00695-z)
  by Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova
• Use of Satellite Information on Wetness and Temperature for Crop Yield Prediction and River Resource Planning (RePEc:spr:nrmchp:978-3-319-61194-5_5)
  by Alan Basist & Ariel Dinar & Brian Blankespoor & David Bachiochi & Harold Houba
• Pareto efficiency in the jungle (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-017-0199-3)
  by Harold Houba & Roland Iwan Luttens & Hans-Peter Weikard
• A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:52:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1150-4)
  by Aaron Kamm & Harold Houba
• Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment (RePEc:tin:wpaper:19960140)
  by Xander F. Tieman & Gerard van der Laan & Harold Houba
• Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Negotiations (RePEc:tin:wpaper:19980115)
  by Harold Houba & Gijsbert van Lomwel
• Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Time-Varying Mutation Rates in Coordination Games (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010041)
  by Harold Houba & Alexander F. Tieman
• Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050063)
  by Harold Houba
• Alternating Offers in Economic Environments (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050064)
  by Harold Houba
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060028)
  by Harold Houba & Quan Wen
• Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060095)
  by Harold Houba
• Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070070)
  by Harold Houba & Quan Wen
• The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080049)
  by Harold Houba & Dinard van der Laan & Dirk Veldhuizen
• Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080120)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Environmental Damage and Price Taking Behaviour by Firms and Consumers (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090029)
  by Harold Houba & Hans Kremers
• The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090081)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Stone Age Equilibrium (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090092)
  by Harold Houba & Hans-Peter Weikard
• The Condorcet Paradox Revisited (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100026)
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba
• Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100047)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Market Power in Water Markets (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100054)
  by Erik Ansink & Harold Houba
• Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110166)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120139)
  by Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova
• Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130051)
  by Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan & Yuyu Zeng
• Saving Private Pareto (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130053)
  by Harold Houba & Roland Iwan Luttens & Hans-Peter Weikard
• International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130157)
  by Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan & Yuyu Zeng
• Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130178)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130182)
  by Harold Houba & Erik Ansink
• Assessing the Economic and Political Impacts of Climate Change on International River Basins using Surface Wetness in the Zambezi and Mekong Basins (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140005)
  by Brian Blankespoor & Alan Basist & Ariel Dinar & Shlomi Dinar & Harold Houba & Neil Thomas
• The Economics of Transboundary River Management (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140132)
  by Erik Ansink & Harold Houba
• Capacity Choice of Dams under Rivalry Use and Externalities (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140143)
  by Harold Houba & Kim Hang Pham Do & Xueqin Zhu
• Pareto Efficiency in the Jungle (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140144)
  by Harold Houba & Roland Iwan Luttens & Hans-Peter Weikard
• The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140146)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen
• Costless Delay in Negotiations (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150010)
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba
• A Bargaining Experiment with Asymmetric Institutions and Preferences (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150071)
  by Aaron Kamm & Harold Houba
• Note on ‘Competition in Two-sided Markets’ (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150080)
  by Yuyu Zeng & Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan
• Damming Trans-boundary Rivers: A Welfare Analysis of Conflict and Cooperation (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160090)
  by Yuyu Zeng & Harold Houba & Ariel Dinar & Miroslav Marence
• Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190070)
  by Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova
• Market power in California's water market (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20210011)
  by Françeska Tomori & Erik Ansink & Harold Houba & Nick Hagerty & Charles Bos
• Personalized Pricing, Competition and Welfare (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220020)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Hui Wang
• Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:0cf028c6-1985-4fc8-a111-e30df243b7eb)
  by Houba, H.E.D. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Negotiations (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3974c02a-3aad-465d-92d9-b0b09e593fc0)
  by van Lomwel, A.G.C. & Houba, H.E.D.
• Correction of the material balance equation in dynamic input-output models (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:71ce38b2-9b97-4fec-902c-3284ac273f3b)
  by Houba, H.E.D. & Kremers, H.A.W.M.
• Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure (RePEc:tiu:tiutil:fb7d2b93-728f-4398-94e3-4a8893af0fd3)
  by Funaki, Y. & Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E.
• Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0cf028c6-1985-4fc8-a111-e30df243b7eb)
  by Houba, H.E.D. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Negotiations (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:3974c02a-3aad-465d-92d9-b0b09e593fc0)
  by van Lomwel, A.G.C. & Houba, H.E.D.
• Correction of the material balance equation in dynamic input-output models (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:71ce38b2-9b97-4fec-902c-3284ac273f3b)
  by Houba, H.E.D. & Kremers, H.A.W.M.
• Strategic bargaining in a dynamic system with two players (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7a582df6-67da-4052-8ccd-9fe88b2d988d)
  by Houba, H.E.D.
• Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fb7d2b93-728f-4398-94e3-4a8893af0fd3)
  by Funaki, Y. & Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E.
• The Condorcet paradox revisited (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013021)
  by Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H
• Costless delay in negotiations (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015002)
  by Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H
• The Condercet paradox revisited (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010009)
  by Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences (RePEc:van:wpaper:0706)
  by Harold Houba & Quan Wen
• Non-cooperative bargaining in infinitely repeated games with binding contracts (RePEc:vua:wpaper:1992-9)
  by Houba, H.
• An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining (RePEc:vua:wpaper:1993-15)
  by Houba, H.
• The Nash- and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution for Decision Weight Utility Functions (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9611001)
  by Harold Houba & Xander Tieman & Rene Brinksma
• Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9803002)
  by Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan
• A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809002)
  by Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba
• One-Seller/Two-Buyer Markets With Buyer Externalities And (Im)Perfect Competition (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:02:n:s0219198902000616)
  by Gerard Van Der Laan & Harold Houba
• Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:n:s0219198908001935)
  by Harold Houba
• The Role of Legal Principles in the Economic Analysis of Competition Policy (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814616362_0014)
  by Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen