Drew Fudenberg
Names
first:  Drew 
last:  Fudenberg 
Contact
homepage:  http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/drewf 
postal address:  6 Alcott Road 
Affiliations

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
→ Economics Department
 website
 location: Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
Research profile
author of:

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric 
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I. & Maskin, Eric 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean
edited by 
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric 
Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction.
by Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew 
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium.
by Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew 
SelfConfirming Equilibrium.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning.
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Shortterm contracts and longterm agency relationships
by Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric 
Learning to play Bayesian games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks
by Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher 
Learning in games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
The FatCat Effect, the PuppyDog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
Wordofmouth learning
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew 
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang 
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
An Easier Way to Calibrate
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
A "SignalJamming" Theory of Predation
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
An Easier Way to Calibrate
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly.
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
BalancedBudget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Conditional Universal Consistency
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Consistency and cautious fictitious play
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole 
Competing Auctions
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Möbius 
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Conditional Universal Consistency
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
InfiniteHorizon Models of Bargaining with OneSided Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole 
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Learning and Belief Based Trading
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised
by Drew Fudenberg & Dorothy Hodges 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
LearningbyDoing and Market Performance
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
The NeoLuddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
The Theory of Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin 
Open and ClosedLoop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine 
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin 
The NeoLuddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium
by Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi 
Predation Without Reputation
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty
by Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel 
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud 
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole 
Repeated Games with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin 
ShortTerm Contracts and LongTerm Agency Relationships
by Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom 
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
SubgamePerfect Equilibria of Finite and InfiniteHorizon Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps 
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed.
by Fudenberg, D. 
When is Reputation Bad
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Learning Mixed Equilibria.
by Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D. M. 
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Upgrades, TradeIns and BuyBacks
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. & MASKIN, E. 
When Are NonAnonymous Players Negligible?
by Drew Fudenberg 
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games.
by Fudenberg, D. 
When are NonAnonymous Players Negligible
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 
Payoff information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium.
by Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 
Efficiency and Obsevability with LongRun and ShortRun Players.
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning.
by Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D. 
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
by Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. 
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information
by E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg 
SelfConfirming Equilibrium .
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
by Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C. 
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONGRUN AND SHORTRUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
by FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
by D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Learning Mixed Equilibria
by Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M. 
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview.
by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. 
Repeated Games with Longrun and Shortrun Players
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin 
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games.
by D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin. 
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants.
by Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps. 
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K. 
Topologies on types
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen 
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races
by Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean 
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi 
Interim Rationalizability
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris 
Subgameperfect equilibria of finite and infinitehorizon games,
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Openloop and closedloop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean 
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K. 
Limit games and limit equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations
by Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof 
Competing Auctions
by Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg 
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Location Choice in TwoSided Markets with Indivisible Agents
by Robert M. Anderson & Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions
by Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl 
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Topologies on Types
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
An Economists Perspective on MultiAgent Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Imitation processes with small mutations
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. 
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Interim correlated rationalizability
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen 
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
The Nashthreats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics
by Drew Fudenberg 
Topologies on Type
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg 
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam 
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Learning and BeliefBased Trade
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru 
Risk, Delay, and Convex SelfControl Costs
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A DualSelf Model of Impulse Control
by David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg 
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine 
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. 
LearningTheoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
When is reputation bad?
by Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin 
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the HoldUp Problem
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden 
Random matching in adaptive dynamics
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. 
Game Theory
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
The Theory of Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
by Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A. 
Selfconfirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Location choice in twosided markets with indivisible agents
by Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Learning in Extensive Games, I: SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps 
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning
by G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg 
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty
by E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg 
Competing Auctions
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus 
Reexamining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Timing and SelfControl
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Learning Mixed Equilibria
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps 
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown
by Drew Fudenberg & Yuichi Yamamoto 
Word of Mouth Learning
by Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg 
Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps 
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks
by D. Fudenberg & C. Harris 
Competing Auctions
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius 
Learning and Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps 
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play
by Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi 
KnifeEdge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
WordofMouth Communication and Social Learning
by A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg 
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
by D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin 
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam 
Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps 
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin 
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
by Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech 
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
by Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru 
Learning in extensiveform games I. Selfconfirming equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. 
Risk, Delay, and Convex SelfControl Costs
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi 
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi 
Timing and Self‐Control
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview
by Fudenberg, Drew 
NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games
by Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. 
DelayedResponse Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
by Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers 
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
by Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber 
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. 
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew 
Repeated Games with Longrun and Shortrun Players
by Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
NonEquilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors
by Drew Fudenberg 
The NashThreats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction
by Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew 
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium
by Fudenberg, Drew & Diamond, Peter 
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient
by Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
WordofMouth Communication and Social Learning
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn 
Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics
by Imhof, Lorens & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
by Rand, David Gertler & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellingson, Tore & Nowak, Martin A. 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations
by Imhof, Lorens & Fudenberg, Drew 
A DualSelf Model of Impulse Control
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Learning and Equilibrium
by Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew 
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the HoldUp Problem
by Holden, Richard T. & Fudenberg, Drew & Aghion, Philippe 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew 
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Selfconfirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
TitforTat or WinStay, LoseShift?
by Imhof, Lorens & Nowak, Martin & Fudenberg, Drew 
Superstition and Rational Learning
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
KnifeEdge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn 
Topologies on Types
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen 
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
by Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
When is Reputation Bad?
by Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew 
Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics"
by Fudenberg, Drew 
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens 
Interim Correlated Rationalizability
by Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew 
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam 
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
by Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
An Easier Way to Calibrate
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Competing Auctions
by Ellison, Glenn & Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
An approximate dualself model and paradoxes of choice under risk
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents
by Tirole, Jean & Fudenberg, Drew 
Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations
by Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Fudenberg, Drew & Taylor, Christine 
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew 
An Economist's Perspective on MultiAgent Learning
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Conditional Universal Consistency
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
An Approximate DualSelf Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis 
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David 
Winners Don't Punish
by Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin 
SubgamePerfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux 
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility
by Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki 
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion
by Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki 
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
by Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G. 
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms
by Fudenberg, Drew & Archetti, Marco & Green, Jerry R. & Pierce, Naomi Ellen & Yu, Douglas W. & Ãšbeda, Francisco 
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi 
Delayedresponse strategies in repeated games with observation lags
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke 
Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, LA 
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
by Rand, David G. & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna 
SubgamePerfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
by Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi 
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi 
Timing and SelfControl
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
by Maniadis, Zacharias & Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew 
Delayedresponse strategies in repeated games with observation lags
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke 
Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems
by Fudenberg, Drew & Lavine, David K. 
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
by DreberAlmenberg, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G. 
Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion
by Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki 
Rationalizable partitionconfirmed equilibrium
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro 
Altruism and Self Control
by Anna Dreber & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & David G. Rand 
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion
by Fudenberg, Drew & Strzalecki, Tomasz 
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and NonEquilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem
by Drew Fudenberg & Peysakhovich, A. 
An approximate dualself model and paradoxes of choice under risk
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias 
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices
by Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki 
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David Saul 
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi 
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games
by Rand, David G. & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna 
SubgamePerfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux 
An approximate dualself model and paradoxes of choice under risk
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics
by Drew Fudenberg 
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Repeated Games with Longrun and Shortrun Players
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin 
KnifeEdge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps 
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole 
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
WordofMouth Communication and Social Learning
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg 
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole 
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. 
Active learning with a misspecified prior
by Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp 
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and NonEquilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem
by Fudenberg, Drew & Peysakhovich, Alexander 
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He 
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics
by Fudenberg, Drew 
OpenLoop and ClosedLoop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship
by Fudenberg, Drew & Rayo, Luis 
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
by Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech 
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi
edited by 
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE
edited by 
Rationalizable partitionconfirmed equilibrium
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro 
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility
by Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki 
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
The Nashthreats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine
edited by 
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID M. KREPS & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Location choice in twosided markets with indivisible agents
by Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew 
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Whither game theory? Towards a theory of learning in games
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine. 
When is reputation bad?
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine
edited by 
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
by Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A. 
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONGLIVED OPPONENT
by MARCO CELENTANI & DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE & WOLFGANG PESENDORFER
edited by 
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer
edited by 
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE
edited by 
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He 
PlayerCompatible Equilibrium
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He 
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons
by Juan I. Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Testing the DriftDiffusion Model
by Drew Fudenberg & Whitney K. Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki 
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices
by Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki 
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play
by Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang 
Rationalizable partitionconfirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro 
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He 
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play
by Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang 
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
by Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. 
Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He & Lorens Imhof 
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID LEVINE & ERIC MASKIN
edited by 
Efficiency and Observability with LongRun and ShortRun Players
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine
edited by 
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS
by DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE
edited by 
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games
by Rand, David Gertler & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna 
THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
by DREW FUDENBERG & ERIC MASKIN
edited by 
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
by Takahashi, Satoru & Fudenberg, Drew 
“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games
by Arechar, Antonio A. & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G. 
Whither Game Theory?
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine 
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship
by Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo 
Measuring the Completeness of Theories
by Drew Fudenberg & Jon Kleinberg & Annie Liang & Sendhil Mullainathan 
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a SignalingGame Experiment
by Drew Fudenberg & Emanuel Vespa 
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play
by Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang
editor of:

A LongRun Collaboration on LongRun Games
edited by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine