Peter M. DeMarzo
Names
| first: |
Peter |
| middle: |
M. |
| last: |
DeMarzo |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (weight: 50%)
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Stanford University
/ Graduate School of Business (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:7:p:2955-79)
by Viral V. Acharya & Peter DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer - Test Design and Minimum Standards (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:6:p:2173-2207)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:936-959)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a ContinuousâTime Agency Model (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:61:y:2006:i:6:p:2681-2724)
by PETER M. DeMARZO & YULIY SANNIKOV - Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:67:y:2012:i:6:p:2295-2340)
by Peter M. Demarzo & Michael J. Fishman & Zhiguo He & Neng Wang - American Finance Association (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:71:y:2016:i:6:p:3121-3121)
by Peter DeMarzo - The Leverage Ratchet Effect (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:73:y:2018:i:1:p:145-198)
by Anat R. Admati & Peter M. Demarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer - Presidential Address: Collateral and Commitment (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:74:y:2019:i:4:p:1587-1619)
by Peter M. Demarzo - Leverage Dynamics without Commitment (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:76:y:2021:i:3:p:1195-1250)
by Peter M. Demarzo & Zhiguo He - Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11538)
by Kaniel, Ron & DeMarzo, Peter - Contracting in Peer Networks (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16177)
by Kaniel, Ron & DeMarzo, Peter - Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6985)
by DeMarzo, Peter & Acharya, Viral & Kremer, Ilan - Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8680)
by DeMarzo, Peter & Acharya, Viral & Kremer, Ilan - Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions (RePEc:ecl:stabus:1719)
by Zwiebel, Jeffrey H. & Vayanos, Dimitri & DeMarzo, Peter M. - Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive (RePEc:ecl:stabus:2065)
by Admati, Anat R. & DeMarzo, Peter M. & Hellwig, Martin F. & Pfleiderer, Paul - The Leverage Ratchet Effect (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3029)
by Admati, Anat R. & DeMarzo, Peter M. & Hellwig, Martin F. & Pfleiderer, Paul - Risking Other People's Money: Gambling, Limited Liability, and Optimal Incentives (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3149)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. & Livdan, Dmitry & Tchistyi, Alexei - Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3432)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. & Sannikov, Yuliy - The Leverage Ratchet Effect (RePEc:ecl:stabus:3435)
by Admati, Anat R. & DeMarzo, Peter M. & Hellwig, Martin F. & Pfleiderer, Paul - Interest Rate Risk in Banking (RePEc:ecl:stabus:4194)
by DeMarzo, Peter & Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Nagel, Stefan - The Leverage Ratchet Effect (RePEc:ecl:stabus:repec:ecl:stabus:3029)
by Admati, Anat R. & DeMarzo, Peter M. & Hellwig, Martin F. & Pfleiderer, Paul - Computing Equilibria When Asset Markets Are Incomplete (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:64:y:1996:i:1:p:1-27)
by Brown, Donald J & DeMarzo, Peter M & Eaves, B Curtis - A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:1:p:65-100)
by Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie - Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:637)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer - Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:641)
by Andrzej Skrzypacz & Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer - A Model of Persuasion - With Implications for Financial Markets (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1635)
by Peter M. deMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel - The Enforcement Policy of a Self-Regulatory Organization (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1636)
by Peter deMarzo & Michael Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty - Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:72-100)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. - Robust option pricing: Hannan and Blackwell meet Black and Scholes (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:410-434)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. & Kremer, Ilan & Mansour, Yishay - An extension of the Modigliani-Miller theorem to stochastic economies with incomplete markets and interdependent securities (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:45:y:1988:i:2:p:353-369)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. - Corporate financial hedging with proprietary information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:2:p:261-286)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. & Duffie, Darrell - Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:80:y:1998:i:1:p:123-152)
by DeMarzo, Peter & Skiadas, Costis - Technological innovation and real investment booms and busts (RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:85:y:2007:i:3:p:735-754)
by DeMarzo, Peter & Kaniel, Ron & Kremer, Ilan - Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default (RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:8:y:1999:i:4:p:241-269)
by Bizer, David S. & DeMarzo, Peter M. - Computing equilibria of GEI by relocalization on a Grassmann manifold (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:26:y:1996:i:4:p:479-497)
by Demarzo, Peter M. & Eaves, B. Curtis - Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions (RePEc:ehl:lserod:454)
by DeMarzo, Peter M. & Vayanos, Dimitri & Zwiebel, Jeffrey - Coalitions and Sustainable Social Norms in Repeated Games (RePEc:fth:stante:529)
by DeMarzo, P. - Finance d'entreprise (RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00399838)
by Jonathan Berk & Peter de Marzo & Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Nicolas Couderc - Finance d'entreprise (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00399838)
by Jonathan Berk & Peter de Marzo & Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Nicolas Couderc - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:21:y:1996:i:1:p:26-43 (article)
- Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive (RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_42)
by Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer - The Leverage Ratchet Effect (RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2013_13)
by Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer - Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive (RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2013_23)
by Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer - A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10615)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Yuliy Sannikov - Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10891)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16485)
by Viral V. Acharya & Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer - Leverage Dynamics without Commitment (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22799)
by Peter DeMarzo & Zhiguo He - Contracting in Peer Networks (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28378)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ron Kaniel - Sovereign Debt Ratchets and Welfare Destruction (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28599)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Zhiguo He & Fabrice Tourre - Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:118:y:2003:i:3:p:909-968.)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel - Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder (RePEc:oup:restud:v:60:y:1993:i:3:p:713-734.)
by Peter M. DeMarzo - Self-Regulation and Government Oversight (RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:3:p:687-706)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty - Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts (RePEc:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:1:p:182-236.)
by Peter M. Demarzo & Yuliy Sannikov - The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:18:y:2005:i:1:p:1-35)
by Peter M. DeMarzo - Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:20:y:2007:i:1:p:151-188)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman - Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:20:y:2007:i:6:p:2079-2128)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman - Relative Wealth Concerns and Financial Bubbles (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2008:i:1:p:19-50)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ron Kaniel & Ilan Kremer - Portfolio Liquidity and Security Design with Private Information
[Strategic liquidity supply and security design] (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:34:y:2021:i:12:p:5841-5885.)
by Peter M DeMarzo & David M Frankel & Yu Jin - Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting (RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:8:y:1995:i:3:p:743-71)
by DeMarzo, Peter M & Duffie, Darrell - Dynamic agency and the q theory of investment (RePEc:red:sed008:1070)
by Zhiguo He & Neng Wang & Mike Fishman & Peter DeMarzo - On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:1:p:1-24)
by Peter DeMarzo & Costis Skiadas - Sovereign Debt Ratchets and Welfare Destruction (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/724571)
by Peter DeMarzo & Zhiguo He & Fabrice Tourre - Sequential Banking (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:1:p:41-61)
by Bizer, David S & DeMarzo, Peter M - The Optimal Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:106:y:1998:i:3:p:602-632)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty - Ownership Dynamics and Asset Pricing with a Large Shareholder (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:114:y:2006:i:4:p:774-815)
by Peter M. DeMarzo & Branko Uro