James W Friedman
Names
first: 
James 
middle: 
W 
last: 
Friedman 
Contact
Affiliations

University of North CarolinaChapelHill
→ Department of Economics
 website
 location: Chapel Hill, North Carolina (United States)
Research profile
author of:

CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES.
by FRIEDMAN, J. W. & SAMUELSON, L.

An Informal Aggregative SocioEconomic Simulation of a Latin American Country
by James W. Friedman & Martin Shubik

An Experimental Study in Oligopoly
by James W. Friedman

An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly
by James W. Friedman

Equal Profits as a Fair Division
by James W. Friedman

A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly
by James W. Friedman

An Experimental Research in Oligopoly
by James W. Friedman

Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry.
by Friedman, J. & Thisse, J. F.

SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS.
by FRIEDMAN, J. W. & SAMUELSON, L.

An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions.
by Friedman, J. W. & Samuelson, L.

Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly.
by Hoggatt, Austin C. & Friedman, James W. & Gill, Shlomo

The Interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Industrial Economics.
by Friedman, James W.

Concavity of Production Functions and NonIncreasing Returns to Scale.
by Friedman, James W.

NonCooperative Equilibria in TimeDependent Supergames.
by Friedman, James W.

A Note on the Turnpike Properties of Time Dependent Supergames [NonCooperative Equilibria in Time Dependent Supergames].
by Friedman, James W.

A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly.
by Friedman, James W.

Duality Principles in the Theory of Cost and Production Revisited.
by Friedman, James W.

On Reaction Function Equilibria.
by Friedman, James W.

NonCooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames.
by Friedman, James W.

Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without QuasiConcavity.
by Nishimura, Kazuo & Friedman, James

A Modification of the Folk Theorem to Apply to TimeDependent Supergames.
by Friedman, James W.

Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium
by James W. Friedman

Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation
by James W. Friedman & JacquesFrancois Thisse

Comments on "A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies for Dynamic Environments."
by Friedman, James W.

On Uncertain Lifetimes.
by Barro, Robert J. & Friedman, James W.

Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements
by Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio

Middlemen as guarantors of quality
by Biglaiser, Gary & Friedman, James W.

REVIEWS AND COMMENTS
by Friedman, James W.

Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry
by Friedman, James W. & Thisse, JacquesFrancis

Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach
by Chen, HsiaoChi & Friedman, James W. & Thisse, JacquesFrancois

Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection
by Gary Biglaiser & James W. Friedman

An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions
by Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry

Learning in Games by Random Sampling
by Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio

Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
by Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio

Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations
by Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio

Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
by Friedman, James W. & Samuelson, Larry

On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities
by James W. Friedman

Oligopoly theory
by Friedman, James
edited by

Limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking
by Friedman, James W.

Limit pricing and entry
by W. Friedman, James

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets
by Friedman, James W.

A positive approach to noncooperative games
by Friedman, James W. & Rosenthal, Robert W.

Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
by Friedman, James W.

Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies
by Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry

A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY*
by JAMES W. FRIEDMAN & ISABEL GRILO

A modified folk theorem for timedependent supergames
by FRIEDMAN, James

Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice.
by FRIEDMAN, J. & THISSE, J.F.

Membership Diversity in Club Decisions
by Biglaiser Gary & Friedman James

Oligopoly Theory
by Friedman, James

Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach
by CHEN, HsiaoCh. & FRIEDMAN, J. W. & THISSE, JacquesFrancois

On Uncertain Lifetimes
by Barro, Robert J. & Friedman, James W.

The legacy of Augustin Cournot
by James W. Friedman

COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION
by James Friedman & Philippe JÉhiels & JacquesFrançois Thisses

COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION
by James Friedman & Philippe JÉhiel & JacquesFranÇlois Thisse

James Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England (1986), p. 262.
by Geroski, P. A.

An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions
by Friedman, J. & Samuelson, L.

Collusion and antitrust detection
by FRIEDMAN, J. W. & JÉHIEL, P. & THISSE, J. F.

Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach
by CHEN, H.C. & FRIEDMAN, J. W. & THISSE, J.F.

Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry
by FRIEDMAN, J. W. & THISSE, J.F.

Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation
by FRIEDMAN, James W. & THISSE, JacquesFrançois