John C. Harsanyi
(Deceased since 20000809)
Names
first:  John 
middle:  C. 
last:  Harsanyi 
Contact
homepage:  http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1994/ 
Research profile
author of:

Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponents' Utility Function
by John C. Harsanyi 
On Incentives to Forecasters and to Decision Makers Under Uncertainty
by John C. Harsanyi 
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods.
by Harsanyi, J. C. 
Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics.
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion.
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Games with Incomplete Information.
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Comments on Roth's Paper, "Values for Games without Side Payments".
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods
by John C. Harsanyi 
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information
by Harsanyi John C. 
Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
by Harsanyi, John C.
edited by 
Solutions for some bargaining games under the HarsanyiSelten solution theory, part I : Theoretical preliminaries
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Solutions for some bargaining games under the HarsanyiSelten solution theory, part II : Analysis of specific bargaining games
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risktaking
by John C. Harsanyi 
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
by John C. Harsanyi 
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
by John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten 
Games with Incomplete Information
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Autobiography
by Harsanyi, John C. 
A Further Note On Rawls's Theory
by John C. Harsanyi 
Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players
by John C. Harsanyi 
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS
by HARSANYI, JOHN C. 
Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 pages.
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Rejoinder to Professors Kadane and Larkey
by John C. Harsanyi 
Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
by John C. Harsanyi 
CommentSubjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper
by John C. Harsanyi 
Games with Incomplete Information Played by ÜBayesianÝ Players, IIII: Part I. The Basic Model&
by John C. Harsanyi 
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, IIII Part I. The Basic Model
by John C. Harsanyi 
Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and in NonCooperative Games
by John C. Harsanyi 
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
by John C. Harsanyi 
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
by Harsanyi, John C. 
An EquilibriumPoint Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
by John C. Harsanyi 
A Generalized Nash Solution for TwoPerson Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
by John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten 
THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
by John C. Harsanyi 
Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function
by John C. Harsanyi 
On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games
by John C. Harsanyi 
Book reviews
by Bruno Frey & John Harsanyi & James Buchanan & Eric Uslaner & Jeffrey Richelson & Nicholas Miller & Harold Hochman 
The work of John Nash in game theory
by van Damme, E. E. C. & Kühn, H. & Harsanyi, J. & Selten, R. & Weibull, J. & Nash Jr., J. & Hammerstein, P. 
The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory
by Kuhn, H. W. & Harsanyi, J. C. & Selten, R. & Weibull, J. W. & van Damme, E. E. C. & Nash Jr, J. F. & Hammerstein, P. 
Welfare Economics of Variable Tastes
by John C. Harsanyi 
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard 
A noncooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 1: Preliminary discussion
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard 
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard 
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for nperson noncooperative games. Part I
by Harsanyi, John C. 
A noncooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 2: Consequences of desirable properties
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard 
Nonlinear social welfare functions or, Do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality?
by Harsanyi, John C. 
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for nperson noncooperative games. Part II
by Harsanyi, John C. 
A further note on Rawls's theory
by Harsanyi, John C. 
In Defense of Game Theory
by JOHN C. HARSANYI 
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties
by Harsanyi, John C. & Selten, Reinhard 
Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior. By Howard Nigel. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971. Pp. 248. $12.95.)
by Harsanyi, John C. 
[no title]
by Harsanyi, John C. 
Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory
by Harsanyi, John C.