P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• Maastricht University → School of Business and Economics → Vakgroep Algemene Economie
  • website
  • location: Maastricht, Netherlands

Research profile

author of:

• The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market Is Incomplete
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis
• Continua of underemployment equilibria reflecting coordination failures, also at Walrasian prices
  by CITANNA, Alessandro & CRES, Herve & DREZE, Jacques & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & VILLANACCI, Antonio
• The Robustness of the CAPM-A Computational Approach
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Felix Kubler
• Social Rationalizability
  by J. J. Herings & A. Mauleon & V. Vannetelbosch
• On the Connectedness of the Set of Constrained Equilibria.
  by Herings, J. J.
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market is Incomplete.
  by P. J. J. Herings & H. M. Polemarchakis
• Computing Equilibria in Finance Economies with Incomplete Markets and Transaction Costs
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Karl Schmedders
• Numerical Tracking of the Tracing Procedure for Non-cooperative N-person games
  by P. J. J. Herings & Antoon van den Eizen
• A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
  by P. J. J. Herings & R. Peeters
• Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
• Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Faulures
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch
• The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy
  by Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Hans Peters
• Universally Stable Adjustment Processes - A Unifying Approach
  by P. J. J. Herings
• Computing Equilibria in Finance Economies
  by P. J. J. Herings & F. Kubler
• The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies
  by P. J. J. Herings & H. Peeters
• Limits to Arbitrage when Market Participation Is Restricted
  by Thorsten Hens & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinskii
• An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability
  by Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• symposium articles: A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria of n -person games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
• Equilibrium existence results for economies with price rigidities
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Equilibrium Existence Results for Economies with Price Rigidities.
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Endogenously determined price rigidities (*)
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
  by Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Special Issue on the Brown-Maastricht Conferences
  by Herings, Jean-Jacques & Polemarchakis, Herakles & Vohra, Rajiv & Cornet, Bernard
• Continua of underemployment equilibria reflecting coordination failures, also at Walrasian prices
  by Citanna, Alessandro & Cres, Herve & Dreze, Jacques & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Villanacci, Antonio
• A note on 'stability of tatonnement processes of short period equilibria with rational expectations'
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Equilibrium adjustment of disequilibrium prices
  by Herings, Jean-Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf & Venniker, Richard
• On the existence of a continuum of constrained equilibria1
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• The transition from a Dreze equilibrium to a Walrasian equilibrium1
  by Herings, Jean-Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Venniker, Richard
• Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van den Elzen, Antoon
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies
  by Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans
• A globally and universally stable price adjustment process
  by Jean-Jacques Herings, P.
• The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies
  by Predtetchinski A. & Herings P. J. J. & Perea A.
• Universally converging adjustment processes--a unifying approach
  by Jean-Jacques Herings, P.
• Equilibrium and arbitrage in incomplete asset markets with fixed prices
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H.
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
  by Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P.
• Computing equilibria in finance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs
  by P. Herings & Karl Schmedders
• Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Schinkel, Maarten Pieter
• Rationalizability for social environments
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
• Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald J. A. P.
• The Transition from a Drèze Equilibrium to a Walrasian Equilibrium
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Venniker, Richard
• Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Failures
  by Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH
• On the Generic Occurrence of Price Regulations
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Rationalizability for Social Environments
  by Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH
• Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete
  by P. Herings & Herakles Polemarchakis
• Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
• The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy
  by Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Herings & Hans Peters
• The positional power of nodes in digraphs
  by P. Herings & Gerard Laan & Dolf Talman
• The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies
  by P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea
• The private value single item bisection auction
  by Elena Grigorieva & P. Herings & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen
• Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model
  by P. Herings & Kirsten Rohde
• Limits to arbitrage when market participation is restricted
  by Hens, Thorsten & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Predtetchinskii, Arkadi
• Approximate CAPM When Preferences are CRRA
  by P. Herings & Felix Kubler
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf
• Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective
  by Csoka, Peter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Koczy, Laszlo A.
• Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes-Negishi equilibria
  by Jacques H., DREZE & Jean-Jacques, HERINGS
• Farsightedly stable networks
  by Jean-Jacques, HERINGS & Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
  by Herings, P. Jean Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf
• Socially Structured Games
  by P. Herings & Gerard Laan & Dolf Talman
• Stable Allocations of Risk
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy
• Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy
• On the completeness of complete markets
  by P. Herings & Kirsten Rohde
• Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete
  by Drèze, Jacques H. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes-Negishi equilibria
  by DREZE, Jacques H. & HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques
• Harmonization of private law on a global level
  by Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kanning, Arnald J.
• Equilibria with coordination failures
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf
• Farsightedly stable networks
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Konovalov, Alexander
• Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete
  by DRÈZE, Jacques & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques
• Villanacci, A., Carosi, L., Benevieri, P., and Battinelli, A.: Differential Topology and General Equilibrium with Complete and Incomplete Markets.
  by P. J. J. Herings
• Equilibrium and arbitrage in incomplete asset markets with fixed prices.
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles
• Some preliminary remarks on the relevance of topological essentiality in general equilibrium theory and game theory
  by Stefano Demichelis & Jean-Jacques Herings & Dries Vermeulen
• Continua of underemployment equilibria
  by DREZE, Jacques H. & HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques
• Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles
• The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability
  by HERINGS, P. J.-J. & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
• Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy & Miklós Pintér
• Stable allocations of risk
  by Csóka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
  by P. Herings & Ronald Peeters
• Farsightedly stable networks
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• A general existence theorem of zero points
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Koshevoy, Gleb A. & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu
• The Structure of Online Consumer Communication Networks
  by Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J. W. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Dellaert, Benedict G. C.
• The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z.
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Behavioral Effects in Individual Decisions of Network Formation: Complexity Reduces Payoff Orientation and Social Preferences
  by Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J. W. & Dellaert, Benedict G. C. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• An Extremely Simple Proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem
  by HERINGS , P. Jean-Jacques
• Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
  by HERINGS, Jean - Jacques & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• Coalition formation among farsighted agents
  by HERINGS, Jean - Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch
• Communication Network Formation with Link Specificity and Value Transferability
  by Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J. W. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Dellaert, Benedict G. C.
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
  by Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Competition against peer-to-peer networks
  by Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Peeters, Ronald & Yang, Michael S.
• Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
  by Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Miklós
• On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Transferable utility games with uncertainty
  by Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Introduction to the Coalition Theory Network Special Issue
  by FRANCIS BLOCH & JEAN‐JACQUES HERINGS & BETTINA KLAUS & MYRNA WOODERS
• Core concepts for incomplete market economies
  by Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations
  by Grigorieva, Elena & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries
• Dynamic Cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints
  by van den Berg, Anita & Bos, Iwan & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans
• Sequential share bargaining
  by P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• Pareto-improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete: An example
  by P. J. J. Herings & H. Polemarchakis
• Minimal exact balancedness
  by Lohmann, E. & Borm, P. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time
  by Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries
• Communication network formation with link specificity and value transferability
  by Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J. W. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Dellaert, Benedict G. C.
• Underemployment of Resources and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: Nonwalrasian Allocations at Walrasian Prices
  by Alessandro Citanna & Hervé Crès & Jacques Drèze & Jean-Jacques Herings & Antonio Villanacci
• A bargaining theory of the firm
  by Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• On the Convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
  by BRITZ, Volker & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & PREDTETCHINSKI, Arkadi
• Stochastic bankruptcy games
  by Helga Habis & P. Herings
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Disability in the Netherlands: another dutch disease?
  by Muysken, J. & Rutten, T.
• Theory of the firm: bargaining and competitive equilibrium
  by Britz, V. & Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? -- A dynamic approach
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Yang, M. .
• Procedurally fair income taxation schemes
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations
  by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P. J. J. & Müller, R. J. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• On the fastest vickrey algorithm
  by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P. J. J. & Müller, R. J. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for endogenous bargaining protocols
  by Britz, V. & Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Investor relations on the internet: a survey in the Euronext zone
  by Geerings, J. & Bollen, L. H. H. & Hassink, H. F. D.
• Procedurally fair taxation
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Strategic disclosure of random variables.
  by Flesch, J. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A.
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric nash bargaining solution
  by Britz, V. & Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Risk allocation under liquidity constraints
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Minimal exact balancedness
  by Lohmann, E. & Borm, P. J. A. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Voting in collective stopping games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes-Negishi equilibria
  by Drèze, J. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Locus of control and study program choice: evidence of personality sorting in educational choice
  by Boone, C. A. J. J. & Roijakkers, A. H. W. M. & van Olffen, W.
• Accounting in de "Nieuwe Economie": op zoek naar een relevantere berichtgeving?
  by Vergauwen, P. G. M. C.
• Continua of underemployment equilibria reflecting coordination failures, also at Walrasian prices
  by Citanna, A. & Crès, H. & Drèze, J. & Herings, P. J. J. & Villanacci, A.
• Competition versus collusion: the impact of consumer inertia
  by Bos, A. M. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Pot, E. A.
• Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
  by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P. J. J. & Müller, R. J. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Sequential share bargaining
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Farsightedly stable networks
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• The family of c-bisections auctions: efficiency and running time
  by Vermeulen, A. J. & Grigorieva, E. & Müller, R. J. & Herings, P. J. J.
• The economic order decision with continuous dynamic pricing and batch supply
  by van den Berg, A. H. J. & Herings, P. J. J. & Peters, H. J. M.
• The expectations theory and the founding of the fed: another look at the evidence
  by Kool, C. J. M. & Thornton, D.
• International bond markets and the introduction of the euro
  by Kool, C. J. M.
• On solving multi-type line planning problems
  by Goossens, J. H. M. & van Hoesel, C. P. M. & Kroon, L. G.
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
  by Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P. J. J. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A.
• Bank size, specialization and efficiency in the Netherlands: 1992-1998
  by Bos, J. W. B. & Kool, C. J. M.
• An efficient format for a problem based introductory economics course
  by Woltjer, G. B.
• Dynamic duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints
  by van den Berg, A. H. J. & Herings, P. J. J. & Peters, H. J. M.
• Cooperation under incomplete contracting
  by Habis, H. & Herings, P. J. J.
• The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy
  by Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P. J. J. & Peters, H. J. M.
• Stochastic bankruptcy games
  by Habis, H. & Herings, P. J. J.
• The Condercet paradox revisited
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Houba, H.
• The structure of online consumer communication networks
  by Harmsen - van Hout, M. J. W. & Herings, P. J. J. & Dellaert, B. G. C.
• Balancedness conditions for exact games
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P. J. J. & Kóczy, L. Á.
• Evidence of the effect of domicile on corporate average effective tax rates in the European Union
  by Buijink, W. F. J. & Janssen, J. B. P. E. C. & Schols, Y. J.
• Linear tarification in multi-commodity telecommunications networks
  by Bouhtou, M. & van Hoesel, C. P. M. & van der Kraaij, A. F. & Lutton, J. L.
• The Condorcet paradox revisited
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Houba, H.
• Equilibrium and arbitrage in incomplete asset markets with fixed prices
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H. M.
• Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P. J. J. & Kóczy, L. Á. & Pintér, M.
• Communication network formation with link specificity and value transferability
  by Harmsen - van Hout, M. J. W. & Herings, P. J. J. & Dellaert, B. G. C.
• The feasibility of a fixed exchange rate regime for new EU-members: evidence from real exchange rates
  by Candelon, B. & Kool, C. J. M. & Raabe, K. & van Veen, A. P.
• Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P. J. J. & Kóczy, L. Á.
• Optimising halting station of passenger railway lines
  by van Hoesel, C. P. M. & Goossens, J. H. M. & Kroon, L. G.
• Competition against peer-to-peer networks
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Yang, M.
• Transferable utility games with uncertainty
  by Habis, H. & Herings, P. J. J.
• The online target date assignment problem
  by Heinz, S. & Krumke, S. O. & Megow, N. & Rambau, J. & Tuscherer, A. & Vredeveld, T.
• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Meshalkin, A. V. & Predtetchinski, A.
• The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree
  by van den Brink, J. R. & Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• A note on Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin's (1979) domain richness condition
  by Bochet, O. L. A. & Klaus, B. E.
• A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games
  by Habis, H. & Herings, P. J. J.
• A formal ORM-to -UML mapping algorithm
  by Bollen, P. W. L.
• Coalition formation among farsighted agents
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Bargaining with non-convexities
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Behavorial effects in individual decisions of network formation
  by Harmsen - van Hout, M. J. W. & Dellaert, B. G. C. & Herings, P. J. J.
• The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z.
• Weighted distances between preferences
  by Can, B.
• Comovement of sales, retention practice and financing constraints in Dutch manufacturing
  by Bruinshoofd, W. A. & Letterie, W. A.
• The role of corporate image and extension similarity in service brand extensions
  by de Ruyter, J. C. & Wetzels, M. G. M.
• Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games
  by Volker Britz & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• Risk Allocation under Liquidity Constraints
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Equilibrium delay and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
  by Britz, V. & Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
  by Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Stability of networks under level-k farsightedness
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Balancedness conditions for exact games
  by Péter Csóka & P. Herings & László Kóczy
• Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• On the connectedness of the set of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• On the structure of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Price-Quantity Adjustment in a Keynesian Economy
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Intersection theorems with a continuum of intersection points
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Naschrift bij 'Economische Wetenschap onder de maat?'
  by van Damme, E. E. C. & de Groot, H. & van Hagen, G. & Herings, P. J. J. & Leers, T. & Nahuis, R.
• Minimal Exact Balancedness
  by Lohmann, E. R. M. A. & Borm, P. E. M. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H. M.
• Variational Inequality Problems With a Continuum of Solutions : Existence and Computation
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Quantity Constrained Equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• On the representation of admissible rationing schemes by rationing functions
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Equilibrium adjustment of disequilibrium prices
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Venniker, R.
• The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Socially structured games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Endogenously determined price rigidities
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Economie in de krant
  by van Damme, E. E. C. & de Groot, H. L. F. & van Hagen, G. H. A. & Herings, P. J. J. & Leers, T. & Nahuis, R.
• Equilibria with coordination failures
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Equilibrium adjustment of disequilibrium prices
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Venniker, R.
• The Robustness of the CAPM - A Computational Approach
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Kubler, F.
• A fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• Equilibria with Coordination Failures
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Rigidity of prices, the generic case?
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Constrained Suboptimality When Prices are Non-Competitive
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Konovalov, A.
• Socially Structured Games and their Applications
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Static and dynamic aspects of general disequilibrium theory
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Continua of Underemployment Equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Dreze, J.
• A Fixed Point Theorem for Discontinuous Functions
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• Social Rationalizability
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Cooperative Games in Graph Structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• The computation of a continuum of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J. & Zang, Z.
• The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van den Elzen, A. H.
• Stability of networks under level-K farsightedness
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• A globally and universally stable quantity adjustment process for an exchange economy with price rigidities
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• A General Existence Thorem of Zero Points
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Koshevoy, G. A. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• A globally and universally stable price adjustment process
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree
  by van den Brink, R. & Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Variational inequality problems with a continuum of solutions : Existence and computation
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• A general existence theorem of zero points
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Koshevoy, G. A. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• A Note on "Stability of Tâtonnement Processes of Short Period Equilibria with Rational Expectations"
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• A note on "macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game"
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• The computation of a continuum of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• General equilibrium and the new neoclassical synthesis
  by P. Herings
• Risk allocation under liquidity constraints
  by Csóka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree
  by René Brink & P. Herings & Gerard Laan & A. Talman
• Equilibrium and matching under price controls
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Costless delay in negotiations
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Houba, H.
• Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman
• Cooperative Games in Graph Structure
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman
• The Condorcet Paradox Revisited
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba
• Quantity Constrained Equilibria
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman
• The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman
• Costless Delay in Negotiations
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba
• The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-free Graph Games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman
• The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree
  by Rene van den Brink & Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman
• The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang
• A Fixed Point Theorem for Discontinuous Functions
  by Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang
• Bargaining with non-convexities
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree
  by van den Brink, R. & van der Laan, G. & Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Best response cycles in perfect information games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax
  by P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & ANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
• A fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & van der LAAN, Gerard & TALMAN, Dolf & YANG, Zaifu
• On the completeness of complete markets
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & ROHDE, Kirsten I. M.
• Farsightedly stable networks
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete
  by DREZE, Jacques H. & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques P.
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & van der LAAN, Gerard & TALMAN, Dolf
• Rationalizability for social environments.
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & ANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
• Harmonization of private law on a global level
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & KANNING, Arnald J.
• Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes-Negishi equilibria
  by DREZE, Jacques H. & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques P.
• Coalition formation among farsighted agents
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques P. & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures
  by HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON , Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
• Continua of Underemployment Equilibria Reflecting Coordination Failures, Also at Walrasian Prices
  by Alessandro Citanna & Hervé Crès & Jacques H. Drèze & Jean-Jacques Herings & Antonio Villanacci
• Underemployment of Resources and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: Nonwalrasian Allocations at Walrasian Prices
  by Alessandro Citanna & Hervé Crès & Jacques H. Drèze & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Antonio Villanacci
• Equilibrium and Arbitrage in Incomplete Asset Markets with Fixed Prices
  by Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market is Incomplete
  by Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market is Incomplete
  by Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis
• Doing it now, later, or never
  by Cingiz, K. & Flesch, J. & Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Equilibrium and Matching under Price Controls
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
  by Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Heuristic decision making in network linking
  by Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J. W. & Dellaert, Benedict G. C. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Decentralized clearing in financial networks
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P. J. J.
• A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute All Nash Equilibria for n-Person Games
  by P. Herings & Ronald Peeters
• Doing it now, later, or never
  by Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, János & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Approximate CAPM when preferences are CRRA
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Kubler, F.
• Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance
  by HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent
• Optimality, Equilibrium, and Curb Sets in Decision Problems without Commitment
  by Herings, Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Decentralized Clearing in Financial Networks (RM/16/005-revised-)
  by Csoka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Decentralized Clearing in Financial Networks
  by Csóka, Péter & Herings, Jean-Jacques P.
• Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once
  by Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
  by Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian
• The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
  by Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo Saulle & Christian Seel
• An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks
  by Csoka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• The Computation of a Continuum of Constrained Equilibria
  by Jean-Jacques Herings & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang
• Computing Equilibria in Finance Economies
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Felix Kubler
• Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Naschrift
  by van Damme, E. E. C. & de Groot, H. L. F. & van Hagen, G. H. A. & Herings, P. J. J. & Leers, T. & Nahuis, R.
• A NOTE ON THE WEAK SEQUENTIAL CORE OF DYNAMIC TU GAMES
  by HELGA HABIS & P. JEAN-JACQUES HERINGS
• The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
  by Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel
• Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch
• A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
  by Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games
  by Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank
• Economie-pagina doolhof voor lezer
  by van Damme, E. E. C. & de Groot, H. L. F. & van Hagen, G. H. A. & Herings, P. J. J. & Leers, T. & Nahuis, R.
• EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES
  by P. JEAN-JACQUES HERINGS & RONALD J. A. P. PEETERS
• Liability Games
  by Csoka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Matching with myopic and farsighted players
  by HERINGS P. Jean-Jacques & MAULEON Ana & VANNETELBOSCH Vincent
• The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments (RM/17/002-revised)
  by Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian
• Piracy on the Internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A dynamic approach
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Yang, Michael S.
• Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies
  by Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo D. & Seel, Christian
• General Existence Theorem of Zero Points
  by P. J. J. Herings & G. A. Koshevoy & A. J. J. Talman & Z. Yang
• Intersection Theorems with a Continuum of Intersection Points
  by P. J. J. Herings & A. J. J. Talman
• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty path dominance
  by Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent VANNETELBOSCH
• Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels
  by Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Maes, Jasmine & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Equilibrium and matching under price controls
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Positional Externalities
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian
• The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
  by Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel
• Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria in games with almost perfect information
  by Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Maes, Jasmine & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• Equilibrium and Matching under Price Controls
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu
• The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
  by Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel
• Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon; Ana & Vincent Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Risk Allocation under Liquidity Constraints
  by Csóka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• Naïve imitation and partial cooperation in a local public goods model
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Tenev, Anastas & Thuijsman, Frank
• Stability of networks under horizon-K farsightedness
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch
• Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & A. Predtetchinski
• Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies
  by Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel
• Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks
  by Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald
• Adaptive learning in weighted network games
  by Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank
• Liability games
  by Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P.
• Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes–Negishi equilibria
  by Jacques H. Drèze & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings
• Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies
  by Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo Saulle & Christian Seel
• Stability of networks under horizon-K farsightedness
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch
• The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff Concerns
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel
• Persuading Strategic Voters
  by Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik
• The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff Concerns (RM/18/027-revised-)
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian
• An Interior-Point Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
  by Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Li, Peixuan
• Optimality, Equilibrium, and Curb Sets in Decision Problems Without Commitment
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Andrey Meshalkin & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• Coordinating thoughts on coordination failures
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Underemployment of resources and self-fulfilling beliefs: non-Walrasian allocations at Walrasian prices
  by Citanna, A. & Cres, H. & Dreze, J. & Herings, P. J. J. & Villanacci, A.
• The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy
• Perfect information games where each player acts only once
  by Kutay Cingiz & János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
• Heterogeneous Interacting Economic Agentsand Stochastic Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• A globally convergent algorithm to compute all nash equilibria for n-person games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• The private value single item bisection auction
  by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P. J. J. & Vermeulen, A. J. & Müller, R. J.
• On the representation of admissible rationing schemes by rationing functions
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Minimal Exact Balancedness
  by Lohmann, E. R. M. A. & Borm, P. E. M. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Price-Quantity Adjustment in a Keynesian Economy
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Rohde, K. I. M.
• On the connectedness of the set of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Variational Inequality Problems With a Continuum of Solutions : Existence and Computation
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• On the structure of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• World-wide-welfare: a micro-economic analysis of the new economy
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Schinkel, M. P.
• Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H. M.
• A fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z.
• Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• A folk theorem for bargaining games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Meshalkin, A. V. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Equilibria with Coordination Failures
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• The component fairness solution for cycle-free graph games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Intersection theorems with a continuum of intersection points
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Equilibrium adjustment of disequilibrium prices
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Venniker, R.
• Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Social rationalizability
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Universally stable adjustment processes - a unifying approach
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Quantity constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Quantity Constrained Equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Cooperative games in graph structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• The Robustness of the CAPM - A Computational Approach
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Kubler, F.
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies
  by Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P. J. J. & Peters, H. J. M.
• Rigidity of prices, the generic case?
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H. M.
• Constrained Suboptimality When Prices are Non-Competitive
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Konovalov, A.
• Socially structured games and their applications
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• The communication complexity of private value single item auctions
  by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P. J. J. & Müller, R. J. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Endogenously determined price rigidities
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• The Robustness of CAPM-A Computational Approach
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Kubler, F.
• Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Cooperative Games in Graph Structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• General equilibrium and the new neoclassical synthesis
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Limits to arbitrage when market participation is restricted
  by Hens, Th. & Herings, P. J. J. & Predtetchinski, A.
• Continua of Underemployment Equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Dreze, J.
• The computation of a continuum of constrained equilibria
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Talman, A. J. J. & Zang, Z.
• Socially Structured Games and their Applications
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Stationary equilibria in stochastic games : structure, selection, and computation
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Konovalov, A.
• Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van den Elzen, A. H.
• The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• Social Rationalizability
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete
  by Drèze, J. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Time-inconsistent preferences in general equilibrium
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Rohde, K. I. M.
• A note on "macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game"
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• Computing equilibria in finance economies
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Kubler, F.
• Computing equilibria in finance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Schmedders, K.
• The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree
  by van den Brink, R. & Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J.
• On the completeness of complete markets
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Rohde, K. I. M.
• The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• Equilibrium selection in stochastic games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• Stable allocations of risk
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P. J. J. & Kóczy, L. Á.
• Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations
  by Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P. J. J. & Müller, R. J. & Vermeulen, A. J.
• Intertemporal Market Devision: A Case of Alternating Monopoly
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Schinkel, M. P.
• A differentiable homotopy to compute nash equilibria of n-person games
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Peeters, R. J. A. P.
• A globally and universally stable quantity adjustment process for an exchange economy with price rigidities
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• A General Existence Thorem of Zero Points
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Koshevoy, G. A. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• A globally and universally stable price adjustment process
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• A Note on "Stability of Tâtonnement Processes of Short Period Equilibria with Rational Expectations"
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
  by Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P. J. J.
• Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure
  by Herings, P. J. J.
• A Fixed Point Theorem for Discontinuous Functions
  by Herings, P. J. J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z. F.
• A general existence theorem of zero points
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Koshevoy, G. & Talman, A. J. J. & Yang, Z.
• Decentralized Clearing in Financial Networks
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings
• Best-Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market Is Incomplete
  by Herings, P. J. J. & Polemarchakis, H. M.
• Correction to: Perfect information games where each player acts only once
  by Kutay Cingiz & János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski
• Belief Inducibility and Informativeness
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik & Kerman, Toygar
• Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, V.
• Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?
  by Herings, Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Matching with myopic and farsighted players
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent