Hülya K. K. Eraslan

Names

first:	Hülya
middle:	K. K.
last:	Eraslan

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

per31

Contact

homepage:

http://he6.web.rice.edu/

Affiliations

Rice University / Department of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:10:p:2941-74)
by T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & H?lya Eraslan
Dynamic Agenda Setting (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:1-32)
by Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model with risk-averse players (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:29-40)
by Hülya Eraslan
Introduction (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:3-5)
by Hülya Eraslan & Kazuo Nishimura & Makoto Yano
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:cer:papers:wp570)
by T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan & Jan Zapal
Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic? (RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-001)
by Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio
Deliberation and Security Design in Bankruptcy (RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-029)
by Eraslan, Hulya & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Yilmaz, Bilge
An Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy under Chapter 13 (RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-030)
by Eraslan, Hulya & Kosar, Gizem & Li, Weli & Sarte, Pierre-Daniel
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-031)
by Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya & Zapal, Jan
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model with Risk Averse Players (RePEc:ecl:riceco:15-001)
by Eraslan, Hulya
Dynamic Agenda Setting (RePEc:ecl:riceco:15-002)
by Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:ecl:riceco:15-003)
by Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya & Zapal, Jan
Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2121)
by Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3185)
by Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya & Zapal, Jan
A Structural Model of Government Formation (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:71:y:2003:i:1:p:27-70)
by Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo
Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:4-5:p:893-907)
by Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:11-30)
by Eraslan, Hulya
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:31-48)
by Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:117:y:2004:i:1:p:29-54)
by Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew
Information-based trade (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1675-1703)
by Bond, Philip & Eraslan, Hülya
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2195-2222)
by Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew
Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:167:y:2017:i:c:p:148-176)
by Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya & Zápal, Jan
Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:171:y:2017:i:c:p:293-315)
by Eraslan, Hülya & Merlo, Antonio
Bicameralism and Government Formation (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.81)
by Antonio Merlo & Daniel Diermeier & Hülya Eraslan
An anatomy of U.S. personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13 (RePEc:fip:fednsr:764)
by Hulya Eraslan & Gizem Koşar & Wenli Li & Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte
The anatomy of U.S. personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13 (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:07-31)
by Wenli Li & Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte
An anatomy of u.s. Personal bankruptcy under chapter 13 (RePEc:fip:fedpwp:14-33)
by Hulya Eraslan & Gizem Koşar & Wenli Li & Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte
The anatomy of U.S. personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13 (RePEc:fip:fedrwp:07-05)
by Hulya Eraslan & Wenli Li & Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates From A Bargaining Model (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:2:p:659-681)
by Hülya K. K. Eraslan
Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals (RePEc:jhu:papers:547)
by Philip Bond & Hulya Eraslan
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining (RePEc:jhu:papers:562)
by Andrew McLennan & Hï¿½lya Eraslan
Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:jhu:papers:563)
by Ying Chen & Hï¿½lya Eraslan
Mandatory Versus Discretionary Spending: the Status Quo Effect (RePEc:jhu:papers:603)
by T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hï¿½lya Eraslan
Informational Loss in Bundled Bargainings (RePEc:jhu:papers:605)
by Ying Chen & Hï¿½lya Eraslan
Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1021)
by Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan
Mandatory Versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1229)
by T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan
Informational Loss in Bundled Bargaining (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1234)
by Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1516)
by T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan & Jan Zapal
Dynamic Agenda Setting (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1517)
by Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22457)
by T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hülya K. Eraslan & Jan Zápal
Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30434)
by Marina Agranov & Hülya Eraslan & Chloe Tergiman
Measuring the Welfare Gains from Cardinal-Preference Mechanisms in School Choice (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35658)
by Hülya Eraslan & Jeremy T. Fox & YingHua He
Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals (RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:2:p:459-490)
by Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan
The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies (RePEc:pen:papers:03-037)
by Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo
Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:07-010)
by Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo
Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version (RePEc:pen:papers:07-014)
by Philip Bond & HÃ¼lya Eraslan
Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic? (RePEc:pen:papers:14-003)
by HÃ¼lya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo
The Dynamics of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy (RePEc:red:sed006:378)
by Hulya Eraslan & Wenli Li & Pierre-Daniel Sarte
Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals (RePEc:red:sed007:167)
by Hulya Eraslan & Philip Bond
A Structural Model of Chapter 13 Personal Bankruptcy (RePEc:red:sed007:972)
by Wenli Li & Pierre-Daniel Sarte & Hulya Eraslan
Information Based Trade (RePEc:red:sed008:1012)
by Hulya Eraslan & Philip Bond
Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetics? (RePEc:red:sed009:279)
by Antonio Merlo & Hulya Eraslan
Efficiency of Mandatory and Discretionary Spending (RePEc:red:sed014:464)
by Ying Chen & Jan Zapal & Hulya Eraslan & Renee Bowen
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (RePEc:red:sed015:843)
by Ying Chen & Jan Zapal & Hulya Eraslan & Renee Bowen
Informational loss in bundled bargaining (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:3:p:338-362)
by Ying Chen & HÃ¼lya Eraslan
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information (RePEc:the:publsh:821)
by , & ,

The profile is maintained by Hülya K. K. Eraslan

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/per31/