Vincent Feltkamp

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• Maastricht School of Management (MSM)
  • website
  • location: Maastricht, Netherlands

Research profile

author of:

• A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion
  by Vincent Feltkamp & Yoram Halevy
• Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and Technology.
  by Feltkamp, V. & Koster, A. & Van Den Nouweland, A. & Borm, P. & Tijs, S.
• Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf Values.
  by Feltkamp, V.
• A Bayesian Approach to Uncentainty Aversion
  by Yoram Halevy & Vincent Feltkamp
• Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf Values.
  by Feltkamp, Vincent
• The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games
  by Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin
• Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions
  by V. Feltkamp & Javier Arin
• A Bayesian Approach to Uncentainty Aversion
  by Yoram Halevy & Vincent Feltkamp
• A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion
  by Feltkamp, Vincent & Halevy, Yoram
• - A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO UNCERTAINTY AVERSION
  by Vincent Feltkamp & Yoram Halevy
• Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes
  by Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V.
• Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games
  by J. Arin & V. Feltkamp
• Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core
  by Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V.
• Coalitional Games with Veto Players: Myopic and Rational Behavior
  by J. Arin & V. Feltkamp & M. Montero
• Minimum cost spanning extension problems : The proportional rule and the decentralized rule
  by Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S. H. & Muto, S.
• Linear production with transport of products, resources and technology
  by Feltkamp, V. & van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M. & Borm, P. E. M. & Tijs, S. H. & Koster, A.
• A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion
  by Yoram Halevy & Vincent Feltkamp
• Controlled communication networks
  by Feltkamp, V. & van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M.
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
  by Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V.
• Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
  by Feltkamp, V.
• On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems
  by Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S. H. & Muto, S.
• Cloud Enabled Business Model Innovation: Gaining Strategic Competitive Advantage as the Market Emerges
  by Jacques W. Brook & Vincent Feltkamp & Martin van der Meer
• Politieke machtsverhoudingen
  by van Damme, E. E. C. & Feltkamp, V. & Hurkens, J. P. M. & Strausz, R.
• Bird's tree allocations revisited
  by Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S. H. & Muto, S.
• Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and Technology
  by Feltkamp, V.
• A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players
  by J. Arin & V. Feltkamp & M. Montero
• On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players
  by Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Feltkamp, Vincent
• Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game
  by Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Feltkamp, Vincent